Talk:Winter War

The given number of foreign volounteirs vary quite a lot. It would be good to see some references to reliable statistics aswell as a distinction between number of arrived willing, number of volounteirs deemed fit to fight, and the number of men really active at the front.
-- Ruhrjung 19:23 15 May 2003 (UTC)

Contents

1 More source info needed 2 On Communists in the Winter War 3 Lack of Western Support 4 Disputed 5 Winter War and World War II 5.1 Vote 1/0/2 6 Proposed minor edits 7 Factual Discrepancy 8 factual discrepancy all over it 9 Political Considerations 10 Timeline of Peace Negotiations 11 My correction

More source info needed

This article would really need more source info!

"After the war it became known that the commander of the Allied expedition force actually was instructed to avoid combat contact with the Soviet troops."

It is possible that this really happened, but since respected historians (Heikki Ylinkangas comes to my mind) debate about issues concerning the events and decisions leading to not accepting help (?) from England and France and the events that would have followed if Finland had accepted this help.

Also more info regarding this issue and Finland's relationship to the Allies would in my opinion improve this article.

-- Somebody

There was a huge mistake in text... It claimed that the Russians out-numbered the Finns by 3 to 1 , but perhaps 10 to 1 would be more correct...

-Just another Finn--

On Communists in the Winter War

There is a considerable difference between barring political extremists, and not expecting them to participate in armies build on the idea that absolutely all men who are able to has to take part in the country's defense. I guess you have good sourses?
--Ruhrjung 16:39, 25 Feb 2004 (UTC)

I thought this was an "expect"/"accept" confusion, which is pretty common in English. Maybe a better was to phrase it would be "not accepted into fighting units because of their political background".

Lack of Western Support

I'm preparing an article on the concept of Western Betrayal (User:Halibutt/Western betrayal). I need some info on the pacts Finland had signed with the West, allied support for Finland during the Winter War (or lack of support) and the feelings towards the Allies in Finnish society. Could anyone help?Halibutt 11:46, 5 Apr 2004 (UTC)

Well, it's not the easiest thing to tell. On one hand, it's something we got with the mother milk, on the other hand, the officially and academically purported truth don't fully support the feeling of betrayal - but the feeling is no less real.

With my father's words: there were no alliances or treaties they could break, only the band of blood and our trust in the Western countries' honesty.

Sweden's betrayal was the gravest, but the League of Nations led by France and Britain had nothing but words of sympathy to offer, when what we needed was soldiers of flesh and blood. There had been a long debate in Finland, and people had become convinced that the System of the League and the adaptation to Scandinavian expectations would give Finland the best protection against the "Red Threat" from Russia. It turned out that those authorities that had advocated policies oriented at the League and at Scandinavia, they were naive and mistaken - and so was the people who believed them. The Finns were literally naïve — From the diplomatic corps to the crofters — With very, very few exceptions (chiefly: Mannerheim and Paasikivi). They had every right to be literally naive. Before Finland's independence in 1917, no Finn had been responsible for any country's foreign policies for at least over a hundred years.

The Finns were led to believe that Sweden and the other Western countries would come to Finland's support if we were attacked by Russia. Many Finns had only reluctantly accepted the government's pro-Scandinavian and anti-German line, and the convincing argument was that blood is thicker than water. Sweden had two incentives to come to our support. Firstly, since Finland is Sweden's shield against Russia, and secondly due to our long shared history and "everything we have in common." It might be true that the Charter of the LoN, and the lofty rhetoric from international diplomatic banquettes fooled some contemporary Finnish journalists, for instance, but primarily it wasn't really "the Swedes" or "the Europeans" who gave us promises. It was our Finnish leaders and experts who explained the world to us, who also made us believe that if we did this-and-this then the other nations were obliged to solidarity. Unfortunately, that solidarity turned out to be words and very little else.

In this context it ought to be said that the Swedes see their support as much, much more than "words and little else". The credits and gifts from Sweden to Finland's support, in connection with the Winter War, were greater than Finland's yearly state budget. Additionally 55,000 Finnish children in school age and pre-school age were evacuated to strangers' homes in Sweden, another 5,000 to friends and relatives in Sweden, another 5,000 hospitalised children were evacuated to sanatoriums in Sweden, another 5,000 children were evacuated to Denmark. These children returned first after the war (20% remained in Sweden). This was no insignificant commitment, but in all honesty, it was bad for the kids - and their traumas make it hard for the Finns to recognize this great sacrifice by the Swedes. If you ask Swedes who experienced this time, all give the picture of a total mental mobilization for the sake of Finland's. Everyone wanted to help — With much or with little, depending to capacity. Housewives knitted protective gears against the 40-degrees cold for the soldiers; factories worked extra Sundays and sent the money corresponding the day-wages to Finland, and so on, and so on. Finns can't take this seriously. It doesn't count. The only thing that counts is the 8,000 volunteers at the front, and that they only were 8,000 men. Sweden didn't send her army, and therefore Finland lost Karelia. That loss tears our eyes and makes it impossible to appreciate that the LoN actually did expel the Soviet Union, and that ordinary Swedes actually made sacrifices. They didn't send regular troops, they didn't send regular troops, they didn't send regular troops - damned Swedes! (...and damned hypocrites in Paris and London!)

As a legacy of the Civil War, the society's elite was much more right-leaning than in the countries the people felt kindered to — that is to the West. Anyhow, people our contemporary Americans would call Wilsonian won the debate in Finland but lost their face when they met reality in the Winter War. International law, international esteem, the League of Nations, and such Wilsonian concepts were of little use when Russia attacked. Their opponents (from our contemporary time, Rumsfeldt comes to my mind as an equivalent) were rehabilitated by the end of the Winter War, and both for reasons of prestige and due to the dire need to reorientate Finland towards Germany in haste, they made minced meat of the Wilsonan beliefs which had been the basis for Finland's foreign policy up to November 1939, and the whole society suddenly saw everything differently — from the President to the crofters — America's experience of September 11th comes to mind as a similarly impetus blow. And the rather strong feeling of betrayal is in company with this earthquake in the minds of the Finns. The one isn't possible to understand without the other.

The allienation was reinforced by London's and Washington's agreement with Soviet lies. Finland was twice attacked from Russia. And evertime someone refers to this in English, the second blow is said to have come from Finland. Such a heinous lie! And in Russian, of course both occations are described as Finnish attacks on Russia. And many Anglophones are happy to believe that too. ...and on top of this the nefarious Paris Peace Treaty...

