Management systems for road safety

Contents

1 Paradigms 2 National programs 3 Management systems 4 Semantics 5 References 6 See also 7 External links

Paradigms

Progress in the area of prevention is formulated in an environment of beliefs, called paradigms as can be seen in the next table. Some of them can be refereed as professional folklore, i.e. a widely supported set of beliefs with no real basis. For example, the “accident-prone driver” was a belief that was supported by the data in the sense that a small number of drivers do participate in a disproportionate number of accidents, it follows that the identification and removal of this drivers will reduce crashes. A more scientific analysis of the data indicate that this phenomena can be explained simply by the random nature of the accidents, and not for a specific error-prone attitude of such drivers.

Evolution of road safety paradigms

ASPECTS	PARADIGM I	PARADIGM II	PARADIGM III	PARADIGM IV
Decennia of dominating position	1900 - 1925/35	1925/35 - 1965/70	1965/70 - 1980/85	1980/85 - present
Description	Control of motorised carriage	Mastering traffic situations	Managing traffic system	Managing transport system
Main disciplines involved	Law enforcement	Car and road engineering, psychology	Traffic engineering, traffic medicine, advanced statistics	Advanced technology, systems analysis, sociology, communications
Terms used about unwanted events	Collision	Accident	Crash, casualty	Suffering, costs
Premise concerning unsafety	Transitional problem, passing stage of maladjustment	Individual problem, inadequate moral and skills	Defective traffic system	Risk exposure
Data ideals in research	Basic statistics, answers on “What”	Causes of accidents; “Why”	Cost/benefit ratio of means “How”	Multidimensional
Organisational form of safety work	Separate efforts on trial and error basis	Co-ordinated efforts on voluntary basis	Programmed efforts, authorised politically	Decentralisation, local management
Typical countermeasures	Vehicle codes and inspection, school patrols	The three E’s doctrine, screening of accident prone drivers	Combined samples of measures for diminishing risks	Networking and pricing
Effects	Gradual increase in traffic risks and health risks	Rapid increase of health risk with decreasing traffic risk	Successive cycles of decrease of health risks and traffic risks	Continuous reduction of serious road accidents

From: OECD Road Transport Research

(to be completed)

National programs

A prerequisite for progress in this area is to introduce national programs with clear and quantifiable objectives, some examples are :

• Chile 0% growth in fatalities, (down from historical 5-7% annual growth), (CONASET, 1993)
• EU, 40% reduction in fatalities for 2010.
• Denmark 40% reduction for 2000
• Finland 65% reduction for 2005
• United Kingdom 33% reduction for 2000
• USA No more than 1.0 fatality for every 100 million vehicle miles traveled (VMT) by 2008

Sweden has developed a new concept to improve road safety called "Vision Zero" Vision Zero is conceived from the ethical base that it can never be acceptable that people are killed or seriously injured when moving within the road transport system. It centres around an explicit goal, and develops into a highly pragmatic and scientifically-based strategy which challenges the traditional approach to road safety.

Vision Zero: strategic principles

• The traffic system has to adapt to take better account of the needs, mistakes and vulnerabilities of road users.
• The level of violence that the human body can tolerate without being killed or seriously injured forms the basic parameter in the design of the road transport system.
• Vehicle speed is the most important regulating factor for a safe road traffic. It should be detemined by the technical standard of both roads and vehicle so as not to exceed the level of violence that the human body can tolerate.

While the concept envisages responsibility for safety amongs the designers and users of the system, the designer has the final responsibility for "fail-safe" measures.

Vision Zero: system designer has primary responsibility

• System designers are responsible for the design, operation and the use of the road transport system and are thereby responsible for the level of safety within the entire system.
• Road users are responsible for following the rules for using the road transport system set by the system designers.
• If the users fail to comply with these rules due to a lack of knowledge, acceptance or ability, the system designers are required to take the necessary further steps to counteract people being killed or injured.

Management systems

Modern Road Safety makes a distinction between the situation and the management systems necessary to control it, with prevention activities that largely exceeds the self-evident fields of the traditional 3’E (Engineering, Enforcement, Education) approach, first introduced in 1925. Modern Management systems have the aims of be inclusive, i.e. to include explicitly all activities part of such system.

The more extensive effort to obtain a comprehensive, holistic design of a road safety system, with the direct participation of 123 persons, representatives of different areas of activities, was done in Chile, (CONASET, 1993), utilizing the methodology for the design of social systems developed by Del Valle (1992). The result was the design of the control apparatus for this situation, called “Road Safety System”, defined by its components. An informal test of his completeness can be done simply by consider this management systems without any of his components, for example if we remove rescue we simply lose opportunities to save human life coming from activities in this area. It can be used as a outline to assess the completeness of national road safety programs.

