Titokowaru's War
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Titokowaru's War is a conflict that took place in the Taranaki Region of the North Island of New Zealand between Wanganui and Mount Taranaki from June 1868 to March 1869. It involved the Maori tribe Ngati Ruanui and the Colonial Government of New Zealand.
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Causes of the War
The immediate cause of the war was the continuing confiscation of Maori land by the Government. The campaigns of McDonnell and Chute that ended the Second Taranaki War were followed by the punitive confiscation of tribal land during 1865 and 1866. Once this was apparently completed and recognizing the apparent futility of further resistance the Maori tribes were inclined to accept the situation. Titokowaru, the chief of the Ngati Ruanui hapu or sub-tribe, declared 1867 to be a year of peace and reconciliation and this was largely successful.
However early in 1868 the Government began to confiscate even more tribal land to such an extent that the economic survival of the tribes was seriously threatened. Negotiation, passive resistance and threats proved unavailing, more and more settlers were occupying the confiscated Maori land. Finally, on 9 June 1868, warriors from the Ngati Ruanui killed three of the settlers. This was the beginning of Titokowaru’s War.
From the outset it was a faint hope. Titokowaru was not supported by the other Maori of the area and mustered only eighty fighters from his own hapu. He was opposed by the Patea Field Force, nearly eight hundred armed militia of mixed quality but also including units like Von Tempsky's Forest Rangers who were very experienced and competent. He was also opposed by numerous kupapa, who were Maori fighting on the government side. Again their commitment to the conflict was sometimes dubious but they were quickly joined by Kepa Rangihiwinui, Major Kepa, and his Wanganui fighters, a truly formidable enemy. Furthermore the commander of the Government forces, McDonnell was the same man who had defeated the Southern Taranaki tribes in 1866 using the search and destroy technique, then called bush scouring.
However Titokowaru’s main base was a formidable Pa or fortress, Te Ngutu O Te Manu surrounded by dense bush. The Government troops were equally well placed but a static war was never an option for them, they had to protect the settlers. By a clever campaign of incitement and provocation Titokowaru created a situation where McDonnell had no choice but to attack the Pa.
See also: Maori Wars
The Battle of Te Ngutu of Te Manu
The first two expeditions against Titokowaru’s position were unsuccessful. Bad weather drove the first one back and the second, an unexpectedly fierce counterattack by the Maori.
The third expedition left Camp Waihi on 7 September 1868. Mc Donnell was leading three very experienced units of the Patea Field Force, 360 men altogether including Kepa and the Wanganui Maori and Von Tempsky and the Forest Rangers. They had hoped to surprise the enemy but went astray in the thick bush and approached Te Ngutu o Te Manu unexpectedly from the north and disturbed some of the defenders who raised the alarm.
Pressing on as fast as possible they entered the clearing that approached the Pa and saw the defences which did not look too formidable. McDonnell sent Kepa and the kupapa to circle around and attack the Pa from the east while he ordered the Pakeha militia to make an immediate frontal attack.
However Titokowaru had kept very few of his warriors inside the Pa, most of them were waiting in the bush that surrounded the Te Ngutu clearing. As soon as the government troops entered the clearing they came under heavy and accurate fire from all directions and the momentum was lost as the men took cover. Two attempts were made to resume the attack and both produced serious casualties including Von Tempsky himself, shot dead.
The situation was lost well before Kepa had any chance of getting into position to attack. McDonnell wisely ordered an immediate retreat; The Maori pursued them sniping from cover all the way but they did not risk an attack; the militia still outnumbered them many times over.
The Colonists lost over fifty men, dead and wounded. It was a shattering defeat of the same magnitude Puketakuere during the First Taranaki War, indeed the nature of the engagement was very similar. Titokowaru lost only three men in the whole engagement.
The aftermath of the defeat was even more disastrous as it led to the almost complete disintegration of the Government forces. Hundreds deserted or refused to re-enlist when their term was up. Many of the Maori allies packed up and went home saying that Titokowaru’s mana was now stronger than the government's
The Forest Rangers mutinied and refused to serve under any leader after Von Tempsky. He had been a charismatic leader who created an huge personality cult within his force, without him they were useless and had to be disbanded. It has been suggested that Von Tempsky died unnecessarily. Another officer within the militia had recently been awarded the Victoria Cross, this made Von Tempsky extremely jealous and he was determined to win one for himself, leading him to take foolish risks. This may or may not be true but the story was current at the time and illustrates how Von Tempsky’s contemporaries viewed him.