There are of course some "hard facts" to give as examples, for instance Finland's choise of Swedish munition instead of German, a decission made in the mid-1930s in the hope of Swedish reinforcements being more realistic than German. However, history tought us otherwise. But the hard facts are, in my opinion, diverting the understanding of Finland's feeling of betrayal. /Tuomas 14:30, 6 Apr 2004 (UTC)

Great, that's exactly what I needed. I'll let you know as soon as I finish turning it into an article.Halibutt 14:39, 6 Apr 2004 (UTC)

There could be much added, of course. But the most important aspects are all above. Maybe with one exception. All nations may have problems to recognize how the world seems for other nations, but in this case it's pretty obvious, that some of the feeling of betrayal is based in a profound lack of understanding how Finland was viewed in other countries. Maybe it was Finland's luck that the Finns didn't understand how fragile the new Finnish state could be deemed in other capitals, and how allienated the population in Scandinavia was made by the chain of 1/ the Language strife won by the anti-Scandinavians, 2/ the Civil War, 3/ post-war concentration camps where thousands of trade union leaders were reported to die as flies, 4/ pro-Polish and anti-Scandinavian foreign policies in the 1920s including militarist expansionism, stubborn disregard for the Ålanders' wishes to determ themselves which state to belong to, and the first Finnish president's refusal to make a state visit in Stockholm, 5/ government support for the (semi-) fascist Lapua movement, 6/ the election of Lapua's candidate Svinhufvud to a president who didn't believe in parliamentarism and put an honor in suppressing the political influence of Social Democrats. This hardly warmed the hearts of Swedes who had good experiences of parliamentarism and Social Democratic ministers playing leading roles since 1917. Unfortunately, for the Finns, the Swedes who were the most enthusiastic advocates of support for Finland were also known as the least sympathetic for neutrality, democracy and parliamentarism. Even Paasikivi, otherwise competent, failed miserably as an Ambassador to Stockholm in the late 1930s. He nurtured contacts with the wrong, uninfluential, rightist monarchist and pro-German circles, and forgot totally to communicate with Liberals, Agrarians, trade unionists, Social Democrats, the influential Temperence Movement and the Co-op Movement.

The Finnish worldview of the 1930s never absorbed the Scandinavian fear for Nazi Germany. Or, maybe more correct: those few Finns who did were the very same who above are called "Wilsonian". But even Väinö Tanner shows clearly, both in his contemporary letters and in his book later written in prison, that he didn't recognize a Swedish danger for being invaded from the South -- or after an Allied "support" to Finland being made a battlefield between Franco-British forces in the North and Russo-German forces in the South.

"Karelia" stands for the uniquely Finnic root to Finnishness, few Finns can see the loss of Karelia as a small price to pay for national survival. Other countries, with longer history as independent states, have other and greater losses to compare with. The suspicion that Sweden had been more interested to fight for other, less "Finnish" parts of Finland is irritating. Also if Finns today can recognize that Finland from January 1940 did no longer fight for her national survival, and that the reasons for foreign governments to send troops hence diminished, it is still not right that Finland should suffer alone for Russia's breach of international law.

I happen to agree - but let's keep this to the context of an encyclopedia of facts please. --/Mat 15:39, 16 Apr 2004 (UTC)

Sure. That's why converting it to encyclopaedia style and format takes so long and is so hard... Halibutt 22:02, 16 Apr 2004 (UTC)

I'm sure you aren't supposed to include everything above. :-)) I support your ambition wholeheartedly, thinking that people's sentiments and feelings in some critical cases may be relevant even in encyclopedias. Compare the article on Anti-American sentiments. --Ruhrjung 17:57, 17 Apr 2004 (UTC)

I came across a small detail just a few days ago, when confronted with the belief that the front-line at the end of the winter war by and large coincided with the post-war border. I'm convinced that this is not how most Finns would describe it. I remember many late-night unsober rantings on the loss of the city of Vyborg and the towns of Käkisalmi and Sortavala, non of which were conquered by the Red Army in the war, but lost at the negotiation table. In that context I remember to have heard the figures 25 kilometers at the Bay of Vyborg, 100 kilometers from Taipale (i.e. along and past Ladoga's southern shore, passing Käkisalmi halfways), and 50 kilometers at Sortavala/Ladoga's northern tip — for the difference between end-war frontiers and post-war border. Since the three towns and the relatively densely populated Ladoga-shore lie in this zone, many more homes (if not square kilometers) were lost in the peace negotiations than on the battle field.

Although this bitter loss can be blamed on the Russian Stalinists and the Finnish herrat (the elite, the masters), the international community, the Swedish king and prime minister Per Albin Hansson bear a heavy part of the responsibility since the Swedes declined in public statements to follow the Swedish opinion that demanded troops to be sent to the Karelian isthmus, and barred France and England from sending help through Sweden. Particularly the King's role seem to have left bitter marks in the Finnish soul.
--Ruhrjung 17:57, 17 Apr 2004 (UTC)

---

"Already within a month, the Soviet leadership began to consider to blew the operation off" - I presume this is meant to be "blow the operation off"? But I don't know enough terminology on this subject to correct it. --/Mat 15:39, 16 Apr 2004 (UTC)

Disputed

How come there now is an announcement at the top of the article of it being disputed? Where does it come from? Why is it there? --Johan Magnus 08:25, 10 May 2004 (UTC)

I think it is work of 174, who tries to write texts were Soviet Unions acts are embellished. Kahkonen 09:26 10 May 2004 (UTC)

According to Wikipedia:NPOV dispute: If you add the above code to an article which seems to you to be biased, but there is no prior discussion of the bias, you need to at least leave a note on the article's talk page describing what you consider unacceptable about the article.. So I am going to remove the notice. -- Jniemenmaa 08:44, 10 May 2004 (UTC)

Winter War and World War II

Is the Winter War considered a part of World War II or, like the Continuation War, a somewhat distinct affair? Oberiko 14:54, 16 Jun 2004 (UTC)

I think it is part of WWII, so does European Theater of World War II for instance. In my opinion both the Continuation War and the Lapland War are part of WWII too. Actually it would be much easier to argue that the Winter War was a separate war. (This argument started at Talk:Mannerheim Line over the inclusion of that article in category:World War II defensive lines) -- Jniemenmaa 15:33, 16 Jun 2004 (UTC)

What makes the Winter War "a separate war" is probably only the Moscow peace treaty, and there is absolutely no need to emphasize it's separateness in other articles (in my humble opinion).

The Continuation War and the Lapland War are separate wars seen from a Finnish, or maybe Scandinavian, perspective as they were temporally distinct. But I don't remember to have met any Finn who would say that they were separate from World War II. The separate war dogm served the purpose to put sufficient political/diplomatic distance to the supportive Nazi Germany.

--Ruhrjung 17:23, 2004 Jun 16 (UTC)

Yes, Continuation War is said to be (and is) separate from Operation Barbarossa (Germany - Soviet War). Kahkonen 11:46, 2004 Jun 21 (UTC)

Oh, well. Take a look at Operation Silberfuchs and the German XXXVI Corps for instance. Are these part of the Continuation War? (They take place in Finland and Finnish units were involved) or the Eastern Front? I'd say both. They are definetly part of Operation Barbarossa too. (whoops, slipping from the subject... :) -- Jniemenmaa 19:08, 21 Jun 2004 (UTC)

Yes, but official Finnish liturgy is that ;-) Kahkonen 19:29, 2004 Jun 21 (UTC)

Vote 1/0/2

Alright, just so I'm certain, I'd like to hold a vote here before I change anything.

The proposition is that the Winter War and Continuation War are both theatres of World War II (Like the Eastern Front or the North African Campaign). Oppossing will mean that you believe that they are seperate, concurrent wars (like the Spanish Civil War).