Semantics

The field of Road safety is handicapped by the terminology. Words have power to them that conveys impressions as well as meanings, phenomena that in this case results in sub-optimal approaches to prevention, as follows:

• Road safety

The name “Road safety” have convey that in this field the activities needs to concentrate on items that properly belong to roads and, by extension, to the roads authorities, keeping a reduced scope of activities in a number of different areas, in spite of their potentially significant contributions. For example, in the U.K., Burrough, (1991) indicates that only one-third of the target reduction will be delivered by road safety engineering measures while Koornstra ( 2002) indicates “The contribution of local road engineering to the fatality reductions between 1980 and 2000 are estimated to be 4% for Sweden, 10% for Britain, and 5% for the Netherlands”. Whereas TEC (2003), quotes a research from the imperial college, London that indicates than the progress in medical technology and care made a significant contribution to the 45% fall of fatalities during the last 20 years, and account for 700 lives saved annually, and further puts forward that the lack of consideration of the benefits coming from the medical area, suggests that road safety is probably less effective that thought. It is remarkable that implicitly the author of the research doesn’t consider medicals activities as a component of a road safety management system.

It reflects confusion between the space where this phenomenon occurs (mainly roads) and the design of the Management systems to control it, in what “Roads” is only a 11% of the activities(one area out of nine in previus table).

• Accident

the use of the word “accident” with his connotations of it being and unavoidable event, weaken the resolve to intervene in order to reduce crashes and his harm. Evans (1991) argues that the word “crash” indicates in a simple factual way what is observed, while “Accident” seems to suggest in addition a general explanation of why it occurred.

• Cause of accidents

Moder Road safety recognize that crashes, and his consequences, are multifactor events, Ogden (1996) indicates: “An approach based in notions of cause and blame is simplistic in the extreme”. In short, crashes have factors not causes .

• Problem-solving

Old approaches emphasize the concept of problem-solving in Road safety, but it is more correct to recognize that Road safety activities doesn’t solve problems. For instance, when a safer road design is implemented, hopefully the number of crashes, or their seriousness, will go down, but they will not disappear. It is more correct to see crashes as an area where the implementation of correct policies, programs and measures will reduce his numbers or consequences, but they will no be ´´solved´´.

This realization is important, because it changes the focus from a problem that will go away if we devote enough resources to it, to a situation requiring on-going management. This management in turn requires the development of scientifically-based techniques, witch will enable us to predict with confidence that safety resources are well-spent and likely to be effective.

References

Ashton, S. J. and G.M. Mackay (1979) Some Characteristics of the Population who Suffer Trauma as Pedestrians When Hit by Cars and Some Resulting Implications, 4th IRCOBI International Conference, Gothenburg.

Burrough P. Procedure for the Road Safety Audit of Truck Roads Schemes. 10p. (UK Department of Transportation, London)

CONASET 1993, Política Nacional de Seguridad de Tránsito. Comisión Nacional de Seguridad de Tránsito, Chile 1993.

Del Valle, Alfredo, 1992. Innovative planning for development: An action-oriented approach. University of Pennsylvania, 1992.

Evans, L. (1991) Older drivers risks to themselves and to other road users. Transportation Research Record 1325, 34-41. Transportation Research Board, Washington, D.C.

Koornstra, 2002. SUNflower: A comparative study of the development of road safety in Sweden, the United Kingdom, and the Netherlands Matthijs Koornstra (SWOV), David Lynam (TRL), Göran Nilsson (VTI), Piet Noordzij (SWOV), Hans-Erik Pettersson (VTI), Fred Wegman (SWOV), and Peter Wouters (SWOV). SWOV, 2002. http://www.swov.nl/rapport/Sunflower/Sunflower.pdf

Murray CJL, Lopez AD, eds. The global burden of disease: a comprehensive assessment of mortality and disability from diseases, injuries, and risk factors in 1990 and projected to 2020. Boston, Harvard University Press, 1996.

Nader, Ralph, Unsafe at any speed; the designed-in dangers of the American automobile

Ogden, K. W., 1996 SAFER ROADS, A guide to road safety engineering. Ashgate Publishing Limited.

OECD Road Transport Research: Outlook 2000. CHAPTER V: ROAD SAFETY, (1997 )Table V.1 Page. 17 http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/41/2/1859509.pdf

OECD Economic Evaluation of Raod Safety Measures (2000)

Ogden, K. W., 1996 SAFER ROADS, A guide to road safety engineering. Ashgate Publishing Limited.

Silcock, David. Preventing death and injury on the world’s roads. Transport Reviews, Volume 23 Number 3, July-September 2003.

TEC 2003. Traffic Engineering & Control June 2003, page 200. Hemming Group.

(to be completed)

See also

• Road safety
• Traffic psychology

External links

• VISION ZERO (http://www.vv.se/traf_sak/nollvis/tsnollvis3.htm)

• World first car death (http://www.roadpeace.org/articles/WorldFirstDeath.html)