Talk:Max Stirner
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Pseudonym/move entry
His pseudonym of Max Stirner is far far more common than this name (which is Johann Kaspar Schmidt in full anyway). This article should go at Max Stirner with this one a redirect there, and his birth name given in the first paragraph of the article. I'd move it, but the stub at Max Stirner means I can't. I'll see if a friendly sysop will do it if there's no objections (and if there are objections, I will counter-object very strongly). --Camembert
Several major writeups
Several major additions and complete rewrites contributed to sections on Biography and Philosophy, with the aim to provide more accurate information as to the chronology of Stirners life, his sources of inspiration and an understanding of the line of the argument in his philosophy. Most references to Marx are moved to the Influences section, where they belong IMO, and made slightly more precise. Removed minor suggestions to the friendship 'working together' between Marx and Stirner, since there is no historical record to indicate any such relation, except for the facts now stated. --Morten Blaabjerg 18:57, 14 Jul 2004 (UTC)
To Whom is This "Interesting"?
"It is interesting to note that, according to some subsequent comparative philosphy based on Stirner's views, cartesian criticism also results in nihilism."
It isn't interesting unless it means something -- and if it does, that something requires explanation. All this seems to mean is that those influenced by Stirner think it is good to be influenced by Stirner, and call their exposition of that view by the bame "comparative philosophy" -- which is boring.
- Hey, if it was up to me, I'd remove that comment entirely. But something tells me that Silverback would never give up trying to re-add it (or a more POV version of it). Oh, and by the way, Christofurio, please log in. ;) -- Mihnea Tudoreanu 12:52, 6 Oct 2004 (UTC)
- I think I've removed the "interesting" phrasing, although it is interesting in a meaningful sense, because it is similar to mathmatics, when two different ways of solving a problem give the same result it gives more confidence in the result. Similarly in physics, when two different means to calculate a constant are within error bounds of each other and converge with time. Cartesian reductionism down to cognito ergo sum (I think therefore I am) was quickly accepted. Flaws were seen in his attempts to construct something back up from the nihilism that he had achieve. In fact, one can consider much of western philosophy since his time, as attempts overcome this nihilism that appeared logically unavoidable. So, it is interesting the hegelian criticism, despite its seeming uniqueness, was shown within the neoHegelian community to also result in nihilism, and Stirner's contemporaries felt it was convincing enough to require a response.--Silverback 18:06, 6 Oct 2004 (UTC)
- Well, I certainly disagree with your assertions, but your latest edit to the article is very good (having finally established NPOV), so I believe we can declare this dispute officially closed. :) -- Mihnea Tudoreanu 15:25, 8 Oct 2004 (UTC)
Biograhphy
Is it accurate that Sterner's biography was, "published in German around the turn of the 19th century," given his birth in 1806?
- I have changed this part. Mackay's biography was published in 1898, near the turn of the 20th century.--Davidwestling2
- Sorry this was a typo of mine - it should have read "published around the turn of the 20th century" - it was a slip, but the present wording is far more precise (didn't remember the exact date). -- Morten 16:50, 15 Nov 2004 (UTC)
Restructuring, making the text more correlative/homogenous
Restructured and rewrote a bit, added a few pieces here and there, to make the text more homogenous.
Section on "borders on the edge of language and reality" re-included, as I believe this is the vital aspect of Stirners philosophy, and why it feels so disturbing to a great number of people. The consequences for language, attribution of meaning and reality is elaborated more deeply further down in the 'philosophy' section, so I believe the sentence in itself does not need to explain what follows below. The reason why Stirners philosophy "borders on the edge of language and reality" is clearly that it disturbs the traditional attribution of meaning to human existance, heavily pioneering a modern media critique which centres precisely on language and reality. (added this under Influences)
Cleaned a bit up in the influences section, as some information was already discussed in the article. What 'other major branch of western philosophy'? Broadened the wording of the Cartesian thingy - one can read more in the cartesian entry, as long as there's a link to that discussion. I hope this is broad yet precise enough to hold the implications discussed above, if not, please elaborate.
I would like to see sources or influences named on the gender issue - who was influenced by Stirner, when, where and why? I moved the sentence on gender roles to the 'influences' section.
Morten Blaabjerg 02:40, 15 Nov 2004 (UTC)
- I also downplayed the 'nihilism' of the text, as I believe the 'nihilism' of Stirner is too constraining for his thinking to be contained by such a category. It doesn't fit very well to Stirner, who does not use this concept, nor use the concept of anarchy for that matter, (although I find this a more descriptive term, than an ideological one). One could easily argue Stirner to be a conservative, as he clearly opposes a revolution with the claim that a revolution only exchanges one 'spook' with another. He is none of it all, and everything of it, depending on the context he's read in. Clear are his hegelian roots and his radical demolition of religion, ideology and language.