This vote will be over in one week (June 28th) unless an extension is asked for.

Support

1. Of course they are part of WW II, because they occured during it. Kahkonen 11:43, 2004 Jun 21 (UTC)
2. Jniemenmaa 13:46, 21 Jun 2004 (UTC)

Oppose

Neutral

1. Oberiko 00:57, 21 Jun 2004 (UTC)
2. Tuomas 04:38, 22 Jun 2004 (UTC) Indeed separate wars in a technical sense, since that was purposful for Helsinki, Moscow, London, Washington and Stockholm. Does it matter?

Comments

Why is a poll needed in the first place? Seems to be a consensus that the wars are part of WW2 (so far). Or did I miss something? (BTW, how can the Spanish Civil War be concurrent with WW2 if it ends in April 1939?) -- Jniemenmaa 08:01, 21 Jun 2004 (UTC)

I'm going to be changing catagorization with this, I just want to be certain everyone's on the same page before I do so (as is, there were only three responses to the original question). Naturally if there's an obvious gap then we don't have to wait until the time is up.

As for the Spanish Civil War, I'm not sure, I think it's because it's just around the same time and had intervention from the Axis and some of the Allies. But you're right, I'll change it to Related Wars. Oberiko 10:19, 21 Jun 2004 (UTC)

Proposed minor edits

I'd like to make the following minor edits:

First, under Background, the phrase "the Soviets attacked with 23 divisions of 450,000 men who quickly reached the Mannerheim Line" could be interpreted as "23 divisions with 450,000 men each." I'd like to clarify this, changing the sentence to "the Soviets attacked with 23 divisions, totalling 450,000 men, which quickly reached the Mannerheim Line."

Also, under Foreign Support, this sentence sounds awkward to me: "Sweden, that had declared herself as a non-belligerent and not a neutral country, as in the war between Nazi Germany and the Western Powers, contributed with military supplies, cash, credits, humanitarian aid and some 8,700 Swedish volunteers prepared to die for Finland."

I'd like to change it to: "Sweden, which had declared herself as a non-belligerent rather than a neutral country (as in the war between Nazi Germany and the Western Powers), contributed military supplies, cash, credits, humanitarian aid and some 8,700 Swedish volunteers prepared to die for Finland."

Is this alright with everyone? These are pretty minor edits which don't change the meaning of the sentences, but I'd like to get approval anyway.

Go ahead! /Tuomas 07:58, 11 Jan 2005 (UTC)

Factual Discrepancy

This article states that the Soviets outnumbered the Finn's 3 to 1 (and a person above stated that 10 to 1 may be more accurate). The History of the Soviet Union article goes as far as to say 50 to 1; quite a different statistic! So...which one is accurate? Jsan

factual discrepancy all over it

3:1? 10:1? 50:1?

All wrong. The Finns had, at the Karelian Isthmus, 6 infantry divisions (4, 5, 11, 8, 10, 6), 4 infantry brigades, one cavalry brigade and 10 battalions. That makes 80 battalions. The Russians had there, at the beginning of the war, 9 rifle divisions (24, 90, 138, 49, 150, 142, 43, 70, 100), one machine gun brigade and 6 armoured brigades. Which makes 84 battalions. 3:1, huh? The total strength of the Finns (at the Karelian Isthmus) was 130 thousand, of the Russians 169 thousand. 10:1? Not to mention that, e.g., the 138th rifle division entered the battle on the 11th of December, and the 100th on the 21st of December.

The total Russian strength, at the beginning of the war, was 20 divisions and one machine gun brigade (185 battalions), versus the total Finnish strength of 9 infantry divisions, 4 infantry brigades, one cavalry brigade, 35 detached battalions and 38 reserve battalions (170 battalions). So much for 50:1.

...They started the offensive without having a decisive numeric superiority. Which must have been 3:1 by any book. When they realised the mistake, they simply stopped the advance, amassed more troops, which took the rest of the year and January, reconnoitred the forts, and pulverized them with their 203mm howitzers and 280mm mortars...

As for the losses, then the number of Russians KIA was 127 thousand, Finns KIA 48 thousand. This article needs serious face lifting.

User:194.7.94.82 20:45, 7 Mar 2005

Well, it depends what you measure.

• Size of population: 170.5m vs. 3.5m -> 49:1
• Size of Armed Forces: 1 800 000 vs. 337 000 -> 6:1
• If Sep 9 Soviet mobilization is taken into account (add 2-3m) -> 10+:1
• Against Finland at start of Winter War: 450 000 vs. 317 000 -> 1.4:1
• At Carelian Isthmus: 180 000-190 000 vs. 133 000 -> 1.5:1
• Tanks against Finland: 2000 vs. 32 -> 62:1
• (Finns had even 112 37mm AT guns)
• Artillery: 2050 vs. 489 -> 4:1
• Daily shell usage: 230 000 vs. 4850 -> 47:1
• Combat planes: 800 vs. 119 -> 7:1

You are missing separate Soviet battalions from your order of battle, which produce additional personnel to the count. Also, you take into account three Finnish KT divisions, which were called to exercise but disbanded at end of October (to be called back into the duty at the beginning of December).

The bare 3:1 ratio for all troops in the front is never needed as was proved in France. It is only needed in the location of the breakthrough.

And where did you get that 48 000 Finns KIA?

194.7.94.82 11:38, 5 Apr 2005 (UTC) See Simon Sebag Montefiore, "Stalin", p. 337 (paperback). He in turn cites a joint Russo-Finish work by O. A. Rzheshevsky and O. Vechvilayninen, "Winter War 1939-40" vol. I, detailing as follows: Finland 48243 KIA, 43000 wounded, 1000 POW; USSR 87506 KIA, 39369 MIA, 5000 POW. I was a bit off originally, quoting from memory.

Ok. I heard this same number exist in the book "Тайны и уроки зимней войны. 1939-1940" ("secrets and the lessons of winter war. 1939-1940 "), publisher "Издательство Полигон", St. Petersburg, 2000. It uses only Soviet sources, so it's value is questionable.

194.7.94.82 14:52, 6 Apr 2005 (UTC) The books I quoted used Finnish sources as well. If we start to say "written by Russians, ergo false", then, first of all, you should not refer to any Russian/Soviet materials (which you do), second, we might as well say "written by Finns, equally false". Then what's the point? The above mentioned materials represent the latest state of the research, done in Finland and by Finns, they were recognized as accurate by reputable historians, yet you cling to what sounds awfully like official Finnish propaganda.

At war, it is always hard to estimate how many casualties opponent suffers, and generally those are just educated guesses, typically overestimating own efficiency. So, if author uses only Soviet sources for Finnish casualties, I doubt very much their values. Similarily if author uses only Finnish sources for Soviet casualties, I doubt the values as well. Also it seems that I demand stricter adherance to first-hand sources, so that I like to know exact documents which are used by author, and value less those who do not give their primary sources at all. It is much easier to believe something which is based on the papers written and/or published at the time than those who present claims without a single paper for evidence.

