Arthur Zimmermann
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- For other uses of "Zimmermann", see Zimmermann (disambiguation)
Arthur Zimmermann (October 5, 1864 - June 6, 1940) was Germany's Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs from November 22, 1916, until his resignation on August 6, 1917. His name is associated with the Zimmermann Telegram during World War I. However, he was also closely involved in plans to support an Irish rebellion and to help the Communists undermine Tsarist Russia.
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His career
He was born in Marggrabova (now part of Olecko, Mazury, Poland) in East Prussia, and died of pneumonia in Berlin. He studied law from 1884 to 1887 in Knigsberg, East Prussia, and Leipzig. A period as a junior lawyer followed and later he received his doctorate of law. In 1893, he took up a career in diplomacy and entered the consular service in Berlin. He arrived in China in 1896 (Canton in 1898), and rose to the rank of consul in 1900. While stationed in the Far East, he witnessed the Boxer Rebellion in China.
Later he was called to the Foreign Office, became Under Secretary of State in 1911, and on November 24 1916, he accepted his confirmation as Secretary of State, succeeding Gottlieb von Jagow in this position. Actually, he had assumed a large share of his superior's negotiations with foreign envoys for several years prior to his appointment because of von Jagow's reservedness in office. He was the first non-aristocrat to serve as foreign secretary.
The Kronrat
As acting secretary he had also taken part in the so-called Kronrat, the deliberations in 1914, with Kaiser Wilhelm II and Chancellor Theobald von Bethmann-Hollweg, in which the decision was taken to support Austria-Hungary after the assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand, Archduke of Austria at Sarajevo, which ultimately was to lead to the outbreak of war. He later disavowed the name Kronrat since it was the Kaiser's opinion that was decisive in the discussion, but with which Bethmann-Hollweg and Zimmermann concurred.
His resignation
On August 6, 1917, he resigned as foreign secretary and was succeeded by Richard von Khlmann.
One of the causes of his resignation was the famous telegram he sent on January 16 1917. Two-and a half years into World War I, the United States had maintained a status of strict neutrality while the Allied armies had been fighting those of the Central Powers in the trenches of northern France and Belgium. Although President Woodrow Wilson had been re-elected – winning the election on the slogan, "He kept us out of the war" – it became increasingly difficult to maintain that position.
After the Royal Navy had been engaged in a successful naval blockade against all German shipping for some time, the German Supreme High Command concluded that only a total submarine offensive would break the stranglehold. Although the decision was made on January 9, 1917, the Americans were not informed of the operation until January 31. The Germans abrogated their Sussex pledge (not to sink merchant ships without due warning and to save human lives wherever possible) and began an unrestricted U-boat campaign on February 1, 1917. Since it was obvious that US shipping would also come under attack in the course of this operation, it became just a matter of time before the USA was drawn into the conflict.
See Zimmermann telegram for a detailed description of the telegram and the events surrounding it.
Background to the telegram
Germany had been pursuing various interests in Mexico from the beginning of the 20th century. Although a latecomer in the area, with Spain, Britain, and France having established themselves there centuries earlier, the Kaiser's Germany too attempted to secure a continuing presence. This entailed many different approaches to the Mexican Republic and its changing, often revolutionary governments as well as, if not always, assuring the United States of Germany's peaceful intentions. German diplomacy in that area depended on sympathetic relations with the Mexican government of the day. During Arthur Zimmermann's period in office, among the options discussed, Germany offered to improve communications between the two nations and suggested that Mexico purchase German submarines for its navy.
After Francisco Villa's cross-border raids into New Mexico, President Wilson sent a punitive expedition into Mexico to pursue the raiders. It was then, that the Germans were encouraged to believe (mistakenly) that this and other concerns in the area, would tie up US resources and military operations for some time to come, sufficiently to justify the overtures made by Arthur Zimmermann in the telegram to the Venustiano Carranza government. The proposals included an agreement for a German alliance with Mexico, while Germany would still try to maintain a state of neutrality with the United States. If this policy were to fail, the note suggested, the Mexican government should make common cause with Germany, try to persuade the Japanese government to join the new alliance, and attack the US. Germany on its part would promise financial assistance and the restoration of its former territories of Texas, New Mexico and Arizona to Mexico.
It is against this background that the Zimmermann telegram has to be seen.
The sending of the telegram
On 16 January 1917 Foreign Secretary Zimmermann sent the telegram to the German ambassador in Washington, Johann von Bernstorff, who in his turn forwarded it secretly to the German ambassador in Mexico, Heinrich von Eckardt.
British intelligence intercepted it on 17 January, but were unable to decipher it at that stage as it had been sent in a new code which neither the British cryptographers nor the German embassy in Mexico possessed. It was only when it had been transcribed for von Eckardt into the old code, which too was duly intercepted, that the British were able to compare the two codes and so were able to read the latest code and learn the contents of the message.
It was at this stage that British intelligence realized that to transmit the telegram without delay to President Wilson would indicate to the Germans that Britain was able to decipher their codes, a fact which would jeopardize British intelligence operations. A British agent then obtained a copy of the Mexican version of the cable, with slight variations in the text, and thus rendered it plausible how Britain knew of the telegram.
Its effect
On February 24, the telegram was finally delivered to the US ambassador in Britain, Walter Page, who two days later retransmitted it to President Wilson. On March 1, the United States Government passed the text of the telegram to the press.
