Third Battle of Panipat
|
|
The Third Battle of Panipat took place on January 14, 1761 at Panipat (Haryana State, India) about 80 miles (130 km) north of Delhi, between the Maratha forces of north-western India aiding their allies, the Mughal Empire, and Afghan forces under Ahmad Shah Abdali. Almost 100,000 people either died or injured on both sides in the one-day battle (Disputed- the probable figure could be around 60,000).
The battle pitted the French-supplied and trained artillery of the Marathas against the famous light cavalry of the Afghans. The matchup would have been rather one sided in favour of the Marathas had not their own cavalry decided to charge prematurely leading to their defeat. Both forces were so heavily attritted that the Mughal Empire fell, the expansion of the Maratha's power ended, and Ahmad Shah's Durrani Empire suffered continual attacks by the growing Sikh power and eventually retired to the north of Kandahar. The Marathas had also pursued his fleeing army right up to Attock at the foothills of Afghanistan in 1756 under Raghobadada.
| Contents |
|
1 Perpetual Atrocities on descendants of Maratha prisoners of war |
Prelude to Panipat
The Mughal Empire of north-western India had been in decline for some time after Ahmad Shah's first attacks against them in 1749, eventually culminating in his sacking of Delhi in 1757. He left them in nominal control however, which proved to be a fateful mistake when his son, Timur Shah, proved to be utterly incapable of maintaining control of the Afghan troops. Soon the local Sikh population rose in revolt and asked for the protection of the Marathas, who were soon in Lahore. Timur ran for the hills of Afghanistan.
Ahmad Shah could not allow this to go unchecked, and in 1759 rose an army from the Pashtun tribes with help from the Baloch, and invaded India once again. By the end of the year they had reached Lahore, but Marathas continued to pour into the conflict and by 1760 had formed a huge single army of over 100,000 to block him.
After lots of manoeuvring and skirmishes at Karnal and Kunjapura and failing to prevent Abdali crossing Yamuna river they set up defensive works in the excellent ground near Panipat, they blocked Ahmad's access back to Afghanistan and Abdali blocked theirs to south. Abdali slowly tightened the noose by cutting off Maratha Army's supply lines. Sikhs and Jats (with the exception of Ala Singh) did not support Marathas because of their earlier behaviour of loot and plunder. When their supplies and stores dwindled to nothing, the Marathas then moved in almost 150 pieces of modern long-range rifled French made artillery. With a range of several kilometres, these guns were some of the best of the times.
Siege
The Afghan forces arrived in late 1760 to find the Marathas in well-prepared works. Realizing a direct attack was hopeless, they set up for a siege. The resulting face-off lasted two months. During this time Ahmad continued to receive supplies from locals, but the Marathas own supply line was cut off.
Realizing the situation was not in their favour, the Marathas under Sadashiv Bhau decided to break the siege. His plan was to pulverise the enemy formations with cannon fire and not to employ his cavalry until the Muslims were thoroughly softened up. With the Afghans now broken, he would move camp in a defensive formation towards Delhi, where they were assured supplies.
The line would be formed up some 12km across, with the artillery in front, protected by infantry, pikemen, musketeers and bowmen. The cavalry was instructed to wait behind the artillery and bayonet wielding musketeers, ready to be thrown in when control of battlefield had been fully established.
Behind this line was another ring of 30,000 young Maratha soldiers who were not battle tested, and then the roughly 30,000 civilians entrained. Many were middle class men, women and children on their pilgrimage to the Hindu holy places and shrines, a once-in-a-lifetime opportunity to see Aryavarta (Aryan Land). The civilians were irrationally confident of the Maratha army, regarding it as one of the best in the world, and definitely one of the most powerful in Asia. Behind the civilians was yet another protective infantry line, of young inexperienced soldiers.
