Revolt of the Admirals
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The "Revolt of the Admirals" was a late 1940s episode during which several high-ranking officers of the United States Navy publicly disagreed with the United States government's plans for the military forces. Template:Spoken Wikipedia
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Background
The debate that caused the "Revolt" had been building for several years, but climaxed in 1949 when many of those officers, including Chief of Naval Operations Louis E. Denfeld as well as Secretary of the Navy John L. Sullivan (the civilian head of the Department of the Navy), were either fired or forced to resign.
In November 1943, General George C. Marshall called for postwar unification of the Department of War and the Department of the Navy. His action led to what became known as the “unification debates” and the eventual passage of the National Security Act of 1947. That Act created a unified National Military Establishment, a National Security Council (NSC), Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), and an independent United States Air Force.
The generals of the newly-formed Air Force proposed the doctrine that strategic bombing, particularly with nuclear weapons, was all that would be needed to win any future war. To support such a doctrine, of course, the Air Force would need to build a large fleet of long-range heavy bombers, and so their projects should receive large amounts of funding, beginning with the B-36 Peacemaker bomber.
The admirals of the Navy disagreed. Pointing to the overwhelming dominance of the aircraft carrier in the war in the Pacific, they asked the United States Congress to fund a large fleet of "supercarriers" and their supporting battle groups, beginning with USS United States (CVA-58). Wars could not be won by strategic bombing alone, they maintained, and to decide that any future war would only be fought with widespread use of nuclear weapons was "immoral" — though United States was designed to support 100,000-pound aircraft, which would be large enough to carry the multi-ton nuclear bombs of the day.
Cancellation of United States
The first Secretary of Defense, James V. Forrestal, supported the Naval position and authorized construction of United States. However, he had to resign for reasons of health on 28 March 1949 and was replaced by Louis A. Johnson, who supported the Air Force's position. On 23 April — less than a month after taking office — Johnson ordered cancellation of United States. Secretary Sullivan resigned in protest.
A research group, Op-23, headed by Captain Arleigh A. Burke, began to gather material critical of the B-36's performance and capabilities. An "anonymous document" soon appeared, claiming that the B-36 was a "billion-dollar blunder" and alleging fraud on the part of B-36 contractors, specifically that Secretary Johnson, who had been on the board of directors of Consolidated Vultee, manufacturer of the bomber, had a personal interest in its production.
Result of Congressional Hearings
In its final report, the House Armed Services Committee found no substance to the charges relating to Johnson's and Symington's roles in aircraft procurement. It held that evaluation of the B-36's worth was the responsibility of the Weapons Systems Evaluation Group, and that the services jointly should not pass judgment on weapons proposed by one service. On cancellation of the supercarrier, the committee questioned the qualifications of the Army and Air Force chiefs of staff, who had testified in support of Johnson's decision, to determine vessels appropriate for the Navy. The committee, disapproving of Johnson's "summary manner" of terminating the carrier and failure to consult congressional committees before acting, stated that "national defense is not strictly an executive department undertaking; it involves not only the Congress but the American people as a whole speaking through their Congress. The committee can in no way condone this manner of deciding public questions."
The author of the so-called "anonymous document" turned out to be Cedric R. Worth, civilian assistant to the Under-Secretary of the Navy. A House Investigating Committee recommended that Cedric Worth be fired. Following a naval court of inquiry, Worth was dismissed.
The committee expressed solid support for effective unification, but stated that "there is such a thing as seeking too much unification too fast" and observed that "there has been a Navy reluctance in the interservice marriage, an over-ardent Army, a somewhat exuberant Air Force … It may well be stated that the committee finds no unification Puritans in the Pentagon."
Finally, the committee condemned the dismissal of Admiral Denfield. The House Armed Services Committee concluded that Denfeld's removal was a reprisal because of his testimony and a challenge to effective representative government.
Army General Omar Bradley, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, called the Navy admirals, "'fancy dans' who won't hit the line with all they have on every play unless they can call the signals" who were in "open rebellion against the civilian control."
Continuing Effects
The "Revolt of the Admirals" opened the discussion, still on-going, in the American military establishment about the role of nuclear weapons, strategic bombing, and the unification of military command. The first test of national doctrine came on 25 June 1950 when the Korean War broke out, and the national command authority decided that strategic bombing would not be used to defeat North Korea — rather, the use of ground forces, supported by naval gunfire and amphibious assault, would defeat the invasion. Although that limited war was dismissed as an aberration by supporters of the Air Force doctrine, the Vietnam War and scores of other smaller conflicts have been fought without the use of strategic bombing. The idea of defeating an enemy with few or no American casualties continues to be seductive, though in the 21st century cruise missiles have replaced high-altitude bombing as the panacea of choice.
Air Force and Navy historians continue to argue the positions held by both sides during this "revolt".
Reference
- Jeffrey G. Barlow, Revolt of the Admirals, the Fight for Naval Aviation (1945-1950) (Naval Historical Center, 1994)
External links
- Hermann Wolk article in Air Force Magazine, from 1988 (http://www.afa.org/magazine/perspectives/0588revolt.asp)
- Death and Rebirth of the Supercarrier (http://www.hazegray.org/navhist/carriers/supercar.htm) - Andrew Toppan, 1996