At first, some sectors of the US papers, especially those of the Hearst press empire, tried to claim that the telegram was a forgery by British intelligence in an attempt to persuade the US government to enter the war on Britain's side. This opinion was reinforced by German and Mexican diplomats, as well as pro-German and pacifist opinion-formers in the United States. However, on March 29 1917, Arthur Zimmermann gave a speech confirming the text of the telegram and so put an end to all speculation as to its authenticity.
By that time a number of US ships had been torpedoed with heavy loss of life, and on April 2, President Wilson asked Congress to agree to declare war on Germany, and on April 6 Congress complied. The United States had entered World War I on the Allied side.
Arthur Zimmermann's speech
The speech was intended to explain his side of the situation. He began that he had not written a letter to Carranza but had given instructions to the German ambassador via a "route that had appeared to him to be a safe one".
He also said that despite the submarine offensive, he had hoped that the USA would remain neutral. His instructions (to the Mexican government) were only to be carried out after the US declared war, and he believed his instructions to be "absolutely loyal as regards the US". In fact, he blamed President Wilson for breaking off relations with Germany "with extraordinary roughness" after the telegram was received, and that therefore the German ambassador "no longer had the opportunity to explain the German attitude, and that the US government had declined to negotiate".
Thinking that the USA would remain neutral while their ships were being attacked does indicate extreme naivety on Arthur Zimmermann's part. However, it is possible he was hoping (in an equally nave way) the world would see the desperate situation Germany had found itself in during the blockade of German shipping, and it would bring some understanding to that situation.
There was honesty in his speech since he would have had occasion to reflect on the impact of the telegram and its aftereffects in the meantime, yet still was prepared to present its original ideas. However, it also revealed he was seriously misinformed about the real strength of the United States vis--vis its southern neighbour, but that was the fault of the German intelligence services.
Mexico's reply
Later, a general assigned by Carranza to assess the realities of a Mexican takeover of their former provinces came to the conclusion that it would not work. Taking over the three states would almost certainly cause future problems and possibly war with the US; Mexico would also be unable to accommodate a large Anglo population within its borders; and Germany would not be able to supply the arms needed in the hostilities that would surely arise.
Carranza declined Zimmermann's proposals on April 14.
The fact-finding mission of Nuncio Pacelli
At the end of June 1917, Zimmermann found the first real opportunity for paving the way to peace negotiations during his period of administration. At several meetings with Nuncio Eugenio Pacelli (later to become Pope Pius XII) and Uditore Szioppa, who were on a fact-finding mission, Chancellor Bethmann-Hollweg and Arthur Zimmermann outlined their plans. There would be no annexations of territories, no border adjustments with Russia, Poland was to remain an independent state, all occupied areas of France and Belgium were to be evacuated, and the cession of Lorraine to France. The only exception in return was to be the restitution of all former German colonies to Germany.
That none of these plans came to fruition was due to the fact that neither the two German participants would be very much longer in office.
As an afterthought, it was Chancellor von Bethmann-Hollweg's belief – unlike that of the General Staff's – that once the United States entered the war, the prospects for Germany would indeed be bleak.
Nurse Edith Cavell's execution
Arthur Zimmermann as foreign secretary also felt called upon to comment on Edith Cavell's execution by firing squad on October 12 1915. The incident had caused a sensation in the UK and US press and political capital was being made out of it. He began by saying that "it was a pity that Miss Cavell had to be executed", but that it was necessary.
He continued by saying that although it was a terrible thing that the woman had been executed, consideration should be given to the consequences if a state, particularly one at war, were to leave women unpunished after they had committed crimes aimed at the safety of its armies. No criminal court in the world – least of all one with jurisdiction over the laws of war – would make such a distinction (as man and woman are equal before the law), etc. He had before him the court's verdict and was "convinced that no court in the world would have given any other verdict", and so on.
Looked at in those days, although it was part of his office to defend the indefensible, to the world it would have been easy to condemn him for this, especially since these crimes in peacetime almost certainly would have been no crimes at all. But with hindsight, we have gained some understanding of some of the processes which caused these "miscarriages" of justice, especially since shooting soldiers for "cowardice before the enemy", for example, was another kind of offence punishable by firing squad that was practiced in all armies.
Peace in the East
In March 1917, with the imminent collapse of the Russian front, Zimmermann took steps to promote Peace in the East with the Russians, a proposal that was of immense importance to Germany at the time. The foreign secretary set forth the following: regulations for frontline contacts with the opposite side; reciprocal withdrawal of the occupied areas; an amicable agreement about Poland, Lithuania and Kurland; and a promise to aid Russia in its reconstruction and rehabilitation. Last not least, Lenin and the emigré revolutionaries would be allowed to pass through Germany to Russia in a sealed train. These proposals once carried out, would free Germany's armies in the east and allow them to be concentrated in the west, a master-stroke that would reinforce the German western front vastly.
It did not only do that but also left the world with a huge problem – the Bolshevik Revolution.
See also
External links
- Mexican-German relations, 1910-1918 (http://www.wibemedia.com/mexico-germany.html)
- The Zimmermann speech (http://www.firstworldwar.com/source/zimmermann_speech.htm)
- Japanese Prime Minister Count Terauchi on the Zimmermann Telegram (http://www.firstworldwar.com/source/zimmermann_terauchi.htm)
- The execution of Edith Cavell (http://www.firstworldwar.com/source/cavell_zimmermann.htm)
References
- Barbara W. Tuchman, The Zimmermann Telegram, 1958.he:ארתור צימרמן