Battle opens
Before dawn on January 14, 1761 the Maratha forces emerged from the trenches, pushing the artillery into position on their pre-arranged lines, some 2km from the Afghans. Seeing that the battle was on, Ahmad positioned his 60 smoothbore cannon and opened fire. However, because of the short range of the weapons, the Maratha lines remained untouched. Ahmad then launched a cavalry attack to break their lines.
The first defensive salvo of the Marathas went over the Afghans' heads and inflicted very little damage, but the Afghan attack was nevertheless broken by Maratha bowmen and pikemen, along with some famed Maratha gardi musketeers stationed close to the artillery positions. The second and subsequent salvos were fired at point blank range, and the resulting carnage sent the Afghans reeling back to their lines. The European-style plan had worked just as envisioned.
The Marathas then started moving their infantry formation forward, led by the artillery. The Afghans responded with repeated cavalry attacks, all of which failed. About 12,000 Afghan cavalry and infantrymen lost their lives in this opening stage of the battle. Gaping holes were opened in their ranks, and in some places the Afghans and their Indian Muslim allies began to run away.
The Marathas cavalry charge
At this stage it looked as though Bhausaheb would clinch victory for the Marathas once again. However, some of the Maratha lieutenants, jealous of the exploits of their artillery chief (Commandant de la gard - Ibrahim khan Gardi), decided to exploit the gaps in the enemy lines & dash; despite strict instructions not to charge or engage Afghan cavalry in hand to hand fight. The mass of Maratha horsemen raced through their own artillery lines and charged towards the demoralised Afghans, intending to cut the faltering army in two.
The over-enthusiasm of the charge saw many of the half starved Maratha horses exhausted long before they had travelled the two kilometres to the Afghan lines; some simply collapsed. Making matters worse was the suffocating odour of the rotting corpses of men and animals left on the field from the fighting of the previous months. Still, a major mass of Maratha cavalry collided with the Afgan cavalry, initially taking down a few thousands Afghans.
In response, the Afghan officers stiffened their troops resistance. Abdali sent his body guards to call up his reserves of 10,000 from his camp and arranged it as column right in front his and cavalry of musketeers, and swivel mounted cannons on the back of camels. because of their positioning on camels they could fire an extensive salvo over the heads of their own infantry and at the Maratha cavalry, who were unable to withstand the rifled muskets and camel-mounted swivel cannons of the Afghans.
With their own men in the firing line, the Maratha artillery could not respond, and about 7,000 Maratha cavalry and infantry perished before the hand to hand fighting began at around 2PM. By 4PM the tired Maratha infantry began to succumb to the onslaught of attacks from fresh Afghan reserves, protected by armoured leather jackets.
Attack from within
The main reason for the failure of Marathas were the lack of allies. Though their infantry was based on European style contingent, they failed to woo allies in North India. Their earlier behavior and their political ambitions which led them to loot and plunder, had antagonized all the powers. They had interfered in the internal affairs of the Rajputana states and levied heavy taxes and huge fines on them. They had also made huge territorial and monetary claims upon Awadh. Their raids in the Sikh territory had angered the Sikh chiefs. Similarly the Jat chiefs, on whom also they had imposed heavy fines, did not trust them. They had, therefore, to fight their enemies alone, except for the support of Muslim Imad -ul-Mulk. Moreover, the senior Maratha chiefs constantly bickered with one another. Each one of them had ambitions of carving out their independent states and had no interest in fighting against a common enemy.
Sadashivrao Bhau, seeing his forward lines dwindling took flight from battle. Unable to accompany the womens folk he left instructions with his bodyguards that, if the battle were lost, they must kill his wife Parvati bai, as he could not abide the thought of her being dishonoured by Afghans.
Some Maratha soldiers, seeing that their general had disappeared from his elephant, panicked and began to flee. Vishwasrao, the son of Prime Minister Nanasaheb, had already fallen to Afghan stray shot, in the head. Sadashivrao Bhau and his loyal bodyguards fought to the end, the Maratha leader having three horses shot out from under him.
