Comparison of 21st century fighter aircraft

This page attempts to compare the combat performance of fighter aircraft of the early 21st century.

Specifically, it compares their capabilities as air superiority fighters, that is, fighting other fighter aircraft, which is generally a harder task than shooting down aircraft which are not fighters.

In general, because of the lack of reliable information about the fighters themselves, and the lack of actual combat between them, it is extremely hard to judge how they will perform in combat. The bodies in the best position to know - aircraft manufacturers and air forces - keep secret much of the real capabilities of their aircraft, but simultaneously often try to present them in the best possible light by claiming superiority over other comparable vehicles. More detailed reports of capabilities, or comparative evaluations, are often unsourced, making it extremely difficult to determine the factual accuracy of the capability reports or the expertise of the opinions advanced.

Contents

1 Aircraft included

2 What makes a good fighter?

2.1 Performance
2.2 Supercruise
2.3 Stealth
2.4 Avionics
2.5 Logistics

2.5.1 Cost effectiveness and availability
2.5.2 Range and runways
2.5.3 Servicing

3 Fighters as part of a system

Aircraft included

For conciseness, this page considers only fighter aircraft manufactured in 2000 and those that are planned to be manufactured later in the decade. Older aircraft are likely to be less capable than the aircraft in this survey. Two promising Russian aircraft, the MiG-35 and Sukhoi Su-47 Berkut will also not be included, as there is not enough reliable information available about their performance and no assurance that they will ever go into service with any air force. The aircraft included are:

People's Republic of China/ Pakistan:
- FC-1 manufactured 2006-
- Chengdu J-10 manufactured ?
France: Dassault Aviation Rafale manufactured 2001-
India: Light Combat Aircraft (LCA) manufactured 2006-
Germany/UK/Italy/Spain: Eurofighter Typhoon manufactured 2003-
Japan: Mitsubishi F-2 - based on the F-16, manufactured 1996-
Russia:
- Mikoyan MiG-29 'Fulcrum' manufactured 1983-
- Sukhoi Su-27 'Flanker' and derivatives such as Sukhoi Su-33: manufactured 1982-
- Sukhoi Su-30 'Flanker', manufactured 1996 -
Sweden/UK: Saab/BAE Systems JAS-39 Gripen manufactured 1996-
Taiwan: AIDC Ching Kuo - based on the F-16, manufactured 1994-2000
USA:
- McDonnell Douglas F-15 Eagle manufactured 1973-2000
- General Dynamics F-16 Fighting Falcon manufactured 1978-2002
- McDonnell Douglas F/A-18 Hornet manufactured 1980-
- Lockheed Martin F-22 Raptor manufactured 2005-
- Lockheed Martin F-35 Joint Strike Fighter (Also UK), expected deployment 2008-

What makes a good fighter?

Performance

In past air-to-air combat, that a fighter has to get into a good position to fire its weapons at an enemy fighter, and many still believe this to be very important.

If a fighter can turn faster than its opponent, it will find it easier to get into a good position, for example behind its opponent. If a fighter has high speed and great acceleration, it will be able to choose whether or not to engage a less capable opponent. It will also have more chance of outmaneuvering or outrunning a missile that is locked on to it.

When aircraft turn, such as when they perform high-g maneuvers typical of air-to-air combat, they lose speed. The better their acceleration, the quicker they can pick up this speed again.

An aircraft's acceleration is calculated as its thrust minus its drag, divided by its mass. A good measure of comparative acceleration is a plane's thrust to weight ratio (note that if this is greater than 1, the aircraft is capable of flying vertically upwards).

An aircraft's ability to turn can be approximately gauged by its wing loading. This is the mass of the aircraft divided by the area of the wings. The bigger the wings, the easier it is for them to push the aircraft in a direction other than that it is curently travelling. Note that some aircraft use thrust vectoring, where the exhaust from the engines doesn't go straight backwards but can be tilted up or down (and sometimes also left to right). The purpose of thrust vectoring is to increase maneuverability.