I checked the book you mentioned, but couldn't find one with exactly the same name, so I believe that it is a Russian translation of a book Yksin suurvaltaa vastassa: Talvisodan poliittinen historia ("Alone against major power: The political history of the Winter War") by O.A. Rzesevski (Finnish translittering) and Olli Vehviläinen, 1997, published by Finnish Historical Society and Soviet Academy of Sciences, ISBN 951-710-072-8. Russian translation is published 1998.

Well, the book is not exactly the consensus between Finnish and Russian historians, as O. Vehviläinen and A.O. Tsubarjan write in Foreword: ...in other questions there are still differing interpretations. When research can only progress through contradictions and disagreements between researchers, these differences with their reasonings are presented to the reader.

Did you check the numbers from the Stalin book or Winter War book? Because in the Vehviläinen's book Finnish casualties are given as 21 396 KIA, 1 434 MIA, 43 557 WIA and ~1 100 PoW (only 847 returned alive, ~20 refused to return and stayed in SU). In those numbers are missing those who died to their wounds later.

The Finns had very peculiar way to handle those killed in combat: They didn't bury them to the field but did everything they could to transfer them to their home parishes and they were buried there to separate "Sankarihautausmaa" (Hero's cemetaries) in separate graves with separate tombstones with name and birth and death dates. (This gave birth to the Finnish proverb "Kaveria ei jätetä!" (Pal will not be left behind!)) If the body was totally destroyed or it was impossible to recover it, the empty casket was buried and tombstone raised. If he disappeared and wasn't recovered in exchange of war prisoners, he was declared dead six months afterwards and tombstone raised.

Sometimes it was impossible to transfer bodies immediately to the home parishes, then temporary military graveyards were created, but regularly they were emptied when military situation allowed. And if they couldn't be evacuated after the war, those soldiers had their empty graves in their local parishes. (Not all of those graves are empty nowadays, as after the Soviet collapse, Finnish volunteers had combed known Finnish military burial places and locations of known Finnish casualties in Karelian Isthmus and in Ladoga Karelia and brought the remnants of over two hundred soldiers back to Finland.)

In that kind of environment it is impossible to hide casualties. If somebody's son has left to war and he receives the message that his son is dead, he would automatically assume that his son would have tombstone in local Hero's cemetary. If that doesn't happen, do you think he would be quiet?

194.7.94.82 14:52, 6 Apr 2005 (UTC) This does not prove anything at all. You're referring to anonymous persons whom we can never ask.

Even worse: I was referring to non-existing people.

Even after the Continuation War, when Communists were legalized in Finland, they never questioned the official body count and never found a single man or woman whose relative were not buried to the hero's cemetaries but had disappeared somewhere. It is totally impossible to hide half the casualties.

Everyone can go and count the number of graves.

194.7.94.82 14:52, 6 Apr 2005 (UTC) Have you done it yourself? What can you prove with this kind of argument?

In my home parish, yes. Some friends of mine have done it in other parishes, most of those on the same general area I'm living. Number of graves match the number of fatalities recorded in books.

And what does it prove? It proves that there is no contradictory numbers between number of graves and numbers of recorded casualties. That nobody is crying about missing graves indicates that there are no missing graves. And both of those together indicate that the official Finnish number of casualties is the correct one and the one from Soviet sources is highly exaggerated. --Whiskey 23:21, 7 Apr 2005 (UTC)

Several books has been written describing the names of casualties in each parish, or each region and there is even a database available in the web where you can search all casualties. So I'd say that there is no question how many deaths Finland suffered during the World War II.--Whiskey 00:59, 6 Apr 2005 (UTC)

Whiskey 00:33, 9 Mar 2005 (UTC)

A splendid summary! Ought to be put into the article under a heading of its own. Very different figures for comparisons of the strength-relation are common in texts on the Winter War. Here we have a chance to establish it authoritatively with references to sources and so on! /Tuomas 16:36, 9 Mar 2005 (UTC)

All the x:y comparisons in the article and earlier in the discussion were not qualified; the obvious guess would be the head count of the fighting armies. And that one is far from 3:1 even if a few battalions are miscounted (then again, what about 100K+ Suojeluskunnat? 10K+ foreign volunteers, almost a division?). Comparing the populations or even the armed forces overall is useless except from the political point of view, but let's address that separately.

It is true, that at most cases it is not said, what were compared, which is unfortunate. But head count of the armed forces had not been for over 400 years the defining factor, but technology, training and economic potential has been that. That's why it would be much more important to compare number of modern equipment instead of number of men with rifles.

194.7.94.82 11:38, 5 Apr 2005 (UTC) Then you must also factor in the fortifications, which the Finns possessed in abundance, and the Russians lacked; proximity to the supply stores (inversely proportional to the distance in kilometers multiplied by their throughput); knowledge of the terrain (inversely proportional to the time since latest survey); and the list goes on and on. Even though I tried to give meaningful metrics for the factors mentioned above, they are much less dependable than head counts. Technology is good, but not decisive. The Russians had plenty of tanks but they were essentially useless on the terrain. The biggest offset was in the heavy artillery; the numerical superiority was the second; in just about any other respect, the Russian fared worse than the Finns.

The Karelian Isthmus was the best (and only) area suitable for tanks in Finland. And later in 1944, according to S.P.Platonov in Bitva za Leningrad 1941-1944 (Battle of Leningrad) claimed that STAVKA considered that Soviet manpower ratio of 1.2:1 was enough in Karelian Isthmus to breach Finnish lines when ratio of heavy equipment was 3-5:1. And fortifications in Main Defence line or VT-line were much stronger than they ever were in Mannerheim Line.

194.7.94.82 14:52, 6 Apr 2005 (UTC) "Russian, ergo false". Tanks are useless when the infantry cannot support them.

You cannot blame me for foolish Soviet commanders and their incompetence. Finns lacked artillery ammunition (also recorded in Soviet sources, btw.) to efficiently protect their installations.

There is no need to have separate count for Suojeluskunnat because their members formed 1/3 of the Finnish army, soldiers, underofficers and officers. They never had their own units but were distributed to their home units. (Finnish system during Winter War was such that men for each company were collected from the same parish, so they all knew each other beforehand, adding unit cohesion.) At the beginning of the Winter War, there were no foreign volunteers. (And those numbers I gave were concerning the situation at Nov 30, 1939 except the daily average of artillery shell usage.)

194.7.94.82 11:38, 5 Apr 2005 (UTC) The Suojeluskunnat members could and did fight where they lived, drafted or not. Much like the Russians during WWII in the occupied territories.

Nope. Only those members who were unfit for military service due to their young or old age were left home to serve in guard duty guarding bridges, rail yards etc. All those who were capable to serve in military were drafted and placed to their local units and transferred to the front. They were never intended to be used in a manner Soviet used their partisans.

194.7.94.82 14:52, 6 Apr 2005 (UTC) Wonderful. We're talking about this spiritual war, yet you're claiming that the Finns would not fight if not officially in military service. I thought better of the Finns, quite frankly. Even the French did better than that.

Well, then you have to factor in grandpa's and kids from Leningrad on Soviet side also. The area Soviet forces occupied was evacuated, so there was no-one to start guerilla war.