- I have tried as much as possible to use Stirners own phrases in the 'philosophy' section, and keep everything else in the 'influences' section.-- Morten Blaabjerg 03:18, 15 Nov 2004 (UTC)
- Nihilism is not very constraining. I don't think his lack of belief in movements for change make him a conservative, perhaps he would be better described as an "inactivist". In the United States libertarian movement, there is a term for lack of willingness to expend resources trying to change the world, it is called "Harry Browning it", and was inspired by Harry Browne's egoistic viewpoint expressed in his book "How I Found Freedom in an Unfree World". He surprised later on with what many see as a reversal, by running for president as the Libertarian Party candidate.
- While using some of Stirner's language adds some of his flavor to the article, his writing was hardly for the ecyclopedic/academic audience, in addition to translating it to English, I think it also helps to translate it from the Hegelian insider lingo, although perhaps, like all translation this also involves interpretation.--Silverback 04:22, 15 Nov 2004 (UTC)
- Interesting notes - 'Harry Browning it' might be an interesting addition to the influences section, as I long thought that the consequences of Stirners thought are often far radicalized. The book is anti-ideological, anti-isms more than anything else. -- Morten 16:50, 15 Nov 2004 (UTC)
- I've never seen any evidence that Harry Browne was influenced by Stirner, just the possible similarity in their choice of individualism over ideology. Since Harry Browne's signature book was written in 1973, it is late enough to perhaps to have been influenced by a little bit of the Stirner revival. However, Browne seemed more interested in financial rather than philosophical matters. He certainly succeeded in raising the ire of the libertarian ideology true believers in Stirner'esque fashion.--Silverback 00:04, 16 Nov 2004 (UTC)
I reworked some of the material towards the end of the Influences section, mostly just grammatical stuff. I did augment the section which refers to Baudrillard to put some distance between postmodernist/poststructrualist thinking and Stirner's viewpoint, which I find very important at this juncture in the history of ideas. --davidwestling2
Where was Stirner banned?
Quote from the article: His philosophy has been disturbing, sometimes even banned as a direct threat to civilization.
A lot of works have been "banned" in a lot of places, to the point that it's almost a meaningless thing to say. Anyone have a source for where Stirner's works might have been "banned", and in what form? Is this the Dogbreath County School District? Nazi Germany? The Third Federal Circuit Court of Appeals? The Free Separatist Nation of Staythehellout? The Index Prohibitorum? Soviet Russia? --FOo 04:35, 14 Jan 2005 (UTC)
- Hmmmm... perhaps banned is not the right word, as I haven't heard any mention of the book being the object of direct censorship (although in the cases you mention his ideas would have been quite uncomfortable to exist in print). I have elaborated a bit on this aspect on the page, but maybe you can add to that. What I originally meant by this, was the exclusion and omission of Stirners work from 'accepted academic or political discourse' if you will - so 'banned' in this regard as something you couldn't say out loud without being ridiculed and considered nonsensical. - This no doubt mostly stems from Marx's treatment of his work, which is extremely satirical of Stirner's ideas, and is probably why Stirner's name is like totally washed away from the history of philosophy, in most 'traditional' literature. --Morten 21:24, 19 Jan 2005 (UTC)
- Sure, I can see how Stirner's position has been marginalized. However, an awful lot of works have actually been banned in one sense or another. Sometimes this means that people are prohibited from selling them, or can suffer persecution from owning them -- for instance various samizdat works in the Soviet Union. In other cases it means that they are perfectly legal to own and sell, but excluded from libraries, for instance in U.S. public school districts. In other cases, works have been termed "banned" because groups have picketed bookstores that sell them, or booksellers have been prosecuted but found innocent -- for instance The Tin Drum.
