Biological warfare
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| Radiological warfare edit (https://academickids.com:443/encyclopedia/index.php?title=Template:WMD&action=edit) |
Biological warfare, also known as germ warfare, is the use of any organism (bacteria, virus or other disease-causing organism) or toxin found in nature, as a weapon of war. It is meant to incapacitate or kill an adversary.
The creation and stockpiling of biological weapons is outlawed by the 1972 Biological Weapons Convention, signed by over 100 states, because a successful attack could conceivably result in thousands, possibly even millions, of deaths and could cause severe disruptions to societies and economies. Oddly enough, the convention prohibits only creation and storage, but not usage, of these weapons. However, the consensus among military analysts is that, except in the context of bioterrorism, biological warfare is militarily of little use.
The main problem is that a biological warfare attack would take days to implement, and therefore, unlike a nuclear or chemical attack, would not immediately stop an advancing army. As a strategic weapon, biological warfare is again militarily problematic, because unless it is used to poison enemy civilian towns, it is difficult to prevent the attack from spreading, either to allies or to the attacker, and a biological warfare attack invites immediate massive retaliation, usually in the same form.
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History
The use of biological agents is not new, but before the 20th century, biological warfare took three main forms:
- deliberate poisoning of food and water with infectious material
- use of microorganisms, toxins or animals, living or dead, in a weapon system
- use of biologically inoculated fabrics
Biological warfare has been practised repeatedly throughout history. During the 6th Century B.C., The Assyrians poisoned enemy wells with a fungus that would make the enemy delusional. In 184 BC, Hannibal of Carthage had clay pots filled with poisonous snakes and instructed his soldiers to throw the pots onto the decks of Pergamene ships.
Historical accounts from medieval Europe detail the use of infected animal carcasses, by Mongols, Turks and other groups, to infect enemy water supplies. Prior to the bubonic plague epidemic known as the Black Death, Mongol and Turkish armies were reported to have catapulted diseased corpses into besieged cities.
During the Middle Ages, victims of the bubonic plague were used for biological attacks, often by flinging their corpses and excrement over castle walls using catapults. The last known incident of using plague corpses for biological warfare occurred in 1710, when Russian forces attacked the Swedes by flinging plague-infected corpses over the city walls of Reval.
Much, or even most of the Native American population was decimated after contact with the Old World due to the introduction of many different fatal diseases. The British army at least once used smallpox as weapon, when they gave contaminated blankets to the Lenape. It is suspected but not confirmed that biological warfare was used against the Indians at other times as well.
Native peoples in Aptos gave to Spaniards gifts of freshly cut flowers wrapped in leaves of poison oak.
During the United States Civil War, General Sherman reported that Confederate forces shot farm animals in ponds upon which the Union depended for drinking water.
Use of such weapons was banned in international law by the Geneva Protocol of 1925. The 1972 Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention extended the ban to almost all production, storage and transport. It is, however, believed that since the signing of the convention the number of countries capable of producing such weapons has increased.
During the Sino-Japanese War (1937-1945) and World War II, Unit 731 of the Imperial Japanese Army conducted human experimentation on thousands, mostly Chinese. In military campaigns, the Japanese army used biological weapons on Chinese soldiers and civilians. This employment was largely viewed as ineffective due to inefficient delivery systems. However, new information has surfaced within the last decade, which alleges a more active Japanese usage. For example, firsthand accounts testify the Japanese infected civilians through the distribution of plagued foodstuffs, such as dumplings and vegetables. There are also reports of contaminated water supplies. Such estimates report over 580,000 victims, largely due to plague and cholera outbreaks. In addition, repeated seasonal outbreaks after the conclusion of the war bring the death toll much higher.
In response to suspected biological weapons development in Germany and Japan, the United States, United Kingdom, and Canada initiated a BW development program in 1941 that resulted in the weaponization of anthrax, brucellosis, and botulinum toxin. The center for U.S. military BW research was Fort Detrick, Maryland. Some biological and chemical weapons defense research was also conducted at "Dugway Proving Grounds" in Utah. Research carried out in the United Kingdom during World War II left a Scottish Island contaminated with anthrax for the next 48 years.
When biological and chemical weapons become too old, they sometimes need to be disposed of. Many NATO nations use the U.S. chemical weapons disposal facility on the tiny Johnston Atoll located in the middle of the Pacific.