Rout
The Afghans pursued the fleeing Maratha army and the civilians, while the Maratha front lines remained largely intact, with some of their artillery units fighting until sundown. Choosing not to launch a night attack, made good their escape that night. Parvatibai escaped the Armageddon with her bodyguards, and eventually returned to Pune.
The Massacre
Mass of surrendered Maratha soldiers were handcuffed and then murdered, their heads chopped off by Afgans to earn blessings for killing Kafirs on account of their families back in Afghanistan.
(“the unhappy prisoners were paraded in long lines, given a little parched grain and a drink of water, and beheaded… and the women and children who survived were driven off as slaves - twenty-two thousand, many of them of the highest aristocratic rank in the land, says the Siyar-ut-Mutakhirin.”22)
The Afghan cavalry and pikemen ran wild through the streets of Panipat, killing any Maratha soldiers or civilians who offered resistance. About 6,000 women and children sought shelter with the north Indian local ruler, the Shuja-ud-Daula (alley of Abdali), who was actually undecided before the war about if he should join the Marathas or Abdali. His Hindu officers persuaded him to protect the Maratha women and children. Another 22,000 women and children seeking refuge in streets of panipat were hounded back in afgan camps as slaves. Children over 14 were beheaded before their own mothers and sisters. Women were made to carry the severed heads of Marathas to the afgan army accountant so the afgan soldiers earned 1 silver coin per head brought in.
Afghan officers who had lost their kin in battle were permitted to carry out massacres the next day, also in Panipat and the surrounding area. They arranged victory mounds of severed heads outside their camps. About 10,000 Maratha civilians and soldiers alike were slain this way on 15th January 1761. Many of the fleeing Maratha women jumped into the Panipat wells rather than risk rape and dishonour. Many others did their best to hide in the streets of Panipat when even the North Indian Hindus / Muslims of the town refused to give them refuge. The main reason for the failure of Marathas was that they went to war without good allies. Though their infantry was based on European style contingent and had some of the best French made guns of the times,they failed to woo allies in North India. Their earlier hegemonistic behavior and their political ambitions which led them to loot and plunder, had antagonized all the powers. They had interfered in the internal affairs of the Rajputana states (present day Rajasthan) and levied heavy taxes and huge fines on them. They had also made huge territorial and monetary claims upon Awadh. Their raids in the Sikh territory had angered the Sikh chiefs. Similarly the Jat chiefs, on whom also they had imposed heavy fines, did not trust them. They had, therefore, to fight their enemies alone, except for the weak support of Imad -ul-Mulk. Moreover, the senior Maratha chiefs constantly bickered with one another. Each one of them had ambitions of carving out their independent states and had no interest in fighting against a common enemy.
Abdali's soldiers took about 22,000 women and young children and brought them to their camps. The women were raped in the camp, many committed suicide because of constant rapes perpetrated on them. All of the prisoners were exchanged or sold as sex slaves to Afghanistan or North India, transported on bullock carts, camels and elephants in bamboo cages.
A conservative estimate places Maratha losses at 35,000 on the Panipat battlefield. Almost 22,000 women and children as prisoners and slaves. According to Mr. Hamilton of Bombay Gazette about half a million people were present there on Panipat town from Maharashtra and on any rate he gives figure of 40,000 prisoners as executed. Most of the Maratha prisoners were evidently non-combatants and included camp-followers and pilgrims.
The Afghans losses amounted to more than 30,000. As far as battle casualties are concerned, the Afghans too suffered heavily. It was more like a battle the Marathas lost, than a battle won by the Afghans.
Following the battle
To save their kingdom, and in the name of Islam, the Mughals once again changed sides and welcomed the Afghans to Delhi, forgetting that Marathas had just lost 100,000 men and women for their cause. However, the news soon arrived that Marathas had organised another 100,000 men in the south to avenge their loss and to rescue the captured prisoners. He left Delhi two months after the battle, heading for Afghanistan with his loot of 500 elephants, 1500 camels, 50,000 horses and at least about 22,000 women and children.