- Still, in my mind there's a big difference between "banned" in the sense of being socially marginalized and "banned" in the sense of being forbidden by law. The former has nothing particularly to do with a work's value (after all, many bad works are socially marginalized, for reason of their being not very good) but the latter frequently has a great deal to do with the work's value (because people in power are threatened by it). So I am very interested to know if Stirner's work has actually been banned anywhere, or if it has simply been disregarded. --FOo 05:22, 20 Jan 2005 (UTC)
- I agree with the marx theory above. With marxist zealots, Marx's mocking dismissal of Stirner was the gospel on the subject and there was no more need to read Stirner themselves than there was to think for themselves. That might require them to question the marxist "faith", and questioning was forbidden. Hmmm, perhaps a social ostracism similar to shunning (or is shouting down more likely?) is what brought "banning" to someone's mind.--Silverback 08:27, 20 Jan 2005 (UTC)
- Oh please! Stirner's work is available in German as a Reklam edition, and in English as a twice-recently-reprinted volume in the "Cambridge editions in the history of political philosophy". Considering that he only wrote one book he's hardly "marginalized"! In his own time, the book caused quite a sensation, and was very well known --"the talk of the town" in all the newspapers, etc. (more than one can say for any living philosopher). It has been through a few revivals of interest since then. Even in the USSR, Stirner did have a place in the library because of his historical connection to Engels, etc.; the accident of his knowing (and being "critiqued") by Marx and Engels very much ensured that his philosophy would not be forgotten. Aside from that, there's a long list of artists and anarchists who invoke his name every so often. Who can complain that Stirner is "forgotten" or "suppressed"? If you're not already very well read in 19th century politics and philosophy, there are many long passages of the book that are nearly incomprehensible; and its numerous literary allusions (etc.) further remove it from the grasp of "the common man". It is rather amazing that the book isn't completely obscure --and, moreover, that it has so many ardent admirers among "men of action" rather than mere academics and artists.
A lot of ignorant errors to be corrected
(1) Re: the question of Stirner being "Banned", it is a well known anecdote that the reason why the title page of the 1st edition is "post-dated" by 1 year is that he *anticipated* that it would be banned (i.e., and only gradually come to light a year following) but the censor actually did let it pass with the comment that it was "too absurd" to do any harm. This bit of odd humour is noted in the introduction to the current Cambridge edition.
(2) The following statement is completely absurd to anyone who HAS ACTUALLY READ BOTH HEGEL'S WORK AND STIRNER'S: [quote] Stirner attended university in Berlin, where he attended the lectures of Hegel, who was to become a vital source of inspiration for his thinking, and on the structure of whose work Phenomenology of Spirit (org. Phänomenologie des Geistes), he modelled his own book. [\quote]
There is absolutely *no* grounds to say Hegel was a "vital source of inspiration" to Stirner --Stirner absolutely ridicules Hegel throughout his book, and has nothing but contempt for Hegel's work (some of it being well-grounded criticism, but much of it just "poking fun"). Secondly, why don't you compare the table of contents of Hegel's _Phanomenolgie des Geistes_ to Stirner's _Der Einzige..._ --is there anything in common? No, nothing. The two books are as different as night and day --in form, in content, every way!
I believe the following should be added as Wiki policy: IF YOU HAVEN'T READ THE PRIMARY SOURCES, PLEASE DO NOT WRITE ENCYCLOPEDIA ENTRIES! The fact that one of your idiot professors vaguely suggested something doesn't mean its supported by the historical facts or the original texts. I have already tried to re-write the entry on Hegel to reflect the historical reality of Stirner's relations with his various contemporary philosophers --but someone insists on spreading these mythical notions from the bottom of the barrel of philosophy department gossip. Read the book, or else don't write the article!
- Please sign statements with the 'signature' menu over the edit-box.
- Please don't insult other contributors - there's no reason to, and it's not a good starting point for any kind of discussion. If you think something is wrong in the article, you're free to rewrite it - with respect to other contributions. The goal is to get the best and most comprehensible NPOV article about Stirner as possible - in itself quite difficult, as I know personally from several rewrites of the article.
- I've personally read the book at least twice, in translation, and written several papers on Stirner and related subjects. The latest Danish translation of the work is very concise, and to the word of the original. The 'mythical notions' you're talking about (which I believe you're right about, in part) - try writing them into the article - that will make them more concrete. I would like to know more. If it's not in the article, it should be.
- I am no philosopher, but a history man. Where I find Stirners thinking relates to Hegel is partly based on things I've read (especially the writings of Lawrence Stepelevich, which I find is quite interesting) - but to a great deal also with my personal experience of applying Stirner's philosophy as a philosophy of history. Yes, it is true, Stirner ridicules many (if not all) of his contemporaries - but what I find the more paradoxical (and impressive), is that while his work is critizising the thinking of Hegel, Feuerbach et.al. it is yet fundamentally rooted in this kind of thinking.