Table of thrust-to-weight ratio and wing loading
	Thrust/ Weight Ratio	wing loading kg/m²	notes
Rafale F2	1.04	320
Typhoon	1.18	311
F-2	0.89	430
MiG-29SM	1.13	411
Su-27
Su-30			Indian Su-30MKI has thrust vectoring
Gripen	0.94	341
F/A-22	1.27	320	max takeoff wt; thrust vectoring
F-35A	0.83	446

Notes:

values are at normal takeoff weight unless otherwise specified
some of the takeoff weights and thrust values are not officially available; there is some considerable guesswork involved. Ricconi [1] (http://www.pogo.org/m/dp/dp-fa22-Riccioni-03082005.pdf) (PDF) claims that the F-22's wing loading and thrust-weight ratios are actually little better than the F-15C.

However, some sources dispute the value of maneuverability of fighters in the contemporary and near future environment, given the expected abilities of medium-range air-to-air missiles to outturn, outrun, and outaccelerate any manned aircraft, and the ability of new short-range missiles (with helmet sights) to be launched at a very wide range of angles and with a very high probability of hits. The extreme version of this view states that any aircraft will do, as long as it can carry the missiles and radar. In exercises using the new missiles, pilots report using only a small fraction of their available maneuverability, and that in WVR (within visual range) combat "everybody dies at the same rate", and "F-5 or a MiG-21 with a high-off-boresight missile and HMD is as capable in a 1-v-1 as an F-22" [2] (http://www.janes.com/defence/air_forces/news/idr/idr010529_1_n.shtml). As to the validity of this argument, it is worth noting that the F-22 (on the basis of the estimates presented here) has a very high thrust-to-weight ratio, low wing loading, and thrust vectoring to improve maneuverability; but whether this maneuverability is simply a remnant of its 1980's genesis is open to question. There are also plans to upgrade the thrust of, and possibly add thrust vectoring to, the Typhoon. If these plans are implemented, it would be reasonable to assume the users of the Typhoon still regard maneuverability as an important combat feature.

Conversely, on the basis of published thrust-to-weight ratios and wing loading the F-35 is likely to be little more manoeuverable than the F-16.

Supercruise

The Typhoon and, even more so, the F-22, have a considerable performance advantage over the other craft in the list in that they have the ability to travel at supersonic speeds without the use of afterburners, an ability known as supercruise. As afterburners use a huge amount of fuel, most fighters can use them for only a few minutes. Therefore, an aircraft with supercruise should theoretically have a huge advantage in pursuing or evading a non supercruise-capable plane. Supercruise will also allow these planes to spend more time in combat, particularly at longer ranges, rather than in transit.

However, a report by a former Air Force colonel who was involved in the F-16 program states that the advantage of the F-22 is not great in practice, because of the amount of fuel it can carry greatly limits the use of supercruise [3] (http://www.pogo.org/m/dp/dp-fa22-Riccioni-03082005.pdf) (PDF).

Stealth

To pursue and launch missiles at an opponent out of visual range, a fighter must determine their location. By and large, this is done with radar. A plane that is hard to detect on radar, therefore, will be at a big advantage over one that is more easily detected because the "stealthy" plane should be able to shoot first (or, for that matter, leave without being detected).

American fighter aircraft development has focused intently on stealthiness, and the recently deployed F-22 is the first fighter designed from the ground up for stealthiness. The in-development F-35 is also regarded as "stealthy", but some reports claim it is significantly less so than the F-22, particularly from the rear. [4] (http://www.ausairpower.net/jsf-analysis-2002.html). The stealthiness of the F-22 from angles other than head-on is also not clear. The export JSF is claimed to be significantly less stealthy than the US/UK version.

The Rafale and Typhoon are not ground-up stealth designs, but since the disclosure of the F-22 and earlier stealthy bomber designs they have undergone substantial detail refinement to reduce their radar cross section. How much effect this has on detection range is unclear, as the inverse square law (to a first approximation) governs detection range - a 50% reduction in radar cross section only reduces detection ranges by 29%. The Mitsubishi F-2 is also reported to have been equipped with radar-absorbing material in parts.

Neither the MiG-29 nor the Su-27 and its derivatives have any known stealthy features, nor do the F-16 derivatives produced by Taiwan. Similarly, there are no reports on the stealthiness of the Indian or Chinese aircraft.