"3:1 is only needed in the location of the breakthrough" is a property of Blitzkrieg warfare. Which is not practicable in Finland. Adjusted to Finland’s conditions, the entire Karelian operation was a breakthrough. In February, when the Russians had about 3:1 and artillery to spare.

No, it is as old as the oldest city walls. It was never necessary to breach walls everywhere, what was needed was single breach point which could be used to move forces inside the fortification. And it truly was usable in Finland. The Feb offensive proves the point, as Soviets did NOT try to breach Mannerheim Line everywhere but concentrated their efforts to Summa. You can see it clearly if you check where Soviet units, especially the new formations, were at the time. They were not spread equally along the line but concentrated to Summa.

194.7.94.82 11:38, 5 Apr 2005 (UTC) The city walls analogy is flawed. Attackers must be significantly stronger than the defenders. Otherwise, if the attackers amass most of their forces at one particular spot at the wall, the defenders may simply outflank them and the "attackers" will suddenly find themselves between a hostile wall and hostile troops, with no supplies. Guess what will happen then. Blitzkrieg has the same property: the breakthrough spot must be 3:1 or greater, but the flanks must also be strong; otherwise, the "Blitzkrieg" will result in self-encirclement (c.f. the massacre of the Russians in the north; also Stalingrad, 1942-43). It is only at the tactical level that the attackers need only have local superiority, because the tactical level is limited temporally and does not deal with the question "what happens if the enemy switches his troops from 100 km away".

With Soviet material superiority,

194.7.94.82 14:52, 6 Apr 2005 (UTC) See above. It was offset by other factors.

the strong enough flanks would be more like 0.8:1 which leaves a lot of troops to be massed against the breach point. In most cases Soviets didn't have the 3:1 when breaking through enemy lines in WWII. For example in Bagration they had overall 2.5:1, but overwhelming in breakthrough points.

194.7.94.82 14:52, 6 Apr 2005 (UTC) Thank you for the confirmation. There was about the same ratio in Finland, second attempt.

But it still failed to reach 3:1 you claimed was necessary.

And like I wrote above, Platonov claims that STAVKA considered 1.2:1 enough to crush Finland 1944.

194.7.94.82 14:52, 6 Apr 2005 (UTC) You really ought to decide, whether you trust or mistrust Russian sources.

I trust Soviet low level sources, like copies of orders, maps, reports etc. Higher level sources tend to be less trustworthy. Basically, if you catch them few blatant lies, then it becomes much harder to believe anything they say. The two most common lies are perhaps the existence of Secret protocol in Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact and shelling of Mainila when speaking about the Winter War. --Whiskey 23:21, 7 Apr 2005 (UTC)

...

User:194.7.94.82 18:40, 9 Mar 2005

Could you please sign your entries (with four tildes for example)? It would make them much easier to read. I'll answer your political considerations under the new subsection. --Whiskey 15:22, 10 Mar 2005 (UTC)

194.7.94.82 11:38, 5 Apr 2005 (UTC) I prefix my replies thusly. I have no idea how I could make myself a user like you.

In the top right corner there is a "Create account/log in" link. By pressing it you can create an account you can use. --Whiskey 00:59, 6 Apr 2005 (UTC)

Political Considerations

The other parts of the article are just as amusing. One the one hand, it claims "the Russians had had enough" and so it was a good time to negotiate honourable conditions, while, on the other hand, "The Finns were shocked by the harsh peace terms". Why, then, could the Finns who were doing so stellarly well, not negotiate mild conditions?

The real history of that war is very simple: the Russians seriously underestimated the strength of the Finns and the quality of their fortifications (in fact, the Russians did not even know that the Finns had modern flanking/interlocking fire forts, let alone where they were). They started the offensive without having a decisive numeric superiority. Which must have been 3:1 by any book. When they realised the mistake, they simply stopped the advance, amassed more troops, which took the rest of the year and January, reconnoitred the forts, and pulverized them with their 203mm howitzers and 280mm mortars. By the 12th of February, the Summa sector of the Mannerheim line collapsed (hence the armistice draft). Following that, the Finns were doomed, and they started peace negotiations in March. At that time, the Russians could have done anything they wanted, annexation of the entire country included.

User:194.7.94.82 20:45, 7 Mar 2005

Finns were all the time ready to negotiate peace treaty, and tried to open contacts to SU since early January. It was Soviet Union which until January 29 when they first admitted that there is a war going on and Finnish government exists in Helsinki. It is possible, that SU didn't knew architecture of the most recently built fortifications, but it is only self-delusion that they were unaware of most of them, as only their doors were locked but they were not guarded or located in restricted area, so anybody could have walked in and drawn a picture.

194.7.94.82 12:13, 5 Apr 2005 (UTC) This is naive. You cannot extend your contemporary ideas of borders in Europe to the pre-WWII situation.

Could you please clarify? Soviet spies were vary active before the Winter War as was exemplified by the "Red Army Marching Guide to Finland", small book found on a dead Soviet officer near Suomussalmi, where all main roads, their chokepoints, workarounds, bridges with their weight limits etc. were described. It is not believable that Soviet intelligence failed to check bunkers by the main road leading from Leningrad to Viipuri.

194.7.94.82 16:29, 6 Apr 2005 (UTC) What is there to clarify? Conducting field reconnaissance of fortifications in the border area of a hostile country, where each local will immediately see and report a stranger is not exactly easy. It takes much more than "drawing a picture" to create useful maps of fortifications, when you consider that GPS will be invented only in fifty years. Besides, practically all Russian accounts, some of which you do seem to trust, mention that they knew very little about fortifications.

Soviet spies managed to spectacularly collect information from bridges and their capabilities. Also being a Soviet spy doesn't mean that one has to be Russian, there were enough Finns to do the job. Viipuri was the most cosmopolitan city in Finland at the time, and many residents had their holidays at Terijoki, close to Soviet border. Also Finnish geographic administration has made very good maps which were available to all willing to buy them. (Even today their copies are useful to tourists traveling outside main roads in Karelian Isthmus and Ladoga Karelia.) And all this during the two decades before the war. At least Molotov was very aware of Finnish fortifications during negotiations before the war. It was the stupidness of army leadership if they failed to inform field commanders about them. And it was really interesting that few concrete reinforced machine gun nests without necessary artillery protection proved to be so hard to breach. On average there was one armed (armed with mgs, but six gun bunkers north of River Vuoksi) bunker for every 3km. And the amount of concrete used for Pentagon one could have built 22 Mannerheim Lines.

The Finns were doing stellarly well, considering material situation, but even that wasn't enough. The main reasons why Finns accepted the harsh peace are 1) No foreign intervention (Swedish no to regular troops and allied troop transportation, insufficient allied participation) and 2) No more ammunition.

194.7.94.82 12:13, 5 Apr 2005 (UTC) Yup. The Germans in 1945 also were doing stellarly well, considering material situation, but even that wasn't enough. The main reasons why Germans accepted the harsh peace are 1) No foreign intervention (Swedish no to regular troops and allied troop transportation, insufficient allied participation) and 2) No more ammunition.