- Stirner's 'creative nothing' arises from his repeated argument of tearing down every absolute concept in existance, discovering a languageless void (when nothing can be described in absolute terms, there's not only nothing - not even nothing exists there; Yngve Ahlberg (Sweden) has written a dissertation about this line Stirner's thinking - I personally haven't read all of it). This 'nothingness' creates room for the creativeness of existance - the individual self. This is why Stirner can create so much fun out of saying "he has based and rests his case on nothing" - he is actually basing everything on himself, who has come from nothing. What does this have to do with Hegel? - A lot IMO, as it is a line of dialectical thinking, which is modelled on Hegel's. Stirner would not be able to reach his conclusion without Hegel. That is why it is even more of a ridicule IMO, that he in part models the structure of his work and argument on Hegel's. Stirner clearly was inspired by Hegel, even though he reached radically different (IMO brilliant) conclusions. --Morten 19:34, 1 Mar 2005 (UTC)
- Put the phrase <quote>(Stirner clearly embraced both psychological egoism and ethical egoism)</quote> back in - I agree, it is not perfect, but no short introduction to Stirner will probably ever be. I think it is worth keeping this distinction, and I believe it pretty much sums up what Stirner is about, in the introducing paragraph.
- Stirners egoism is psychological, in the way, that he believes all people naturally act in their own interest, even those 'possessed by spooks'. And it is ethical, in the way, that his point is that individuals will only be themselves, when they realize their burden of false ideals, and begin to act according to their egoism. I'd like to hear arguments for the contrary, if this phrase should be removed. --Morten 02:17, 2 Mar 2005 (UTC)
Morten--your vitriol is misplaced. You cite Stepelevich, but ignore his basic ideas on both Stirner and Hegel. Please see his article, "Max Stirner as Hegelian", _Journal of the History of Ideas_, v.15, pp. 597-614 (1985), for a well-mounted discussion of the Stirner/Hegel relationship. We are speaking of dialectics here, Morten. Opposites are _related_ in such a schema. Yes, Stirner thoroughly repudiates Hegel, but at the same time, he employs some of the most important elements of Hegelian structure and many of Hegel's basic presuppositions to arrive at his own conclusions. Stepelevich quotes the prominent historian of philosophy Karl Lowith, who says that _Ego_ is "in reality an ultimate logical consequence of Hegel's historical system". As Stepelevich continues, "In Hegelian terms, the thought of Stirner is taken as a phenomenological exemplification of spirit's advance to ultimate self-knowledge." Stepelevich then tips his hat to those who have a hard time making any connection between these two radically different thinkers; he acknowleges that _Ego_ had an " evidently un-Hegelian structure and tone to the work as a whole", as well as being fundamentally hostile to Hegel's conclusions about the self and the world. Nevertheless, this does not mean that Hegel and Stirner are not related on the most intimate level. Stepelevich again: "The main juncture leading from Hegel to Stirner is found [in the _Phenomenology_--dw] at the termination of a phenomenological passage to absolute knowledge. Stirner's work is most clearly understood when it is taken to be the answer to the question, 'what role willl consciousness play after it has traversed the series of shapes known as 'untrue' knowledge and has attained to absolute knowledge?'" In other words, to go beyond Hegel in true dialectical fashion is to continue Hegel's project, and Stepelevich argues persuasively that this effort of Stirner's is, in fact a _completion_ of Hegel's overall project. Stepelevich concludes this important essay with an example from _Phenomenology of Spirit_ which seems to point directly to Stirner's _Ego_: "This last shape of Spirit--the spirit which at the same time gives its complete and true content the form of the Self and thereby realizes its Notion as remaining in its Notion in this realization--this is absolute knowing...the nature, moments, and movement of this knowing have, then, shown themselves to be such that this knowing is a pure _being-for-self_ of self-consciousness, it is 'I', that is _this_ and no other 'I', and which is no less immediately a _mediated_ ot superceded _universal 'I'. Stirner would reject this last part of Hegel's formulation, that there is an identity existing between the personal 'I' and some universal 'I', but it is clear that Stepelevich is on to something significant here. Stirner's work looks all the more profound and transformational when seen in the light of his close, albeit largely antagonistic, relationship to the master-philosopher George W.F. Hegel.--davidwestling2 April 24 2005 3:06pm CDT
- New note from anonymous:
This is a note from the fellow who put in the initial posting under this rubrick --no, I will not divest myself of my (limited) anonymity. Morton's absurd post states
- quote: "...he is actually basing everything on himself, who has come from nothing. What does this have to do with Hegel? - A lot IMO, as it is a line of dialectical thinking, which is modelled on Hegel's. Stirner would not be able to reach his conclusion without Hegel." end quote