The Patea Field Force was reduced to about a quarter of its original strength. McDonnell was replaced by Colonel Whitmore, possibly a more effective soldier although every historian who mentions him describes him as a most unpleasant person. Inevitably the Government forces had to retreat towards Wanganui and the Maori triumphantly reoccupied the territory they vacated. Other than that they did little to exploit their position which gave the military commanders time to rebuild their forces. Whitmore eventually had an army of about nine hundred men although about two thirds of them could only be relied upon for defensive duties.
Moturoa
Meanwhile Titokowaru was also gaining support and possibly doubled his force to about two hundred warriors. Whitmore had established his base at Patea, some eighty kilometers up the coast from Wanganui. Titokowaru established another Pa nearby and tried unsuccessfully to provoke an attack. When this did not work he bypassed Whitmore and moved to a position midway between Patea and Wanganui, building a Pa at Moturoa. To make the threat perfectly clear he immediately sent raiding parties out into the district which had hitherto been apprehensive but peaceful.
Whitmore had no choice but to respond. He moved his base to Wairoa (Waverley) and almost immediately mounted an expedition against Titokowaru. They left Wairoa on 7 November 1868 with about six hundred men however about two hundred of these were allied Maori who refused to enter the bush. The only Maori who continued with Whitmore were Major Kepa and his Wanganui men. When they arrived at Moturoa the Pa appeared to be only half built being no more than a very flimsy palisade. The attacking force was divided into three. Kepa and his men made their way to the rear while Whitmore remained in front of the fort. They were to provide covering fire while Major Hunter led an attack from the left flank.
Once again they had seriously underestimated their enemy. Kepa was not able to get into a position where he could attack the rear of the Pa. and the left flank was very heavily defended. The palisade was there merely to conceal the real defences, a two level firing trench and three low towers made of packed earth. Titokowaru and his men were very well protected while their attackers were completely exposed. Within a few minutes Major Hunter and most of the attacking party were dead. Once the attack had been stopped the defenders left the Pa and moved into rifle pits hidden in the bush on both flanks of Whitmore’s position from where they maintained a heavy but disciplined fire. They had no choice but to retreat as fast as possible back to their own stronghold at Wairoa.
It was another defeat of the same magnitude as Te Ngutu o Te Manu, some sixty of the militia were killed and wounded while Titokowaru lost only one man killed..
The Colony in Crisis
Titokowaru’s first victory caused consternation in New Zealand, his second one caused panic. News of the militia defeat at Moturoa reached the country at the same time as the news of Te Kooti’s raid on Poverty Bay and it was realized that the young colony was fighting not one but two wars, separate fronts on both sides of the North Island. Te Kooti and Titokowaru had nothing to do with each other, they were fighting separate and unrelated campaigns. Titokowaru was seen as the greater threat but Te Kooti’s massacres in Poverty Bay excited the most horror and fear.
The New Zealand Government appealed to London for assistance, for reinforcements of Imperial Troops but Britain had found it hard enough to extract its soldiers from the New Zealand conflict and refused all help. There was also a feeling in London that the New Zealand Government’s practice of aggressively confiscating Maori land was the cause of their predicament; they were probably right.
The militia withdrew from most of southern Taranaki, concentrating on Wanganui. Titokowaru triumphantly reoccupied the evacuated territory and built himself a very strong pa at Tauranga-Ika, some thirty kilometers north west of Wanganui from where he sent out raiding parties right to the outskirts of the town.
The big question was “What will the King Movement do?” It was only four years since the Invasion of the Waikato when it had taken an army of eighteen thousand men to defeat the King Movement and drive them out of the rich farmlands of the Waikato. However, the military power of the King Movement was still intact. They were sitting in the middle of the North Island, in the area that is still called the King Country, sullen and resentful of the encroaching Pakeha government. If King Tawhaio had chosen this moment to intervene, to join with Titokowaru and Te Kooti in a coordinated attack it was believed then that he could have driven the settlers out of all the confiscated Maori land; back to the main settlements and, conceivably, out of the North Island altogether. Some panicked Settlers did leave New Zealand for Australia.
In fact the King Movement did stir briefly. A small war party of Ngati Maniopoto conducted a brief raid down into Northern Taranaki, killing nine people. But they then withdrew and that was end of it.