Considerable research on the topic was performed by the United States, the Soviet Union (see Biopreparat), and probably other major nations throughout the Cold War era, though it is generally believed that such weapons were never used. This view was challenged by China and North Korea, who accused the United States of large-scale field testing of biological weapons against them during the Korean War (1950-1953). Their accusation is substantiated by Stephen Endicott and Edward Hagerman in 'The United States and Biological Warfare: secrets of the early Cold War and Korea' (Bloomington, Indiana University Press, 1998). In 1972, the U.S. signed the Biological and Toxic Weapons Convention, which banned "development, production, stockpiling, and use of microbes or their poisonous products except in amounts necessary for protective and peaceful research."
In 1986, the U.S. government spent $42 million on research for developing defenses against infectious diseases and toxins, ten times more money than was spent in 1981. The money went to 24 U.S. universities in hopes of developing strains on anthrax, Rift Valley fever, Japanese encephalitis, tularemia, shigella, botulin, and Q fever. When the Biology Department at MIT voted to refuse Pentagon funds for biotech research, the Reagan administration forced it to reverse its decision by threatening to cut off other funds.
There have been reports that the United States Army has been developing weapons-grade anthrax spores at Dugway Proving Ground, a chemical and biological defense testing facility in Utah, since at least as early as 1992. Under the BWC, nations are permitted to develop small amounts of BW agents for the purpose of defensive research. The United States maintains a stated national policy of never using biological weapons under any circumstances since November 1969 President Nixon.
references for this section include (Eitzen & Takafuji, 1997)
Biological weapons characteristics
Ideal characteristics of biological weapons are high infectivity, high potency, availability of vaccines, and delivery as an aerosol.
Diseases most likely to be considered for use as biological weapons are contenders because of their lethality (if delivered efficiently), and robustness (making aerosol delivery feasible).
The biological agents used in biological weapons can often be manufactured quickly and easily. The primary difficulty is not the production of the biological agent but delivery in an infective form to a vulnerable target.
For example, anthrax is considered an excellent agent. We use it here for discussion because it is historically important, and enough information is public that this discussion can't be used as a manual. First, it forms hardy spores, perfect for dispersal aerosols. Second, pneumonic (lung) infections of anthrax usually do not cause secondary infections in other people. Thus, the effect of the agent is usually confined to the target. A pneumonic anthrax infection starts with ordinary "cold" symptoms and quickly becomes lethal, with a fatality rate that is 80% or higher. Finally, friendly personnel can be protected with suitable antibiotics or vaccines.
A mass attack using anthrax would require the creation of aerosol particles of 1.5 to 5 micrometres. Too large and the aerosol would be filtered out by the respiratory system. Too small and the aerosol would be inhaled and exhaled. Also, at this size, nonconductive powders tend to clump and cling because of electrostatic charges. This hinders dispersion. So, the material must be treated with silica to insulate and discharge the charges. The aerosol must be delivered so that rain and sun does not rot it, and yet the human lung can be infected. There are other technological difficulties as well.
Diseases considered for weaponization, or known to be weaponized include anthrax, Ebola, Bubonic Plague, Cholera, Tularemia, Brucellosis, Q fever, Machupo, VEE, and Smallpox. Naturally-occurring toxins that can be used as weapons include Ricin, SEB, Botulism Toxin, and many Mycotoxins.
Attacking crops
Instead of targeting humans, biological weapons could be designed to target food crops. Distributing a (possibly genetically enhanced) pathogen to ruin a country's harvest could have dire consequences for the country's ability to sustain itself. Biological agents used to target plants are called Bioherbicides, or Mycoherbicides if the agent is a fungus.
Protective measures
The primary civil defense against biological weaponry is to wash one's hands whenever one moves to a different building or set of people, and avoid touching door knobs, walls, the ground and one's mouth and nose. Washing literally sends the germs down the drain.
More exotic methods include decontamination, usually done with household chlorine bleach (5% solution of sodium hypochlorite). One useful decontamination is to leave shoes in an entranceway and make people wade and handwash in a footbath of bleach. Another useful technique is to periodically decontaminate floors and door knobs.
Medical methods of civil defense include stockpiles of antibiotics and vaccines, and training for quick, accurate diagnoses and treatment. Many weaponized diseases are unfamiliar to general practitioners.