--In this statement, Morton has made two completely unsubstantiated claims here: (1) that when Stirner 'is basing everything on himself' it is 'a dialectical line of thinking'. Does the word "Dialectical" mean anything to you? You certainly aren't using a Hegelian definition of the term! Can you provide me with one instance of Stirner using Hegel's dialectical method in the entire corpus of his writing? Yes or no? There is no Hegelian dialectic when Stirner says "Man is not the measure of all things, but rather, *I am*"; nor is there there any dialectical proof/reasoning behind the claims "I am nothing, but I am creative nothing; a chaos...". Neither in method nor in structure (nor in its conclusions) do any of these tenets share any common features with Hegel! (2) The second unsupported claim is that Stirner "would not be able to reach this conclusion without Hegel". The latter assertion is so weak and absurd that one might as easily say that all philosophies in in disagreement with Hegel "would be impossible without Hegel". Certainly, from the standpoint of an encyclopedia article, it is absurd to include such a tendentious sort of claim as if it were an established fact --but in terms of Stirner's own description of the sources of his philosopy, one can no more credit Hegel than Jesus Christ as a "great inspiration". He thinks Christianity is a joke and a fraud, too --so should we list the Bible as one of his "sources of inspiration"? Stirner certainly quotes the Bible more often than Hegel --but in both cases it is only in order to ridicule the source in question. Any attempt to exaggerate the importance of Hegel's philosophy in relation to Stirner seems to founder on this simple point (you could as easily claim that Hegel was a great influence over Arthur Schopenhauer or Karl Popper --as both attacked Hegel at great length). Moreover, is it not rather obvious that (quantitatively) Stirner has fewer words about/against Hegel than even a figure like Feuerbach, or the half-dozen nearly forgotten figures of 19th century German Liberalism that he lambastes throughout the book? The assertion that Hegel (alone or above all others) is of some special significance in Stirner's critique rings very hollow --is it not rather the case that of the vast array of establishment figures that Stirner attacks, Hegel is simply the only one still read by University students today? Or is there some very profound, "structural" reason why all the other objects of Stirner's contempt and derision are passed over without comment in this encyclopedia article, but Hegel alone is exalted as so terribly important? One specific example: It is utterly risible that you try to pin "Ich habe mein sache auf nichts gestellt" on Hegel when the actual phrase is a quote from Goethe. What, will you now claim that Goethe is an Hegelian?
- And in reply to Davidwestling...
This fellow Davidwestling has very carefully set out a false conclusion from a sound premise. I appreciate his (important) concession that _Der Einzige_ quote "had an 'evidently un-Hegelian structure...'" end quote --let me just halt on this point and remind all assembled that it was the structure of the work that I pointed out is *not Hegelian* in my original posting --and I said then (as now) that this should be evident even from looking at the table of contents. However, this absurd assertion that there is any common ground between the Stirner's philosophical analysis of thinking and the Hegelian "Spook" of "Absolute thinking" is completely false --and is easily refuted by quoting the primary source itself. Why don't you look up "Absolute thinking" in the Index of your Danish [Correction: Swedish] edition (if it has an index) and read Sitner's many statements that "Absolute thinking is nothing but thinking that has forgotten that merely 'I' am the thinker ..." etc. etc. Do you really imagine that you have grasped the outermost hem of Stirner's philosophy if you think his philosophy of the self is equivalent to Hegel's "Notion thinking itself ... absolute knowing ... pure being as such ... etc. etc."? Do you think Stirner refuted and dismissed all these abstract notions for no reason except to exercise his penmanship? Given that Stirner's own work contains a lengthy rejection of "Absolute knowledge" as the goal of philosophy or life, it is completely laughable for some academic to say:
- quote: "Stirner's work is most clearly understood when it is taken to be the answer to the question, 'what role willl consciousness play after it has traversed the series of shapes known as 'untrue' knowledge and has attained to absolute knowledge?" end quote
Stirner attacks the dichotomies between true and untrue, absolute and relative knowledges at their most fundamental level, and sets up his own attitudes toward knowing on a basis completely alien to both the Platonic and the Hegelian traditions: do you recall the passage, "Truths exist in space in my head just as that stone exists in space on the street"? How about "Truths are my creatures, my creations, they arise from me and come to rest in me; I am not a creature haunted by the truth"... etc. etc.
- Final note
I find it very touching to hear that you have read the book in question --and I am sorry if you were so offended at my request that you actually read the book before writing an encyclopedia article about it. Perhaps I should have instead requested that you "Understand" the book, and suggested that you "Report on its contents in a detached manner, instead of super-imposing a bunch of crazy nonsense that is completely spurious to it, and represents not Stirner, but the bored scribbles of Hegelian-trained academicians". Fundamentally, an encyclopedia exists to emphatically state what something is --not what it might be if interpreted by a spurious (an in this case opposed) philosophy. I could easily concot a paragraph raving about the common features of Stirner's philosophy with Nagarjuna --but this would be a super-imposition, that really has nothing to do with Stirner's philosophy as such. Likewise, DW's claim that "Hegel and Stirner are... related on the most intimate level" is simly a modern, Hegelian superimposition; it 'does not describe an "intimate relation" that actually exists in the tenets of Stirner's text, but only a really obscure (and, I would say, untenable) "relationship" posited by a modern reader. I, too, could posit any number of such "intimate relations" (e.g., Stirner as the follower of Sextus Empiricus --quite a bit more tenable than supposing Stirner shares Hegel's notions of the self as "Pure Spirit knowing itself"!) but they would be alien to the subject, and it would be completely false to assert them (in an encyclopedia!) as some kind of actually existing relationship to be found in the text --or in the biography of the author in question!