Nope. German fronts had collapsed and allies are marching forward several kilometers each day,

194.7.94.82 16:29, 6 Apr 2005 (UTC) Which is all that matters.

capital was occupied,

194.7.94.82 16:29, 6 Apr 2005 (UTC) Does not mean anything at all. The capital of Prussia, for example, was once occupied by Russian troops, moreover, all the Prussians made an oath of loyalty to Russia, yet the King and the army continued to exist and regained control of Prussia, never surrendering.

It was at the time before industialization and total war. Cannot compare.

all of the industrial

194.7.94.82 16:29, 6 Apr 2005 (UTC) Which practically did not exist in Finland.

Everything is relative. For what existed, hadn't been occupied.

and economical heartland was occupied when Germany surrendered unconditionally and was occupied.

194.7.94.82 16:29, 6 Apr 2005 (UTC) Does not matter when the enemy troops "are marching forward several kilometers each day".

So all that is important is "marching forward several kilometers each day" and Finland was to see that if she had been controlled by a madman like Hitler. Much like I dislike that Finnish govt, they finally opened their eyes and realized what was going on.

But in Finland fronts were not marching several kilometers each day. During the last two weeks of war, marching speed was several hundred meters each day at best locations.

Soviet Union ditched the original plan and settled less because

194.7.94.82 12:13, 5 Apr 2005 (UTC) The Soviet Union did not ditch the original plan; the post-war demands were actually slightly bigger than the pre-war.

I have to clarify: Soviet Union postponed the original plan.

194.7.94.82 16:29, 6 Apr 2005 (UTC) What original plan? The original plan was fulfilled; the USSR received the land and the naval bases, and then some.

The original plan was to occupy and annex Finland.

It was only sometimes near the end of the Continuation War, when the original plan was ditched. The original plan was to annex Finland,

194.7.94.82 16:29, 6 Apr 2005 (UTC) Did you ask Stalin himself? There is no reliable evidence as to this "plan". Even if there is some evidence, then it will necessarily come from Russia, and you seem determined to ignore such evidence anyway.

Oh, there are lots of evidence! The most shining one is the creation of Terijoki government, Molotov's international declaration that there is no war between Finland and Soviet Union, radio broadcasts, leaflets and published newspaper by Terijoki government where new Finnish territory included not only Repola and Porajärvi but large areas from Olonets and Viena Karelia, captured orders from destroyed Soviet divisions in middle Finland where they were ordered to behave politely to Swedes at Tornionjoki, etc.

and after the ditching it was changed to making Finland communist satellite state, but even that had to be postponed to the unseen future 1948, when communists were kicked from the government.

194.7.94.82 16:29, 6 Apr 2005 (UTC) Same question, same remark.

Given demand for unconditional surrender at June 1944 (declassified document is available), published interviews of Finnish communists after the war, actions and declarations of Finnish communists after the war.

1) Need to reorganize and train army before somebody else takes advantage of the sorrow state of it,

194.7.94.82 12:13, 5 Apr 2005 (UTC) To dispatch it somewhere else, like in the Baltic States or Poland, perhaps.

You are not aware of extensive reform done in Red Army based on the experience from the Winter War? It was still ongoing when Germans attacked.

194.7.94.82 16:29, 6 Apr 2005 (UTC) And you're apparently not aware of the small enterprise in the Baltic States that followed within weeks and having to maintain military presence in the occupied Polish lands?

Soviet Union was increasing the size of the army very fast during the time, and it was estimated that only 40% of manpower was included to Winter War. The occupation of Baltic states could have been done at any suitable time, it was not timed to be done June 14, but the end of Winter War released troops to that enterprise. And you proved my point when pointing the occupation of Poland: SU couldn't spare time to finish Finland but had to move troops elsewhere.

2) Allied intervention could push SU to general war too early

194.7.94.82 12:13, 5 Apr 2005 (UTC) The allies never even considered for a second sending any expedition to rescue the Finns. The force they were preparing was to occupy parts of Norway or Sweden. Read Churchill’s memoirs, or any WWII book that deals with the battle of Norway. The Winter War was just a pretext.

You know that. I know that. In hindsight. At the time it happened Stalin didn't knew that.

194.7.94.82 16:29, 6 Apr 2005 (UTC) Of course, you again asked Stalin himself. Please understand that ever since 1938 and until 1953 all the Russian foreign policy was made precisely by two persons, Stalin and Molotov. And we know exactly zero about what influenced their decisions most. Unless, of course, you want to trust all the Russian literature that you find so questionable on other occasions.

Declassified documents are quite revealing, and it was those documents Stalin and Molotov had to base their decisions. One recent research used declassified material of the meetings where material from Paris and London were handled and how Stalin reacted to those presented.

In fact, Soviet spies from Paris were feeding exaggerated reports of the troop numbers and the seriousness of preparations to send troops and material to Finland through the first months of 1940. Only few days after the peace was concluded he received correct numbers and plans.

194.7.94.82 16:29, 6 Apr 2005 (UTC) And we know that Stalin pushed aside similar reports until the 22nd of June, 1941. So it is hardly convincing.

Well, he didn't push them totally aside, as many units were upgraded to full war readiness before that date and Red Navy was issued to war footing day before actual attack.

3) German pressure to end conflict before allies arrive

194.7.94.82 12:13, 5 Apr 2005 (UTC) Source? As far as I know, the Germans would actually prefer to keep the war going.

Germans were fully aware of allied help offers and their real intentions of occupation of Swedish ore fields. And also what that would mean to German war machine. So Germans started to pressure both sides to the peace to thwart allied excursion. Officially German diplomats informed their Finnish counterparts that Germany will not help Finland and warned about allied participation. Unofficially Göring delivered letter through Swedish intermediates where he strongly pressured government to accept any kind of peace. On the Soviet side, German ambassador in Moscow, von der Schulenburg, announced German worries for dragging war and hoped it would end quickly.

4) Finns were still resisting furiously

194.7.94.82 12:13, 5 Apr 2005 (UTC) As did the Germans in 1945, see above.

But contrary to Germany, the heartland was still unconquered and fronts were holding. Barely, but still holding, and Soviet advances could be counted in tens or hundreds of meters each day after the retreat to back line.

194.7.94.82 16:29, 6 Apr 2005 (UTC) It was not holding anywhere. It was wide open and easily exploitable. The Russians may never have tried to exploit, but it was probably because they simply expected that the Finns would finally stop playing fool.

Until the peace Soviet forces were under an order to capture as much ground as possible, as was evidenced by declassified documents. This lead for example a foolish assault in Viipuri lasting two hours at the morning of March 13, several hours after the peace treaty was signed.

One of the most striking features of this discussion is your conviction that the Russians do something nasty simply by default; and when they do something less nasty (they cannot do anything decent by definition, so it can only be less nasty), it necessarily means they are forced.

I don't think Soviets did nasty by default and I could imaging many things they could have done more nasty. It is only so, that the evidence available supports my interpretation better. And Stalin really understood the meaning of force.

Have you ever considered, even for a second, that the Russians genuinely wanted to safeguard their country against a Finnish invasion (having some post-revolution reminiscences) and they merely wanted a strip of land and a couple of islands, and did not want to escalate the conflict beyond that? Then all their actions make sense, eliminating any guesswork.