Faced with all these threats the Government and the military had some hard decisions to make. Titokowaru was seen as the greater threat but he was also seen to be curiously inactive. Having occupied the countryside he did nothing to actually threaten the towns. Te Kooti on the other hand was massacring non-combatants, Pakeha and Maori alike. The decision was taken to deal with him first. Accordingly virtually all the effective forces were withdrawn from Taranaki and shipped round to the other side of the country. It must have been a very difficult decision.
Te Kooti was besieged and defeated decisively at Ngatapa near Gisborne early in January 1869 which gave the colonial government a bit of breathing space.
The Non-Battle of Tauranga-Ika
Titokowaru had built himself a very strong Pa at Tauranga-Ika, some thirty km from Wanganui. From there he had effectively occupied the abandoned countryside but he had done nothing to threaten the towns. He had also gained recruits, but not many. At this stage he probably had about 400 fighters. By comparison the garrison defending Wanganui had grown to about 2000 men.
Colonel Whitmore, Majors McDonnell and Kepa and the rest of the field force returned from Poverty Bay on 16 January 1869 after an absence of five weeks.. Their confidence had been boosted by their victory over Te Kooti and for a third time they accepted Titokowaru’s challenge to attack him at a place of his own choosing..
The army marched out of Wanganui on 21 January, 1753 men including 400 allied Maori. They advanced on Tauranga-Ika slowly and carefully arriving early on 2 February. Trenches were dug for protection and the artillery began a bombardment. Although greatly outnumbered the enemy Maori were cheerful and confident.
It must have been a very tense moment. The impact of another defeat would have been shattering for the Colony.
However as the sun rose on the expected day of battle, 3 February, it was discovered that Tauranga-Ika had been abandoned during the night. The enemy had disappeared. Following their trail several men were killed from an ambush and then the trail disappeared. In the next five weeks the militia caught up with Titokowaru only twice and each time they were severely mauled.
However the threat was over. Titokowaru’s army disintegrated after he abandoned Tauranga-Ika. It took a while to sink in but the war was finished. In early April Whitmore marched his army around Mount Taranaki into the northern area of the province to counter the Kingite threat. By mid April things were sufficiently stable that the government felt able to transfer the militia back to the other theatre of war, Te Kooti in the Urewera Ranges. Of course they did leave a substantial garrison in Taranaki.
Titokowaru retreated to a safe area where, wisely, the government left him alone.
What happened? Why did the Maori abandon Tauranga-Ika? It was probably the strongest pa built in all the Maori wars. Whitmore himself, who consistently underestimated the Maori admitted that it was impregnable.
“no troops in the world could have hewn their way through….defended by excellent shots and desperate men”
Many of his officers agreed. It was another major defeat waiting to happen. But the defenders abandoned it before the battle began. They had ample supplies of food and ammunition, they seemed confident and were apparently looking forward to the battle.
There is one tentative explanation, a dubious one put forward fifty years later by a deserter from the British army who was fighting for Titokowaru. He claimed that the Maori discovered that Titokowaru was having a sexual liaison with the wife of one of his captains. Since he had set himself up as divinely inspired leader this was seen as highly inappropriate behaviour. They were not going to fight for someone they couldn’t trust. Titokowaru’s army went home and the war was over.
It sounds unlikely but no other explanation has ever come forward. Titokowaru was probably not the first general in history to let his willy do his thinking for him but seldom can one of them have lost a war so quickly and completely.
Further reading
- Belich, James (1988). The New Zealand wars. Penguin.
- Belich, James (1996) Making peoples. Penguin Press.
- Binney, Judith (1995). Redemption songs: A life of Te Kooti Arikirangi Te Turuki. Auckland: Auckland University Press.
- Cowan, J., & Hasselberg, P. D. (1983) The New Zealand wars. New Zealand Government Printer. (Originally published 1922)
- Maxwell, Peter (2000). Frontier, the battle for the North Island of New Zealand. Celebrity Books.
- Simpson, Tony (1979). Te Riri Pakeha. Hodder and Stoughton.
- Sinclair, Keith (ed.) (1996). The Oxford illustrated history of New Zealand (2nd ed.) Wellington: Oxford University Press.
- Stowers, Richard (1996). Forest rangers. Richard Stowers.
- Vaggioli, Dom Felici (2000). History of New Zealand and its inhabitants, Trans. J. Crockett. Dunedin: University of Otago Press. Original Italian publication, 1896.
- "The people of many peaks: The Māori biographies". (1990). From The dictionary of New Zealand biographies, Vol. 1, 1769-1869. Bridget Williams Books and Department of Internal Affairs, New Zealand.