- [D.W.'s reply] To anonymous--
I would ask that you formulate your arguments a little more carefully. We are on some difficult ground here. I agree that Sitner does not stand on the ground of "absolute knowledge" as it is formulated by Hegel. When one considers Stepelevich's argument, I take it as axiomatic that one must translate old terminology into new in some important sense. To reach the standpoint of the 'I', an 'I' that is not limited by its _petty_ particularities, is what I think Stepelevich is arguing Hegel thought of as absolute knowledge; naturally one cannot use such a term in speaking of Sitner's orientation. "Absolute knowledge", according to such a reading, is merely Hegel's term for something that, in Sitner's world-view, becomes something quite different. (By the way, "Westling" is Scandinavian, it's true; but from this it does not follow that I have easy recourse to some Danish edition of Sitner's writings. That was some other guy. I have four editions of _Ego_/_Einzige_: Reclam 1892, Boni and Liveright, 1918, Dover Press, 1973, and the Cambridge 1995.) Sitner attended Hegel's lectures when at the University of Berlin; in any case Hegel was the one that had to be taken into account more than any other figure in any attempt to move beyond the death-oriented philosophy which he so assiduously perfected. Thus, it is inescapable that any philosopher worth his salt in this period would need to employ Hegel as a foundation for subsequent developments. One might peruse a book by a colleague of Sitner's, a certain Bruno Bauer, who wrote a diatribe entitled _Trumpet of he Last Judgement Against Hegel the Atheist and Antichrist_ which appeared three years before _Der Einzige_; this same idea is put forward there, that Hegel, _without realizing it_, had made the endpoint of his philosophy the finite ego, even though he couched his terminology in the depths of abstraction. The effort, then, in the period of the _Vormarz_, was to reveal the "true spirit" of Hegelianism to itself, to banish the obfuscation in Hegel's philosophy while retaining the real advances he had achieved. One must, after all, deal with the problem of the "crass" ego or the ego which doesn't understand how to engage in the overall Critique of world and experience. One cannot merely stay on the plane of sense perception; one must pass through various stages of consciousness to arrive at a state of mind which incorporates and synthesizes many forms of perceiving the world. This is Hegel's great contribution to philosophy. To extend this argument to the realm of the Bauerian Critique, for example, the ego in capitalism, imprisoned as it is within the confines of the Protestant Ethic, cannot find its own unique self underneath its Calvinistic quest for membership in the elect. It is doomed to remain a mere _type_, the type of _homo economicus_. One must interrogate the self all the way down to its deepest level, and here we have the basis for examination of unconscious motivations that became the "science" of psychoanalysis. Only after one passes through the Feuerbach is one truly Unique. To term this new state of being "absolute knowledge" would be misleading in the extreme but it arguably corresponds to the territory that was, however wrongheadedly, demarcated by Hegel.--davidwestling2 4/25/05 2:26 PM CDT
[Conversation continues in the topic below]
Amendments; Stirner and/or/as/against Hegel
- Anonymous speaketh thusly:
(1) I have attempted a "Friendly amendment" to the paragraph on Hegel --I hope you can recognise that modern Hegelian opinions about Stirner *are opinions*, and the phrasing needs to make it clear that this is a 20th century POV, *not* an argument inherent in Stirner's text:
- Stirner attended university in Berlin, where he attended the lectures of Hegel, among others. Some modern Hegelians maintain that Hegel was an important inspiration for Stirner's thinking, although there are neither structural, nor logical similarities between their philosophies, and Stirner's own comments about Hegel's work are entirely contemptuous and dismissive thereof. However, some Hegelians feel that Stirner's critique of Hegel shows a profound awareness of Hegel's work, and therefore suggest that Hegel's philosophy must be important to Stirner's intellectual development --even if Stirner's mature philosophy comprises a thorough repudiation of Hegelianism (both in form and content).
(2) The phrase about psychological egoism and ethical egoism has been presented as a separate little paragraph --again, I've retained the point you nutty Hegelians are trying to make, but have made it clear that this is only a POV, and differs from the writ of the original text!
