Canada-France relations
|
|
Modern Canada-France relations have been marked by high levels of military and economic cooperation, but also periods of diplomatic discord primarily over the status of Quebec.
| Contents |
History
At one time nearly all of Eastern Canada, from the Labrador shore and Fort Louisburg on the Atlantic coast to the Great Lakes and beyond, was under French dominion. While the gradual conquest of New France by the British, culminating in Wolfe's victory at the Plains of Abraham in 1759, deprived France of her North American empire, the 'French of Canada' - Acadians, Quebecois, Métis, and others - remained.
World Wars
A realignment of the great powers made allies of Canada (as part of the declining British Empire) and France just in time for the two World Wars that would rock the first half of the 20th century.
In the Second World War especially Canada was an important ally and staunch supporter of General Charles de Gaulle's 'Free French'. De Gaulle himself re-entered France following the Normandy invasion via the Canadian-won Juno Beach, and during a lavish 'state visit' to Ottawa in 1944 departed the assembled crowd with an impassioned call of "Vive le Canada! Vive la France!"
Tensions over the status of Quebec
In July 1967, while on an official state visit to Canada, President de Gaulle ignited a storm of controversy when he uttered, before a crowd of 100,000 in Montreal, a call for the freedom of Quebec: Vive le Québec Libre! (Long live free Quebec). Coming as it did in the centennial year of Canadian Confederation, and amid the backdrop of Quebec's Quiet Revolution, such a provocative act on the part of a widely respected statesman and liberator of France had a wide-ranging effect not only on Franco-Canadian relations but on relations between Quebec and the rest of Canada as well.
De Gaulle, a proponent of national sovereignty, proposed on several subsequent occasions what he termed the "Austro-Hungarian solution" for Canada (based on the arrangement between Austria and Hungary), which appeared similar to the "sovereignty association" model soon championed by René Lévesque.
While some historians have speculated that France under de Gaulle went so far as to set up a spy network in Canada and even give aid to FLQ terrorists in the years leading up to 1967, France's diplomatic manoeuvrings are well documented, if little appreciated at the time. It so happened that just as Quebec, under the reformist Liberal government of Jean Lesage, was turning away from its isolationist past and attempting to find for itself a new place within the Canadian Confederation and within the wider francophone world, a willing and enthusiastic de Gaulle was there to give aid to Quebec's newfound nationalist ambitions.
Master Agreement
The first step towards Quebec developing an 'international personality' distinct from that of Canada, viewed by many as a stepping stone towards full independence, was for Quebec to develop relations with other 'nations' independent from those of Canada. This effort began in earnest following de Gaulle's return to power, when France and Quebec began regularly exchanging ministers and government officials. Premier Lesage, for example, visited de Gaulle three times between 1961 and 1965.
Lesage's statement to the Quebec National Assembly that the French Canadian identity, culture, and language were endangered by a "cultural invasion from the U.S.A.," which threatened to make Canada a "cultural satellite of the United States" mirrored exactly the Gaullists concern for France's cultural survival in the face on an English onslaught. In this light France and Quebec set about in the early 1960s negotiating exchange agreements in the areas of education, culture, technical cooperation, and youth exchange. The Pearson government in Ottawa, which had just appointed a Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism and was taking other steps to ensure the place of French within Canada, would not stand for a province usurping a federal power (foreign affairs), and so signed a Master Agreement with France in 1965 that allowed for provinces to cooperate directly with France, but only in areas of exclusive provincial jurisdiction (such as education). It was not envisioned at the time by the federal government how much this agreement, and the doors it opened, would come to haunt them in the coming years.
The "Quebec Mafia"
The significant contingent of Quebec sovereignty supporters within the French government and the upper levels of the French foreign and civil services (primarily, but not exclusively, Gaullists), who came to be known as the "Quebec Mafia" within the Canadian foreign service and the press, took full advantage of the Master Agreement of 1965 to further their vision for Canada and Quebec. While there are too many instances to mention here, two stand out in their boldness:
Direct relations with Quebec
Shortly after de Gaulle's 1967 Montreal address the Consulate General in Quebec City, already viewed by many as a de facto embassy, was enlarged and the office of Consul General at Quebec replaced, by de Gaulle's order, with that of Consul General to the Quebec Government. At the same time, the flow of officials to Quebec City increased further, and it became accepted practice for high officials to visit Quebec without going to Ottawa at all - despite Ottawa's repeated complaints about the breaches of diplomatic protocol.
Many of these French officials, notably French 'Minister for Quebec' Jean de Lipkowski, greatly angered and embarrass the Canadian government by vocally supporting Quebec independence while in Canada.
La Francophonie
The creation of la Francophonie, an international organization of wholly and partially French-speaking countries modelled somewhat after the British Commonwealth, is another example of France conspiring with the Union Nationale Quebec government (newly elected in 1966) to undermine the Canadian federal government's authority over foreign affairs. While Canada agreed in principle to the organization's creation, it was dismayed by France's position that not only should Quebec participate as an equal, independent member, but that the federal government and (by omission) the other provinces with significant French minorities could not.
France's support was vital, but most Francophonie members would be newly independent African countries. While these countries depended on France for aid and assurances of their newfound independence, and were therefore very susceptible to French pressure, they could be swayed by the prospect of increased Canadian aid. Not only would increased aid be used to 'coerce' potential Francophonie members into backing Canada's position (over the France-Quebec position) on the organization membership, but it would also free them from dependence on France.