I have considered it and found that it doesn't fit available evidence. If they were genuine in their interest to safeguard their border, they would have acted very differently before the war. --Whiskey 16:15, 11 Apr 2005 (UTC)

Even your aftermath analogies with the Baltic States do not make much sense. The Russians knew that if they should have a war, the enemy would come from the West, through the Baltic States, which is why their annexation was strategically sound. They knew that no serious force would come from the North, so annexation of Finland was strategically useless. You may have noticed that in the actual event, only one year later, it happened exactly like that: the real enemy came from the West, and the North only deposited a token force. Which was, however, sufficient to cut-off and starve Leningrad; without the buffer gained at the Winter War, Leningrad would probably have been consumed entirely.

In Soviet plans fight would be taken to the enemy ground immediately. Controlling Finnish territory would have strategic signifigance, as it provides threat to the Swedish ore fields and ore transport, control of Northern shore of Gulf of Finland and provide strategic depth to the Murmansk. I disagree the significance of Winter War to the survival of Leningrad. Without the war it could have been likely that no attack from Finnish soil to Soviet Union would have happened and Finland could have provided some food to the civilians of the city, but Winter War and Soviet policy after the war guaranteed the Continuation War.

194.7.94.82 12:13, 5 Apr 2005 (UTC) By the same argument, Germany's enemies should have hurried to transact peace in March 1945.

They would have done it, if there had been the threat of attack from two almost equal opponents as German enemies and if German leadership had been willing to negotiate. :-)

194.7.94.82 16:29, 6 Apr 2005 (UTC) Almost equal opponents? This is nonsense. They had to transport their troops by sea, which is already limiting. Further they could not transport much, because that would have naked the Western front.

5) was the phoney war really a phoney and in truth Germans and allies were negotiating peace and common attack against SU. --Whiskey 18:04, 10 Mar 2005 (UTC)

194.7.94.82 12:13, 5 Apr 2005 (UTC) Source?

Paranoid like Stalin couldn't count on that not to happen. Germany had been vocal critic of Soviet Union and had clear intentions to attack it. Britain and France had participated in Russian Civil War less than two decades earlier in an attempt to overthrow communist regime. (Stalin had kept three divisions in Murmansk to defend the area against possible allied invsion through the whole Winter War.) And like you said, phoney war was kind of phoney: in half a year neither side had made a real offensive. No serious blood had been spilled in an amount that negotiated solution would become impossible, and allies had sold Checks before... Lots of reasons for mistrust.--Whiskey 08:40, 6 Apr 2005 (UTC)

194.7.94.82 16:29, 6 Apr 2005 (UTC) So there is no proof except that "Stalin was paranoid". Which is also not granted, by the way.

Stalin never counted on the goodwill of France and Britain towards Soviet Union. In fact, he used British as an example to the threat to Soviets about the same seriousness as a Germany. --Whiskey 22:01, 11 Apr 2005 (UTC)

There exists a phase of the war, spanning over most of February 1940, when it seems as if Finland's Cabinet interpreted the fresh Russian preparedness to discuss peace terms as a sign of weakness that had to be exploited, and in effect focused on their hope for a more favorable attitude from Stockholm and more substantial support from France and the United Kingdom. It may be said that the Finns were "all the time ready to negotiate a peace treaty" but then it must be kept in mind that they were so on their own terms — terms that most of all didn't take into account that the Soviet Union in fact was a 50 times as populous country.

/Tuomas 15:46, 12 Mar 2005 (UTC)

Yes, the political establishment was partly still living the time of Russian revolution and their expectations of Soviet military capabilities were based of the collapsing tsarist army and fresh unexperienced red army, which had failed so spectacularly in Poland and Estonia.--Whiskey 12:14, 14 Mar 2005 (UTC)

Speaking of the political point of view, the position of Finland can only be characterized as inadequate. It is obvious now and was obvious back then that Finland would lose. So her only hope was for external help. But that was even more inadequate, after the (then) fresh examples of "Western help". Czechoslovakia was not helped; Poland had a GUARANTEE for military help, which never materialized (the "Phoney War" as military help is, well, phoney). And Finland was not exactly well situated for help in the first place. It would not have received help from Germany, and it would not have received much from Sweden (who could not risk irritating Hitler's biggest ally too much); the British could not have landed anywhere in Norway without causing Germany to invade Norway (which happened anyway because of their "preparations"); the only port into the Atlantic that Finland had would have been (and was) cut off in the first days of war. Both Russia and Finland paid dearly for this inadequacy.

User:194.7.94.82 18:40, 9 Mar 2005

You analysis is correct in hindsight, but one can not forget that there is a certain inertia in peoples' thoughts — particularly when under stress — so in fact it was not understood in Helsinki that the guarantee system of the League of Nations was totally defunct, or that the Swedes really feared, and had reason to fear, the threats of invasion from Britain and Germany. Virtually all leading Finns were bound by old impressions and perceptions, and also disadvantaged by a certain lack of understanding for important leaders and movements in other countries. An important explanation for this is that independent Finland had a ready set of civil servants, but absolutely no experience of diplomacy beyond that kind of "diplomacy" that the semi-autonomous Grand Duchy had pursued with Russian powers. And the era of the League of Nations prepared the Finnish diplomatic corps very badly for the needs after the Abyssinia Crisis. Another partial explanation is that the outcome of the Civil War removed a generation or two of Social Democrats, and pushed the Liberals far out in rightist direction, thus they who could have been bridges to their counterparts in other countries were incapacitated.

So, in effect, the foreign ministry in Helsinki didn't understand the power-relations between public opinion, politicians and bureaucrats in France, Britain or Sweden, nor the thinking in leftist movements that had gained influence due to democratization (and the Great Depression), most notably the Social Democrats who were the de-facto rulers in Stockholm. Neither did they understand Nazi Germany. And, by the way, also Kremlinology was a subject they flunked. So, yes, Finland's position was inadequate, and hopefully our diplomatic corps of today has learned some lessons.

...But, it's a matter of definition what you call a victory and a defeat. If Russia wanted all of Finland and Finland wanted preserved independence, then Finland won,

194.7.94.82 12:13, 5 Apr 2005 (UTC) There is no indication whatsoever that the USSR actually wanted Finland entirely. The negotiations stopped when Finland refused to lease, sell or exchange Hanko.

For other proof that SU wanted Finland entirely, see above. The Soviet insistence of Hanko was another proof to Finns, that Soviets had something different in store for Finland that simple basing rights. SU didn't even try to change Hanko to some offshore islands, which would have been more acceptable to Finns.

although to the price of economically and emotionally very valuable territory at Lake Ladoga and the Karelan Isthmus. This, basically, is an echo of the position of Berlin and Stockholm when they pressured Helsinki to "give in". In retrospect I think many ministers in Finland's cabinet had too much of sisu for the good of the country, but that's of course a sacrilege to say.

 :-)

/Tuomas 15:46, 12 Mar 2005 (UTC)

One has to take into account the certain overjealous regard of land which is very common to newly independent states. And you certainly hit to the point with your analysis of Finnish diplomatic skills and experiences. I'm, as a Finn, more than ready to admit that Finnish leaders (maybe it is a national trait?) were stubborn and hanging too strongly to the legatimacy of treaties and papers and not seeing political currents beneath.

