Euthyphro dilemma
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The Euthyphro Dilemma is found in Plato's dialogue Euthyphro, in which Socrates asks Euthyphro: “Is the pious loved by the gods because it is pious, or is it pious because it is loved by the gods?” In monotheistic terms, this is usually transformed into: “Is what is moral commanded by god because it is moral, or is it moral because it's willed by god?”.
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Explanation of the dilemma
The first horn of the dilemma implies that morality is independent of god and, indeed, that god is bound by morality just as his creatures are. God then becomes little more than a passer-on of moral knowledge.
The second horn of the dilemma (known as divine command theory) runs into four main problems. First, it implies that what is good is arbitrary, based merely upon god's whim; if god had created the world to include the values that rape, murder, and torture were virtues, while mercy and charity were vices, then they would have been. Secondly, it implies that calling god good makes no sense (or, at best, that one is simply saying that god is consistent). Thirdly, it commits the naturalistic fallacy; to explain the evaluative claim that murder is wrong (or the prescription that one should not commit murder) in terms of what god has or hasn't said is to argue from a putative fact about the world to a value (to argue to an ‘ought’ from an ‘is’). Fourthly, it seems to lead to the conclusion that all moral values are at the same level (because what is wrong is simply to disobey god); that is, committing murder is no worse than telling a lie.
Attempts to resolve the dilemma
The Euthyphro dilemma has troubled philosophers and theologians ever since Plato first propounded it. Both horns have had their adherents, the Divine Command Theory probably being the more popular; some philosophers have tried to find a middle ground.
False-dilemma response
Christian philosophers, starting with Thomas Aquinas have often answered that the dilemma is false: yes, god commands something because it is good, but the reason it is good is that good is an essential part of god's nature. So goodness is grounded in god's character and merely expressed in His commands. Therefore whatever a good god commands will always be good.
This approach is, however, essentially a rejection of the Divine Command Theory in favour of the other horn; that is, it depends upon the notion that goodness is a property of god, and thus not under god's control.
Necessary and contingent moral values?
Some modern philosophers have also attempted to find a compromise. For example, Richard Swinburne has argued that moral values fall into two categories: the necessary and the contingent. God can decide to create the world in many different ways, each of which grounds a particular set of contingent values; with regard to these, then, the divine command theory is the correct explanation. Certain values, however, such as the immorality of rape, murder, and torture, hold in all possible worlds, so it makes no sense to say that god could have created them differently; with regard to these values, the first horn of the dilemma is the best explanation.
Swinburne's account depends upon a clear distinction between necessary and contingent moral values — however, it's not at all clear that such a distinction can be maintained.
Sources and references
- Plato Euthyphro (any edition, really; the Penguin version can be found in The Last Days of Socrates ISBN 0-14-044-037-2)
- Paul Helm [ed.] Divine Commands and Morality (1981: Oxford, Oxford University Press) ISBN 0-19-875049-8
- Derrick Farnell, God and Morality (http://www.chains-of-reason.org/articles/god-and-morality/current.htm)
- Peter J. King, Morality & religion I (http://users.ox.ac.uk/~shil0124/dialogues/morality-I.pdf) (PDF file)
- Greg Koukl, Euthyphro's Dilemma (http://www.str.org/free/commentaries/apologetics/evil/euthyphr.htm), Stand to Reason commentary, 2002.
- Norman Kretzmann “Abraham, Isaac, and Euthyphro: god and the basis of morality” (in Eleonore Stump & Michael J. Murray [edd] Philosophy of Religion: The Big Questions (1999: Oxford: Blackwell) ISBN 0-631-20604-3
- Steve Lovell, C.S. Lewis and the Euthyphro Dilemma (http://www.theism.net/article/29), 2002.