The Wikipedia article on the Super Hornet mentions proposals to reduce its RCS, but, like the European aircraft, it will undoubtedly have a much larger RCS than either of the other American fighters.

Actual figures of the stealthiness of the various aircraft are unsurprisingly highly classified.

It should be noted that the stealthiness is considered mainly in terms of lack of visibility to other airborne radars. Ground-based, lower-frequency radars are less troubled by it. The Australian Jindalee over-the-horizon radar project is reported to be able to detect the wake turbulence of an aircraft, regardless of its stealth capabilities [5] (http://defence-data.com/features/fpage37.htm). It remains to be seen whether a similar system can be devised that is small enough to fit into aircraft, and is suitable for tracking rather than simply a warning. Loss of its steathiness advantages would make the F-35 particularly vulnerable.

There are some reports that the Rafale's avionics, the Thales Spectra, includes "stealthy" radar jamming technology, a radar cancellation systems analogous to the acoustic noise suppression systems on the De Havilland Canada Dash 8. Conventional jammers make locating an aircraft more difficult, but their operation is itself detectable; the French system is hypothesised to interfere with detection without revealing that jamming is in operation. In effect, such a system could potentially offer the stealth advantages similar in effect to (but likely lesser in degree than) the F-22 and JSF. However, it is unclear how effective the system is, or even whether it is fully operational yet. As well, research continues into other ways of decreasing observability by radar. There are claims that the Russians are working on "plasma stealth", [6] (http://www.aeronautics.ru/archive/research_literature/aviation_articles/Aviation%20Week/topics/plasma_stealth/index.htm). Obviously, such techniques might well remove some of the current advantage of the F-22 and JSF; but then, American defence research also continues unabated.

There are other ways to detect fighters other than on radar. For instance, passive infra-red sensors can detect the heat of engines, and even the sound of a sonic boom (which any supercruising aircraft will make) can be tracked with a network of sensors and computers. Actually using these to provide precise targeting information for a long-range missile is considerably less straightforward than radar, though.

Avionics

The avionics systems of the various fighters vary considerably. In general, American avionics are viewed as by far the most technologically sophisticated. The F-22 and F-35 have a unified avionics design, with most processing performed in a central aircraft computer and with very high-speed interfaces to individual components. The Rafale and Eurofighter have much less sophisticated internal networks, even more so in the case of Russian and other nation's craft. It should be noted that it is possible to upgrade avionics architecture without changing the airframes, though.

A fundamental part of a fighter's avionics is its radar. In terms of individual aircraft, the AESA radars of the American fighters are claimed to have a significant advantage over others. All fighters are generally equipped with a passive device that "listens" for radars targeted at them. The F-22 and F-35's radar is designed so as to be difficult to detect (given the acronym Low Probability of Intercept - LPI), while maintaining superior ability to find other aircraft to conventional designs. [7] (http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/systems/aircraft/f-22-avionics.htm). This is reportedly regarded as highly secret technology, and it is unlikely to be exported. Neither the Rafale or Eurofighter have such an advanced radar (the Eurofighter is equipped with the Euroradar CAPTOR), though a next-generation radar system, the AMSAR, is under development, and has a basic design along the same lines as the American radars. It may eventually be fitted to both aircraft [8] (http://www.eurofighter.starstreak.net/Eurofighter/sensors.html).

While the F-35's radar is undoubtedly technologically sophisticated, it is reportedly considerably less powerful than the F-22's, a fundamental limitation as the F-35 is limited in the amount of room and electrical power available in its nose.

Another factor to consider is the sophistication of other sensors, such as passive infra-red and passive radar detectors, as well as radar jamming capabilities. Few specific details of these are in the public domain.

All of the modern European and American aircraft are capable of sharing targeting data with allied fighters and from AWACS planes. The F-22 and particularly the F-35 are reportedly much more able in this area.

Given the existence of LPI radars and some basic knowledge (or at least intelligent guesses) as to the methods used, the question arises as to whether countermeasures have yet been developed to allow their detection. This is unclear from published sources.

Comparatively little is known about the avionics of the new Indian and Chinese planes. It is generally assumed that they are well behind Western standards. However, reports from the recent Indian-American exercise suggest that India, at least, has begun to develop their own expertise in the area.