- Stiner has been broadly understood as a proponent of both psychological egoism and ethical egoism, although he did refute the latter position in his own writing, maintaining that there is no sense in which one "ought to" pursue one's own interest, and further claiming any such category of "ought" to belie a crypto-religious conceit/cause. The notion that one's own interest (or one's own nature) is a "calling" to which one is beholden (or "ought to follow" in any moral or imperative sense) is, strictly speaking, contrary to Stirner's tenets.
(3) In reply to D.W., I have clearly stated my argument, and you have not provided any substance for the wacky claims you make linking Stirner to Hegel. Vague statements such as "Stirner extends and explores the limits of Hegelian criticism..." really do not cut it in the world of philosophy; if you can't actually show that Stirner uses the logical structure of Hegelian critique (hint: he doesn't!) then don't make such airy, baseless claims in an encyclopedia. Stirner has a sub-chapter in which he attacks and repudiates "Criticism" as a movement in philosophy --and he correctly attributes the origin of this "movement" to Kant, not Hegel. Hegel was hardly the only author to write Pseudo-Kantian sounding books with titles and chapter-titles named Critique of... in 19th century Germany --and men such as Stirner and Schopenhauer saw right through the academic jargon of that Hegel and his ilk had inherited from Kant and Chr. Wolff. Your supposedly historical claim that Hegel is simply "So important" that Stirner could not fail to have been dependent upon him (and Feuerbach of all people!) in constructing his own philosophy is precisely the kind of academic nonsense that gets laughed out of the room in the company of real philosophers: if Stirner repudiates Hegel, and you claim that in fact Stirner's philosophy is built on Hegelian concepts and methods you have to prove it. In Stirner's case, there is a very large burden of proof incumbent upon you --and you have not proven anything except that the extreme vagueness of some of Hegel's conclusions in the _P. des Geistes_ can be construed (by later, 20th century readers) as having something to do with the ego. So what? Marxists read Hegel as if he were talking about politics when he was talking about the unity of the mind of God; and, most hilariously, Francis Fukuyama interprets passages in which Hegel attacks constitutional monarchy (and defends slavery!) as justifications for electoral democracy and capitalist economics. These "latter-day readings" of Hegel do not reveal anything inherent in Hegel's text --and your assertion that one such "creative interpretation" of Hegel has something (very vague) in common with Stirner's conception of the ego proves absolutely nothing about either Stirner or Hegel as source texts. Reminder: an encyclopedia article about an author should describe that author, his work, and (briefly) the character of the texts he produced. Do not present 20th/21st century re-interpretations as if they were written by Stirner himself! If you want to set up a separate sub-chapter in the article titled Scholarly Re-interpretations, and then clearly indicate that these are P.O.V. statements by Hegelians, I can allow it --but you're writing this stuff as if it described the content of Stirner's own work --it doesn't! Stirner's own work repudiates Hegel, and neither makes use of the structure of Hegel's _Phenomenology_ (which your Encyclopedia article originally claimed!) nor does it borrow terminology or content from Hegel --nor is there even one tenet about which Stirner is in agreement with Hegel! So, to speak precisely, these are two completely opposed philosophers, that some modern Hegelians like to compare to one-another on the basis of a psychological re-interpretation of Hegel (wherein, notably, Hegel's often used "absolute" become quite non-absolute!). This does not mean that Stirner's philosophy "Would have been impossible without Hegel" --and if you cannot actually demonstrate any kind of intellectual inheritance from Hegel in the tenets positively esposed by Stirner's philosophy, you must concede this point. The fact that Stirner derided and ridiculed Hegel does not make him one of Hegel's disciples; the very opposite should be obvious (to anyone but a Hegelian --you guys always have trouble with "opposites" --I guess it's that doctrine of "the unity of opposites" that you're preaching all the time, ha ha).