But, so was Soviet leadership also. If SU had negotiated more skillfully and Bona Fide, it had taken also into account Finnish security concerns

194.7.94.82 12:13, 5 Apr 2005 (UTC) "An objective examination of these terms suggests that they were framed on a rational basis, to provide a greater security to Russian territory without serious detriment to the security of Finland. They would, clearly, have hindered the use of Finland as a jumping-off point for any German attack on Russia. But they would not have given Russia any appreciable advantage for an attack on Finland. Indeed, the territory which Russia offered to cede to Finland would have widened Finland’s uncomfortably narrow waistline." Sir Basil Henry Liddell Hart, History of the Second World War.

This makes me wonder if Liddell Hart has really looked the maps. Repola and Porajärvi were located south from the narrowest part of Finland.

194.7.94.82 16:29, 6 Apr 2005 (UTC) I do not doubt that for a second. Moreover, you can check his maps, they are in the book.

The area SU offered was located south of Kostamus, but the narrowest waistline is well north of Kostamus.

but it failed to do it by keeping demanding a base at the Finnish coast of the mouth of Gulf of Finland and breach of Mannerheim Line at isthmus.

194.7.94.82 12:13, 5 Apr 2005 (UTC) "The re-adjustments of the frontier would still leave intact the main defences on the Mannerheim Line." Ibid.

Ok. This makes it. He has never looked the maps. The Soviet demands to the end of negotiations included Koivisto peninsula at the mouth of Bay of Vyborg thus breaching the Mannerheim Line which reached Gulf of Finland 20km east of Koivisto at Inkilä.

194.7.94.82 16:29, 6 Apr 2005 (UTC) He says "main defences" anyway. The Russians were willing to pay, so the Finns could use the money to restore that small sector.

The payment they offered was from Hanko, not from ceded fortification. Building fortifications takes time, and for that time Soviets have free access. Also that small Inkilä sector would have been replaced by a lot longer and less defensible line. And the new border would have given control of Bay of Viipuri to SU.

Although small movements on border corrections were made, they didn't solve any security concerns Finns had.

194.7.94.82 12:13, 5 Apr 2005 (UTC) See above.

Similar treaties with Baltic countries proved to be kiss of death to their independence, as Soviet military and their free access inside their territory made resistance impossible. And Soviets were adamant with Hanko base, which included the transportation through Finnish territory.

194.7.94.82 16:29, 6 Apr 2005 (UTC) You cannot use that argument. The Baltic States were annexed after the Winter War. Finland had no grounds whatsoever to believe she was to be annexed.

Poland had been already annexed. Also there was floating around versions about the contents of the secret protocol of Molotiv-Ribbentrop-pact, so most politicians in Finland had clear opinion what was to come. It is true, that some politicians, most notable being Paasikivi, considered that Baltic states had behaved more wisely during and right after the war, but when Baltic states were occupied June 14, even Paasikivi considered Finnish decisions not to accept demands correct and the best option for Finland.

The same thing is evident also in peace negotiations: It would have been major political strike against Finnish political system, if SU had refrained to it's original demands instead of more than they controlled militarily.

194.7.94.82 12:13, 5 Apr 2005 (UTC) I do not understand what is said here.

If Soviet Union has taken only what it demanded before the war, then public support to the government, which had led them to "avoidable" war with loss of life and no compensation from Eastern Karelia, could have collapsed. Although after the Terijoki Government the question become more complicated. --Whiskey 08:40, 6 Apr 2005 (UTC)

194.7.94.82 16:29, 6 Apr 2005 (UTC) After your explanation, I understand it even less. Do you mean that the govt would have preferred to give more to the USSR? As for the "public support to the government", it should have collapsed much earlier. I have been trying to put it mildly, but I just cannot: that govt was a typical "war mongers" govt, and I just do not understand why it was never tried for its crimes.

Hypothesis: 1) Before the war: Soviet demands areas and offers compensation for those areas. 2) After the war: Soviet demands same areas and offers nothing in compensation. If those were the options, then which one would you have taken? In reality those were not the options and in it SU blundered it's opportunity to make coup in Finland. By it's blunders in diplomacy it only strengthened the Finnish government and undermined it's own cause.

Which government do you consider typical "war mongers" government, Ryti or Cajander? And why? --Whiskey 22:01, 11 Apr 2005 (UTC)

(There are only two wars, where Russia/Soviet Union received more land than they militarily controlled: Winter War and Continuation War.) It would have discredited whole political leadership before and during the war and possibly enabled communist coup before Barbarossa.--Whiskey 12:14, 14 Mar 2005 (UTC)

The difference: It turned out, they could afford it. ---Johan Magnus 15:41, 14 Mar 2005 (UTC)

Yes, that is the way it works with major power-minor power relations: Major power can afford even very bad bluders without fatal consequences, minor powers don't, and they have to be much more careful with their actions, not to make or take promises lightly and not to tie itself too tightly with majors. Ryti-Ribbentrop agreement was a good example of this kind of behaviour. --Whiskey 09:30, 15 Mar 2005 (UTC)

Timeline of Peace Negotiations

I'd like to add this here, as it could provide future material to article itself.

• December 24, Author Hella Wuolijoki writes a letter to Tanner where she offers to mediate peace negotiations.
• January 8, After negotiating with Ryti and Paasikivi and receiving information from Günther that Mme Kollontai would receive Wuolijoki, accept her offer.
• January 29, Günther delivers message from V. Molotov where he announces Soviet readiness to discuss with Finland.
• February 2, Finland proposes as a starting point the results from negotiations of previous autumn with additional concessions from Finland (through land exhange).
• February 5, Soviets reject proposal
• February 5, Allied high command decides to send troops to Finland
• February 11, Red army starts offensive at Summa
• February 12, SU presents territorial demands: Karelian Isthmus, Ladoga Karelia and Rybachi Peninsula.
• February 15, Mannerheim orders retreat to rear line.
• February 19, King of Sweden announces his rejection to officeal help to Finland.
• February 21, Tanner asks Günther to mediate with SU.
• February 23, SU respons with exact borderline for territorial demands.
• February 28, Finnish government decides that the only option is to make peace immediately.
• February 29, Mannerheim express very pessimistic view of military situation.
• March 3, Tanner informs Günther that Finland is ready for negotiations if Viipuri and Sortavala are left to Finns.
• March 5, Molotov rejects the demand.
• March 6, Finnish government selects peace negotiators.
• March 8, negotiations start, Salla is added to ceded territories.
• March 9, President Kallio and government gives authority to sign any kind of peace treaty to negotiators.
• March 12, Moscow Peace Treaty signed
• March 13, Ceasefire, the Winter War ends

--Whiskey 12:17, 14 Mar 2005 (UTC)

My correction

1) comander od Finns: Mannerheim (C-i-C), no Wallenius 2) soviet forces in Finland: minimal 1,3 milion man, porbably more - cca 450,000 is state from start of war only. 3) my balance of loses of soviet union is from soviet modern war literature.

Cinik (cswikipedia). 62.209.237.4 12:50, 10 Apr 2005 (UTC)