Logistics

It is a truism that "amateurs talk about tactics, dilettantes talk about strategy, professionals talk about logistics". The best fighter in the world is useless unless it is available where it is wanted, when it is wanted.

Cost effectiveness and availability

The more an aircraft costs to buy, the fewer units of it can be afforded and vice versa as contractors decide to charge more for lower quantities. Another aspect of availability is that some exporting nations limit who they will sell aircraft to for political motives. Generally, the USA tends to be the most selective about who it will sell to, and Russia and China the least selective. Information about aircraft costs is hard to get hold of. Because of inflation, one must also include the year that a cost refers to; figures are in USD unless otherwise specified.

Rafale More than €50m, depending on export sales
Typhoon Austrian version: '03 €62m
Mitsubishi F-2 US$ 100m
MiG-29 about '98 US$ 27m
Sukhoi Su-27US$ 24m
Sukhoi Su-30 US$ ~38m (Several variants)
- Sukhoi Su-30K for Indonesia: '98 US$ 33m
- Sukhoi Su-30MKI for India, highly specified version: '98 US$ 45m
Gripen about '98 US$ 25m
Ching Kuo initially large order put cost per unit at US$ 24m
F-15 '98 US$ 43m
F-16 late models about '98 US$ 25m
F-18 E/F model '98 US$ 60m
F/A-22 '03 US$ 152m, based on production run of 276 aircraft costing US$ 42bn
F-35 planned costs, based on version, in '94:
- F-35A US$ 28m
- F-35B US$ 35m
- F-35C US$ 38m

Range and runways

	range, int fuel km	range, ext fuel km	ferry range km	takeoff, landing m	notes
Rafale F2	?	1850	?	400, 300
Typhoon	?	1389	3706	300, ?
F-2	?	834	?	?, ?
Gripen	?	834	?	400, 500
F/A-22	?	?	?	?, ?
F-35A	1000?	?	?	?, ?
F-35B	1000?	?	?	?, 0	STOVL
F-35C	1000?	?	?	carrier

Notes:

explanations of the columns, in order:
- the range the aircraft can travel to, on a typical air superiority mission, with 10 minutes loiter over the target, using only internal fuel, travelling at high altitude (which conserves fuel), returning to its airbase after the mission
- the same, using external fuel (drop tanks) as well
- the range the aircraft can travel when moving to a different airbase
- the length of runway the aircraft needs to take off and land

Servicing

How many hours of servicing does the aircraft require per hour of flight?

Fighters as part of a system

While it may be tempting to focus on the dogfighting capabilities of an individual aircraft, other military equipment has a considerable bearing on the likely outcome of air-to-air combat, particularly for long-range engagements.

Perhaps the most obvious items to consider are the aircraft's air-to-air missile systems. For instance, while the Eurofigher is almost certainly easier to detect on radar than an F-22, the British version is intended to be upgraded to replace the AMRAAM missiles for initial deployment with the MBDA Meteor. The Meteor has a far greater range than the AMRAAM, and is claimed to be much more manoeuverable at the limits of its range. Therefore, the Eurofighter pilot may be able to fire their missiles much earlier. Missile systems are upgraded more often than the planes themselves. As discussed earlier, the development of short-range missiles that can fire at targets not directly in front of a plane seems to have radically changed the nature of short-range combat, making the performance of the missile, not the aircraft, the key factor. Similarly, radar systems, and electronic countermeasures, can also be upgraded. It is not unknown for the combat systems on exported planes to be substantially inferior to the ones supplied to the manufacturer's home air force.

Systems not physically located within the aircraft can also make a substantial difference to combat effectiveness. Radar systems, such as AWACS planes, as well as shipboard and ground-based radars, can inform fighters of the location of opponents that they cannot detect with their own radars, and do this without the the fighters having to use their own radars and thus give away their position. Even the availability of airborne refuelling can make a big difference to combat effectiveness by extending the distance and time fighters can spend in the air.

Finally, the human factor cannot be ignored, as pilot ability and training is still believed to play a large part in the results of air combat. This favours air forces who select their pilots on merit and have the resources to allow extensive training exercises.

