Finlandization
|
|
Finlandization (Finnlandisierung in German) is a negatively charged term originating in West German political debate of the 1960s and 1970s. As the term was used in Germany and other NATO countries, it expressed the process of turning into a neutral country which, although maintaining national sovereignty, in foreign politics resolves not to challenge a more powerful neighbour. Commonly in reference to Finland's policies vis-à-vis the Soviet Union during the Cold War, but could refer to similar international relations, such as Denmark's attitude toward Germany between 1871 and 1940.
| Contents |
Origin and international usage
In Germany, the term was used mainly by proponents of closer adaptation to US interests, chiefly Franz Josef Strauss, but was initially coined in scholarly debate and made known by the German political scientists Walther Hallstein and Richard Löwenthal, reflecting feared effects of withdrawal of US troops from Germany. It came to be used in the debate of the NATO countries in response to Willy Brandt's attempts to normalize relations with East Germany, and the following widespread scepticism in Germany against NATO's Dual-Track Decision. Later, after the fall of the Soviet Union, the term has been used in Finland for the post-1968 radicalization in the latter half of the Kekkonen era.
Finnish perception
In Finland the use (by others) of the term "Finlandization" was perceived as a brickbat stemming from an inability to understand the practicalities of how a small nation might hope to make a deal with a culturally and ideologically alien superpower without losing its sovereignty. Finland cut such a deal with Stalin's government in the late 1940s, and it was largely respected by both parties — and to the gain of both parties — until the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991. While the Finnish political and intellectual elite mostly understood the term to refer more to foreign policy problems of other countries, and meant mostly for domestic consumption in the speaker's own country; many ordinary Finns considered the term highly offensive.
Historical background
Finland's foreign politics before this deal had been varied: independence from Imperial Russia with support of Imperial Germany in 1917; participation in the Russian Civil War alongside the Entente 1918–1920; a non-ratified alliance with Poland in 1922; association with the neutralist and democratic Scandinavian countries in the 1930s ended by the Winter War (1939); and finally in 1940 a rapprochement with Nazi Germany, the only power able to protect Finland against the expansionist Soviet Union, leading to the Continuation War in 1941.
The Wehrmacht's defeat in the Battle of Stalingrad led Finland to basically revert to its 19th century traditions, which had been perceived as highly successful until the Russification of Finland 1899–1905. Finland's leaders realized that opposing the Soviets head-on was no longer feasible. No international power was able to give the necessary support. Nazi Germany, Finland's chief supporter against Russia, was losing the war. Sweden was not big enough, and its leadership were wary of confronting Russia. The western powers were allied with the Soviet Union. Thus Finland had to face its big neighbour on its own, without any greater power's protection. As in the 19th century, Finland chose not challenge the Soviet Union's foreign policy, but exerted to keep its independence.
The Paasikivi doctrine
After the Paris Peace Treaty (1947) Finland succeeded in retaining democracy and parliamentarism until the fall of the Soviet Union, despite the heavy political pressure on Finland's foreign and internal affairs by the Soviet Union. Finland's foreign relations were guided by the Paasikivi doctrine, emphasizing the necessity to maintain a good and trusting relationship with the Soviet Union. To this end, Finland signed an Agreement of Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance with the Soviet Union in April 1948. Under this pact, Finland was obliged to resist armed attacks by "Germany or its allies" against Finland, or against the Soviet Union through Finland, and, if necessary, ask for Soviet military aid to do so. At the same time, the agreement recognized Finland's desire to remain outside great-power conflicts, allowing the country to adopt a policy of neutrality during the Cold War. Hence Finland did not participate in the Marshall Plan and took neutral positions on Soviet overseas initiatives. By keeping very cool relations to NATO, and to western military powers in general, Finland could fend off Soviet preludes for affiliation to the Warsaw Pact.
Self-censorship and excessive Soviet adaptation
However, from the political scene following the post-1968 radicalization, the Soviet adaptation spread to the editors of mass media, sparking strong forms of self-control, self-censorship and pro-Soviet attitudes. Most of the élite of media and politics shifted their attitudes to match the values that the Soviets were thought to favour and approve, developing into a self-imposed Finlandization that often is argued to have exceeded the Soviet expectations.
Civil servants, politicians and journalists accepted the practice that, if they cared about their careers, they did not talk about injustices such as the Soviets' assaults leading to the Winter War. But not only historical injustices were suppressed, also news about Soviet contemporary atrocities, as for instance the fate of Alexander Solzhenitsyn, were sanitized in the name of maintaining a working relationship between Finland and the Soviet Union.
Only after the ascendancy of Mikhail Gorbachev to Soviet leadership in 1985 did mass media in Finland gradually begin to move closer to Western standards of journalistic freedom without governmental pressure.
Criticism
United States foreign policy experts consistently feared that Western Europe would be Finlandized, leading to a situation in which the old NATO allies no longer automatically supported the United States - nor opposed the Soviet Union. Foreign policy scholars such as Eric Nordlinger have, however, argued that the fear of the possible "Finlandization" of Europe was always counterfactual. A vision of Finlandization in America's absence runs up squarely against the European states' long-standing communist antipathies and wariness of Moscow's peaceful wiles, valued national traditions and strong democratic institutions, as well as their size and economic wherewithal.
Authorities on the foreign relations of Finland often argue that proponents of the term "Finlandization" persistently failed to recognize that Finland had achieved its negotiating position after successfully fending off military attacks of the Soviet Union in the Winter War (1939) and the Continuation War (1941). While the Soviets certainly didn't actively fear the Finns, those who were in charge of handling relations with Finland have since openly admitted that relations with Finland were handled with the same care that they would have handled relations with a super-power. Furthermore, if Finland had attempted to get a "Finlandization" deal in the 1930s or 1920s, too soon after the Russian Revolution, the Civil War in Finland and the Russian Civil War, it would likely have wound up like Latvia, Estonia, and Lithuania.
See also
External links and references
- Finland's Relations with the Soviet Union, 1940-1986 (http://www.loyno.edu/history/journal/1985-6/botticelli.htm) by Peter Botticelli
- After the War: Finland's relations with the Soviet Union 1944 - 1991 (http://www.finland.fi/finfo/english/after.html) presented at the web site of the Finnish foreign ministry
- The silent war against Finlandization (http://www.helsinki-hs.net/news.asp?id=20020205IE19) - a book review
- Three cheers for Balkanization! (http://www.enterstageright.com/archive/articles/0501balkanization.htm) by Bruce Walker, re-evaluating the Finlandization concept
- The Silenced Media: The Propaganda War between Russia and the West in Northern Europe (http://www.historycooperative.org/journals/ahr/105.1/br_158.html) - review by Jussi M. Hanhimäki of a book by Esko Salminen
- The Silent Estate? (http://www.halldor.demon.co.uk/estate.htm) - review by David McDuff of the same book by Esko Salminen
de:Finnlandisierung es:Finlandización fi:Suomettuminen pl:Finlandyzacja