Battle of Port Arthur
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Template:Battlebox The Battle of Port Arthur (February 9, 1904) was the opening battle of the Russo-Japanese War. It was inconclusive and was followed by the long Siege of Port Arthur and later in August, the Battle of the Yellow Sea (aka. Battle of Shantung).
Near the then strategic ice-free Russian port of Port Arthur (Today: part of Dalian, known then as 'Darien'), Admiral Heihachiro Togo commanded the Japanese fleet. One of his subordinates, Admiral Shigeto Dewa, who commanded the Japanese First Fleet suggested that the Japanese ships attempt to attack the Russian ships, which were anchored under the cover of various land artillery batteries at Port Arthur. Dewa's actual orders had been to lure the Russian ships toward the Japanese heavy ships, which were commanded by Adm. Togo. The latter reluctantly agreed, after hearing the report of the Japanese Third Fleet and Dewa's own reconnaissance efforts.
Dewa's reconnaissance, however, had been somewhat incorrect, mainly because he was more than three nautical miles away from the Russian fleet when he made his closest approach. It seemed that the twelve battleships and cruisers were mostly aground and/or listing (after the recently successful Japanese destroyer attack), while the screening ships (namely destroyers, gunboats, and mining vessels) were in no formation. However, all of the Russian ships were ready and had their battle flags up, which was not visible to Dewa.
The Japanese ships concentrated their heavier fire on the batteries, while lobbing six and eight inch shells at the Russian ships. However, after about thirty minutes of inconclusive fighting, Togo, with his First Fleet (the Third Fleet had been left in reserve, and took part in none of the fighting) decided to make a highly dangerous move: he turned his ships around and retreated, in full range of the artillery and Russian ships.
As the Japanese ships reached their most vulnerable point, the Russian ship Novik fired a salvo of torpedoes at the Japanese armored cruisers, which returned fire, hitting the Novik below the waterline. Because of the heavy fire encountered, and the higher state of readiness than previously assumed (by the Japanese), Togo decided not to use the Third Fleet, and retreated completely.
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Battle Outcome
The Japanese had suffered no more than 90 casualties, with no seriously damaged ships, while the Russians suffered about 150 casualties, with only battleships Tsesarevitch and Retvizan and protected cruiser Pallada damaged with torpedoes. Retvizan run aground. By May, however, all these ships were back in service. The Japanese immediately blockaded the port, establishing a headquarters and homeport in the (South) Korean city of Pusan (Busan), and started a land campaign to invest the city itself that lasted six to seven months concluding with the Siege of Port Arthur. Dewa's half-hearted reconnaissance had underestimated the Russian fleet's state of readiness, and Togo's reluctance to press for a decisive conclusion was justified in the face of the combined Russian land and naval artillery protecting the port.
Impact on History
One of the Japanese generals in command was Maresuke Nogi, who lost both of his sons; later Nogi would be one of the most important influences on the young Emperor Hirohito. However he wished to commit ritual suicide after the attack, which killed so many young Japanese soldiers. Emperor Meiji forbade this act, but after Meiji died in 1912 the Nogi committed seppuku.
After the naval battle, the Japanese engaged Russian land forces in a long campaign of minor skirmishes and major land battles (See: Battle of Yalu River, Battle of Darien, Russo-Japanese War), concluding battle near Port Arthur in the horrificly bloody battle called the Siege of Port Arthur. These affairs were fought in trenches with machine guns and artillery, involved tens of thousands on both sides in massed charges, and foreshadowed pre-tank conditions much like those of the Western Front during World War I ten years later. Western leaders failed to assimulate and understand the lesson - looking down on both Eastern Powers with disdain and contempt born of predjudice, while simultaneously not appreciating the lethal implications of machine guns and rapid fire artillery (Howitzers); these failings jointly lead to [WW-I]'s casulty lists.
Finally, a large Japanese army, which had dug assault trenches perpendicular to either side's lines, emerged from the trenches and took the Russian lines by brute force, and Port Arthur fell to the shock and consternation of the world's (both white and racist) powers. This outcome resulted in Theodore Roosevelt approaching (secretly) both sides and offering to act as an 'honest broker'. Other Western powers were variously busy arguing over Africa, the Balkans, or the Middle East or were simultaneously perceived by one beligerent or the other as an ally of the other disputant ('Japan and Gr. Britain' vs. 'Russia and France or Germany') and so were unavailable to act as diplomatic intermediaries. The Japanese responded favorably to overtures, then officially but secretly requested the US to approach Russia. Tsar Nicholas II, was much worried about a loss of face might lead to a much feared domestic revolution, the autocrat resisted even entertaining negotiations for some months while Roosevelt pulled strings and twisted arms, and the Japanese continued to prevail in contests of arms.
Russian fears were so strong, that in the eventual peace conference, Roosevelt had to strong arm the Japanese to accept a peace without reparations, these being a pre-condition of the Japanese for sitting at the table, and a precondition for the Tsar in the opposite way - he wouldn't send a plenipotentiary without an understanding that Russia would pay neither reparations, nor give up Shaiklin Island. Roosevelt finessed these mutually conflicting demands using a trick he'd learned settling a major coal strike cum violence in 1903, more to the dissatisfaction of the Japanese. The perceived 'loss of face' lead to widespread rioting in Japan, and a feeling that grew over the following decades that Japan had been maltreated ('dishonored') as 'the losing power' of the war, despite their uniformly successful military actions. Both powers were indeed exhausted by the war, so Japan accepted the peace with much resentment, so much so, that they made this point explicitly in their 'infamously late' communique declaring war on the USA -- delivered 'officially' about an hour after the attack on Pearl Harbor 7 December 1941.
References
- Edmund Morris, 'Theodore Rex', The Modern Library, pb.,2002; ISBN 0-8129-6600-7 (div. of Random House, hc,2001)
External links
- Russo-Japanese War Research Society: Battle of Port Arthur (http://www.russojapanesewar.com/battle-pa.html)he:הקרב על פורט ארתור