DERA study

Britain's Defence Evaluation and Research Agency (now split into QinetiQ and DSTL) did an operational evaluation comparing the Typhoon with some other modern fighters in how well they performed against an expected adversary aircraft, the Sukhoi Su-35. Due to the lack of information gathered on the 5th generation combat aircraft and the Su-35 during the time of this study it is not meant to be considered official.

The study used real pilots flying the JOUST system of networked simulators. Various western aircraft were put in simulated combat against the Su-35. The results were:

Aircraft	Odds vs. Su-35
Lockheed Martin/Boeing F-22 Raptor	10.1:1
Eurofighter Typhoon	4.5:1
Dassault-Breguet Rafale C	1.0:1
Sukhoi Su-35 'Flanker'	1.0:1
McDonnell Douglas F-15C Eagle	0.8:1
Boeing F/A-18+	0.4:1
McDonnell Douglas F/A-18C	0.3:1
General Dynamics F-16C	0.3:1

These results mean, for example, that in simulated combat, 4.5 Su-35s were shot down for every Typhoon lost.

The "F/A-18+" in the study was apparently not the current F/A-18E/F, but an improved version. All the western aircraft in the simulation were using the AMRAAM missile, except the Rafale which was using the MICA missile. This does not reflect the likely long-term air-to-air armament of Eurofighters, which will ultimately be equipped with the superior MBDA Meteor (while carrying the AMRAAM as an interim measure).

One must bear in mind that the full details of the simulation have not been released, making it hard to verify whether it gives an accurate evaluation of the capabilities of these aircraft (for instance, whether they had adequate knowledge of the Sukhoi and Raptor to realistically simulate their combat performance).

Exercise reports

Friendly air forces regularly practice against each other in exercises, and when these air forces fly different aircraft some indication of the relative capabilities of the aircraft can be gained.

The results of an exercise in 2004 pitting USAF F-15 Eagles against Indian Air Force Su-27, Su-29, and Su-30's, MiG-29's (and even the elderly MiG-21) have been widely publicised, with the Indians winning "90% of the mock combat missions" [9] (http://newsfromrussia.com/world/2004/06/30/54664.html). Another report [10] (http://www.strategypage.com/dls/articles/2004101421.asp) claims that the kind of systemic factors mentioned in the previous section were heavily weighted against the F-15s. According to this report, The F-15's were outnumbered 3-to-1. The rules of the exercise also allowed the Indian side the use of a simulated AWACS providing location information, and allowed them to use the full fire-and-forget active radar of simulated MBDA Mica and AA-12 missiles. The F-15's, by contrast, were not permitted to simulate the full range of the AAMRAAM (restricted to 32 km when the full range is claimed in the report to be over 100km), nor to use the AAMRAAM's own radar systems to guide itself in fire-and-forget mode (rather relying on the F-15's internal radar for the purpose). None of the F-15's were equipped with the latest AESA radars, which are fitted to some, but not all, of the USAF F-15 fleet. The report concludes that despite all these mitigating factors, the quality of the IAF opposition were a considerable surprise to the USAF pilots and observers, and revealed a weakness in USAF tactics in dealing with "launch-and-leave" tactics by opposing aircraft.

It is worth noting that the USAF is currently lobbying hard for as large a complement as possible of the F-22 and F-35, and evidence that present USAF equipment is inferior to potential enemy fighters is a useful lobbying tool.

Combat performance

Combat between modern jet fighters has been very rare.

In combat involving the US and its military allies factors extraneous to the quality of the individual aircraft (such as weight of numbers, ability to train pilots properly, presence of radar systems etc) have typically overwhelmingly favoured them, making a realistic assessment difficult.

In any case, air combat involving the aircraft discussed are as follows:

During the 1991 Gulf War, USAF F-15s shot down 5 Iraqi MiG-29s
On January 17, 1993, a USAF F-16 shot down a MiG-29 in Iraqi no-fly zone. (Some sources claim it was a MiG-23.)
In February 1999, Ethiopian Su-27s (believed flown by Ukrainians) shot down 2 Eritrean MiG-29s (believed flown by Russians)
During the 1999 Kosovo War, a Netherlands F-16 shot down 1 Yugoslavian MiG-29; USAF F-15s shot down 4 MiG-29s