The Mughals remained in nominal control over small areas of India, but were never a force again. The empire officially ended in 1857 when its last emperor was accused of being involved in the Sepoy Mutiny and exiled.
The Marathas expansion was stopped in the battle, and soon broke into infighting within their empire. They never regained any unity, and were soon under increasing pressure from the British. Their claims to empire were officially ended in 1818.
It is worth noticing the fact the Maratha empire provided the biggest challenge to the moguls in the erstwhile India keeping in check the influence of foreign invaders, forced conversions and oppression of the local people.
Meanwhile the Sikhs, who were left largely untouched by the battle, soon retook Lahore. When Ahmad returned in March 1764 he was forced to break off his siege after only two weeks due to rebellion in Afghanistan. He returned again in 1767, but was unable to win any decisive battle. With his own troops arguing over a lack of pay, he eventually abandoned the district to the Sihks, who remained in control until 1849.
This 3rd battle of Panipat saw an enormous number of casualties and deaths in a single day of battle, perhaps unmatched even today in the later wars. It was the scene of uncommon valour, unwanted strategic blunders,internal bickering, murders of prisoners of war, and large scale rapes perpetrated on women.
Perpetual Atrocities on descendants of Maratha prisoners of war
Though it is a historical fact that a large number of prisoners, mostly hapless women around the scene of the battle were taken as slaves to Afghanistan, it is only fair to presume that many could have died from the extreme climatic conditions of Afghanistan to which they were unaccustomed. Despite this,even today a large section of people in Maharashtra( a State in India where Maharashtrians live in large numbers) feel that some of them could have survived and lived a miserable life that Afghanistan is so famous for. They believe even now (2005),after 244 years,that some members of the of descendants of prisoners of wars still under slavery can be found at least Balochistan in Bugti and Marri tribal areas. According to them,the Maratha Bugtis and Marri in Balochistan are an interesting case of what may be a caste forming even under Islamic rule. Theirs is a clan claiming descent from Marathas captives of war brought back by members of the Bugti tribe, who served the armies of Ahmad Shah Durrani (Abdali) after the fateful battle of Panipat.In time they underwent forceful 'Bugti-ization' and became Muslims although they were once considered as bonded labour. They could not own or buy land. Till a generation ago they could be 'bought' for twenty or thirty rupees. Their womenfolk remain a fair game for Bugtis and Marris. This according to Marathis of India, means, officially the Panipat war on Marathas have not ended even today.
The Maratha and Marri Bugtis took jobs as unskilled labourers, which their tribal overlords disdained. Over the years some of them have come to occupy higher positions. However they are still targeted and remain to be rescued. It is interesting to note that this caste-like phenomenon has endured for more than two centuries, even in a region largely devoid of Hindus.
The descendants of other batches of maratha prisoners taken in Afghanistan remains a mystery to be traced. However Maharashtra as a nation and Maratha leadership even today has failed to recognise existence of such descendants and rescue these people (on the lines of Jewish agency in Israel) if they are willing even today. These are war crimes perpetrated even today we need to verify and Maharashtra state government needs to verify their existence and raise fund for rescue or humanitarian aid-(This is a phony wish precisely because the caste-rigid Hindu society will not accept these victims to integrate with their society now- just think of victims of partition in 1947 who, abducted to Pakistan, were unwilling to come to India again because of social stigma attached to them) We need to investigate how many prisoners were taken originally by statistical method and investigate other areas of Afghanistan and Pakistan if there exists such tribe who trace their ancestry to marathas as prisoners from panipat war.
I think an appeal to United Nations (UN) and international intervention is required to research undiscovered chapter of history and provide necessary help to these People of Indian origin (PIO) if there is truth in information which is currently available.