The first salvo in the Francophonie affair was launched in the winter of 1968 when Gabon, under pressure from France, invited Quebec - and not Canada or the other provinces - to attend a February francophone education conference in Libreville. Despite protests from the federal government the Quebec delegation attended and was treated to full state honours. In retaliation, Prime Minister Pearson took the extraordinary step of officially breaking off relations with Gabon. Pierre Trudeau, then Justice Minister, accused France of "using countries which have recently become independent for her own purposes" and threatened to break diplomatic relations with France.
The next such educational conference, held in 1969 in Zaire, would end in a relative win for the Canadian government. Zaire, which was a former colony of Belgium, was not as susceptible to French pressure as Gabon. At first it sent an invitation only to the federal government, which happily contacted the provinces concerned (Quebec, New Brunswick, Ontario, and Manitoba) about organizing a single delegation. Quebec, dismayed over the lack on an invitation, complained to the French, who then put pressure on Zaire, which then issued a second belated invitation to Quebec - offering as justification Quebec's attendance at the Gabon conference. Despite the last-minute offer, Canada and the provinces had already reached an agreement whereby the provinces would attend as sub-delegations of the main Canadian delegation (although a French official absurdly stole the main 'Canada' sign from the delegation's table).
The final rounds in the effort to impose Canada's vision on la Francophonie would take place in the months leading up the organizations founding conference in Niger in 1969. It was this conference that would set the precedent that would be followed to this day, and so neither France and Quebec, nor Canada was prepared to go home the loser. For its part, France demanded that Quebec - and only Quebec - be issued in invitation. Niger - influenced in no small part by a promise of four years of "special" educational aid, a grant of 20 000 tons of wheat, and a geological survey of Niger offered by Canadian special envoy Paul Martin Sr. the month before - issued Canada the sole invitation and asked that the federal government to bring with it representatives of the interested provinces. The invitation, however, left open the prospect of Quebec being issued a separate invitation if the federal government and the provinces could not come to an agreement.
Much to the consternation of the French and the indépendantistes within the Quebec government, Ottawa and the provinces reached an agreement similar to the arrangement employed in Zaire - with a federal representative leading a single delegation composed of delegates from the interested provinces. Under this arrangement la Francophonie would grow to become a major instrument of Canadian foreign aid on par with the Commonwealth, although clearly less important politically.
Normalized relations
De Gaulle's resignation in 1969, and more importantly the 1970 election of the Liberals in Quebec under Robert Bourassa gave impetus to the calls on both sides for normalization of France-Canada relations. While the ultra-Gaullists and the remaining members of the 'Quebec Mafia' continue to occasionally cause headaches for Canada - such a 1997 initiative by 'Mafia' members to have the French Post Office issue a stamp commemorating de Gaulle's 1967 visit to Montreal - never again would relations reach anything close to the hostility of the late 1960's.
The Gaullist policy of 'dualism' towards Canada, which called for distinct and separate relations between France and Canada and France and Quebec, has been replaced with a purposefully ambiguous policy of 'non-ingérance, mais non-indifférence'. Also, while visits by federal officials to Paris are now well received, visits by Quebec government officials are, while duly received, increasingly seen as tiresome and pointless.
Saint-Pierre and Miquelon boundary dispute
The maritime boundary between the tiny French islands of Saint-Pierre and Miquelon (off the coast of Newfoundland) and Canada has long been a simmering point of contention between the two countries. As each country expanded its claimed territorial limit in the second half of the twentieth century, first to 12, then to 200 nautical miles (22.2 km, then 370.4 km), these claims began to overlap and a maritime boundary needed to be established.
While the countries agreed to a moratorium on undersea drilling in 1967, increased speculation about the existence of large oil deposits combined with the need to diversify economies after the regional cod fishery collapse triggered a new round of negotiations.
In 1988 Canada and France put the boundary question to an international court of arbitration. In 1992 the court awarded France a 24 mile (44.4 km) exclusive economic zone surrounding the islands, as well as a 200 mile (370.4 km) long, 10.5 mile (19.4 km) wide corridor to international waters (an area totalling 3607 square nautical miles or 12 372 km2). This fell significantly short of France's claims, and the resulting reduction is fish quotas created a great deal of resentment among the islands fishermen until a joint management agreement was reached in 1994.
Trade
Trade between the two countries is relatively modest when compared to trade with their immediate continental neighbours, but still significant. France is Canada's seventh largest trading partner overall, and the third largest in Europe. Annual bilateral trade between the two countries tops seven billion Canadian dollars.
Additionally, Canada and France are important to each other as entry points to their respective continental free markets (NAFTA and the European Union).
While Canada and France often find themselves on the opposite sides of such trade disputes as agricultural free trade and the sale of genetically modified food, they cooperate closely on such issues as the insulation of cultural industries from free trade agreements (something both countries are strongly in favour of).
Bibliography
Bastien, Frédéric. Relations particulières : la France face au Québec après de Gaulle. Montréal : Boréal, 1999. ISBN 2890529762.
Bosher, John Francis. The Gaullist attack on Canada 1967-1997. Montreal : McGill-Queen's University Press, 1999. ISBN 0773518088.
Pichette, Robert. Napoléon III, l'Acadie et le Canada français. Moncton NB : Éditions d'Acadie, 1998. ISBN 2760003612.
Thomson, Dale C. De Gaulle et le Québec. Saint Laurent QC : Éditions du Trécarré, 1990. ISBN 2892493153.