Positive pressure shelters are possible but not cost-effective except for the most important installations. This is because in most attacks, the agent will disperse in a long narrow ellipse downwind from the release point. Persons outside the ellipse will not be affected except by secondary infection. Persons within the release ellipse cannot be helped by civil defense measures. They need medical diagnosis and treatment.
The role of public health departments and disease surveillance
It is important to note that all of the classical and modern biological weapons organisms are animal diseases, the only exception being smallpox. Thus, in any use of biological weapons, it is highly likely that animals will become ill either simultaneously with, or perhaps earlier than humans. Indeed, in the largest biological weapons "accident" known -- the anthrax outbreak in Sverdlovsk (now Yekaterinburg) in the Soviet Union in 1971, sheep became ill with anthrax as far as 200 kilometers from the release point of the organism from a military facility in the southeastern portion of the city (known as Compound 15 and still off limits to visitors today).
Thus, a robust surveillance system involving human clinicians and veterinarians may identify a bioweapons attack early in the course of an epidemic, permitting the prophylaxis of disease in the vast majority of people (and/or animals) exposed but not yet ill. For example in the case of anthrax, it is likely that by 24 -36 hours after an attack, some small percentage of individuals (those with compromised immune system or who had received a large dose of the organism due to proximity to the release point) will become ill with classical symptoms and signs (including a virtually unique chest X-ray finding, often recognized by public health officials if they receive timely reports). By making this data available to local public health officials in real-time, most models of anthrax epidemics indicate that more than 80% of an exposed population can receive antibiotic treatment before becoming symptomatic, and thus avoiding the high mortality of the disease.
Examples of biological warfare
1984 Rajneeshee salmonella attack
In the small town of The Dalles, Oregon, followers of the Bhagwan Shri Rajneesh (the Rajneeshee Cult) attempted to control a local election by infecting salad bars with salmonella. The attack caused about 900 people to get sick. It is considered the first ever bioterrorism case in US history.
2001 anthrax attack
In September and October of 2001, several cases of anthrax broke out in the United States in the 2001 anthrax attacks, caused deliberately. This was a well-publicized act of bioterrorism. It motivated efforts to define biodefense and biosecurity, where more limited definitions of biosafety had focused on unintentional or accidental impacts of agricultural and medical technologies.
See also
- Biological Weapons Convention
- Chemical warfare
- Asymmetric warfare
- Biosecurity
- Biological agent
- Antibiotic resistance
- Fort Detrick
- USAMRIID
- Unit 731
- Geneva Protocol
- Bioherbicide
- Mycoherbicide
- Rihab Rashid Taha
- List of environment topics
References
- Template:Book reference
- Template:Book reference
- Eitzen, Edward M., Jr., M.D., M.P.H., FACEP, FAAP; and Takafuji, Ernest T., M.D., M.P.H.; Brigadier General Russ Zajtchuk, MC, U.S. Army. (ed.) (1997). Historical Overview of Biological Warfare (http://www.nbc-med.org/SiteContent/HomePage/WhatsNew/MedAspects/Ch-18electrv699.pdf). In Medical Aspects of Chemical and Biological Warfare (http://www.nbc-med.org/SiteContent/HomePage/WhatsNew/MedAspects/contents.html), pp. 415-423. Office of The Surgeon General, Washington, DC.
External links
- BiodefenseEducation.org (http://www.biodefenseeducation.com)
- Info on chemical and biological weapons for emergency and security personnel (http://www.cbwinfo.com)
- Potomac Institute Course Notes (http://www.potomacinstitute.org/pubs/bt1proc.pdf)
- The Terrorist Threat, Parts I, II & III (http://www.sgaus.org/dahlke.htm)
- US Army Treatment Summary Sheet (http://www.emergency.com/2001/bio-treatment.htm)
- WHO: Health Aspects of Biological and Chemical Weapons (http://www.who.int/emc/pdfs/BIOWEAPONS_FULL_TEXT2.pdf)
- Monterey Institute of International Studies article on the Yellow Rain controversy (http://cns.miis.edu/pubs/week/020805.htm)
- Lewis, Susan K. "History of Biowarfare." NOVA Online, 2001. http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/nova/bioterror/history.html (2003–04–24)
- DECONference: Yearly conference on decontamination, including a decontamination drill (http://deconference.com)
- Drug Preparedness and Response to Terrorism (http://www.fda.gov/cder/drugprepare/default.htm)da:Biologiske våben
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