More blather from DW-- I'd appreciate it if you left off that "voice of god" attitude you seem to so hooked on and just debated this like an ordinary mortal. You don't have the power to disallow anything. Anon, it's really pretty uncontroversial what I am claiming. Stirner was part of the Young Hegelian group, wasn't he? They were Hegelians! Renegade ones, to be sure, but this is part of the historical record. There's D.F. Strauss, who wrote Das Leben Jesu in 1835-36, which was the first step away from the Master's Lutheranism. August von Ciezskowski took the Hegelian dialectic and applied it to political theory--"the future will be an age of acts and not of facts." Then, we have Bruno Bauer, who proved beyond a reasonable doubt that Christ did not exist, and opened the way towards philosophic atheism. This was all done in the context of a response to Hegel's system, with a growing opposition to it gathering steam with each new step. Feuerbach gained notoriety by critiquing Hegel's position regarding abstraction; his "Towards a Critique of Hegelian Philosophy" of 1839 was a watershed in the development of philosophic materialism. In contrast to PhG, The Essence of Christianity was indeed the immediate point of departure for Stirner's magnum opus. Stirner's book was mainly a response to Feuerbach's, who was the reigning intelligence in Young Hegelian circles at the time. Der Einzige, as you may recall, opens with a quote from Feuerbach. Much of the book is merely (merely!) a lengthy dissection of Feuerbach's simple assertion, "Man is to Man the true Supreme Being." It's true, Stirner has developed a perspective in which Hegelian terminology as such no longer has a place. He has thoroughly moved beyond Hegel. But this does not obviate the matrix from which Stirner's thought appeared. For a thorough discussion of the lineaments of the Young Hegelian enterprise as a whole, I recommend John Toews' Hegelianism (1980). Toews' dense account would not benefit from anything I might contribute to "prove" that all these thinkers are intimately related, and, moverover, trace the origins of their perspectives essentially to Hegel. This argument is becoming quite tiresome, and I would only add at this point that I am in no way, shape or form a Hegelian, nor am I an academic. "Just as every cop is a criminal, and all the sinners saints!" "For he who contends against vice, vice exists." I will leave you to contemplate such dialectically formulated quotes and "allow" you to draw your own conclusons.--Davidwestling2 4/26/05
- Anonymous speaketh thusly (2):
I am not "playing god", D.W., I am playing the part of a man who has read all the primary sources in question --and I find your contentions absolutely laughable --and they reflect the kind of over-reliance on secondary sources that modern universities encourage. Take, e.g., your statement that it is "a matter of historical record" that Stirner "was" a quote-on-quote "Young Hegelian". Why don't you find me one passage where Stirner describes himself as a "Hegelian"? There isn't one. Who were these so-called "Young Hegelians"? They were, as a matter of historical record called Die Freien --they never called themselves young hegelians. They called themselves "The Free", and they had very little in common with one-another --and even less in common with Hegel. The only group of philosophers Stirner was a part of as a matter of historical record was Die Freien --none other! Some later Hegelians (who wrote the histories of philosophy long after Stirner was dead) lumped him in with the followers of Hegel --and if (e.g.) you want to call Bruno Bauer or Feuerbach a follower of Hegel, I don't really care to debate the point. However, the claim that Stirner was a Hegelian --given what he explicitly says about Hegel's philosophy-- is an unproven assertion, and one that would be very difficult to prove. Your abstract statement that, despite the total lack of Hegelian terminology, tenets or method in Stirner's philosophy, there is a "Matrix" of influence that associates Stirner with Hegel is really quite weak. Why do you suppose Hegel is a more important influence than, say, Adam Smith? In case you didn't know, Stirner spent years translating Adam Smith's book The Wealth of Nations from English into German --he thought that Smith was a very important thinker. He never said anything so nice about Hegel! Now Adam Smith was a very influential 19th century thinker --and, unlike Hegel, he wrote about the themes that Stirner cared about --such as self-interest, egoism, and how these relate to social change. Isn't it interesting how this encyclopedia article doesn't mention Adam Smith, but your vague assertion of a "Matrix" of influence seems to justify copious assertions about Hegel? Look, D.W., I am being ascerbic, but I am not being unreasonable: I quoted my proposed amendments to the article above (in my prior message), and they do include clear statements that Hegel was (debatably) an important influence --and that some people today think Hegel was a very important influence. I'm not one of those people, but I'm also not trying to exclude your view from the article --so long as it is clear that it is only one POV! I have already stated in my previous argument that a great deal of the book is written in reply to Feuerbach --so obviously I do not disagree with you (D.W.) that Feuerbach's work was important to Stirner's development. However, the fact that Stirner repudiates Feuerbach does not make him a Hegelian (the opposite supposition is very difficult to defend!); on the contrary, if you look at the sources Stirner actually *agreed with*, or that Stirner says were important to him, you get a much different picture of the "Matrix" of values out of which _Der Einzige_ emerged. The first half of _Der Einzige_ is largely a dismissal of contemporary philosophy (and/or contemporary European civilization generally) --have you considered what sources were influencing Stirner in the composition of the positive assertion of his own philosophy? e.g., "The Union", and other lengthy passages, in which he is explaining his own views, rather than just attacking Hegel and Feuerbach? There is certainly nothing Hegelian in the positive portion of Stirner's work --and to say that there is an inherently Hegelian quality in the purely negative passages lambasting Hegel seems to me an inherently flawed argument.
