XTEA
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XTEA | |||
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General | |||
Designer(s) | Roger Needham and David Wheeler | ||
First published | 1997 | ||
Derived from | Tiny Encryption Algorithm (TEA) | ||
Cipher(s) based on this design | - | ||
Algorithm detail | |||
Block size(s) | 64 bits | ||
Key size(s) | 128 bits | ||
Structure | Feistel network | ||
Number of rounds | variable; recommended 64 Feistel rounds; 32 "cycles" | ||
Best cryptanalysis | |||
A related-key differential attack can break 26 out of 64 rounds of XTEA, requiring 220.5 chosen plaintexts and a time complexity of 2115.15 (Ko et al, 2004). |
In cryptography, XTEA (eXtended TEA) is a block cipher designed to correct weaknesses in TEA. The cipher's designers were David Wheeler and Roger Needham of the Cambridge Computer Laboratory, and the algorithm was presented in an unpublished technical report in 1997 (Needham and Wheeler, 1997). It is not subject to any patents.
Like TEA, XTEA is a 64-bit block Feistel network with a 128-bit key and a suggested 64 rounds. Several differences from TEA are apparent, including a somewhat more complex key-schedule and a rearrangement of the shifts, XORs and additions.
Presented along with XTEA was a variable-width block cipher termed Block TEA, which uses the XTEA round function but applies it cyclically across an entire message for several iterations. Because it operates on the entire message, Block TEA has the property that it does not need a mode of operation. An attack on the full Block TEA was described in (Saarinen, 1998), which also details a weakness in Block TEA's successor, XXTEA.
As of 2004, the best attack reported on XTEA is a related-key differential attack on 26 out of 64 rounds of XTEA, requiring 220.5 chosen plaintexts and a time complexity of 2115.15 (Ko et al, 2004).
Implementations
This standard C source code, released into the public domain by David Wheeler and Roger Needham, encrypts and decrypts using XTEA:
void encipher(unsigned long* v, unsigned long* k) { unsigned long v0=v[0], v1=v[1], i; unsigned long sum=0, delta=0x9E3779B9; for(i=0; i<32; i++) { v0 += (v1 << 4 ^ v1 >> 5) + v1 ^ sum + k[sum & 3]; sum += delta; v1 += (v0 << 4 ^ v0 >> 5) + v0 ^ sum + k[sum>>11 & 3]; } v[0]=v0; v[1]=v1; } void decipher(unsigned long* v, unsigned long* k) { unsigned long v0=v[0], v1=v[1], i; unsigned long sum=0xC6EF3720, delta=0x9E3779B9; for(i=0; i<32; i++) { v1 -= (v0 << 4 ^ v0 >> 5) + v0 ^ sum + k[sum>>11 & 3]; sum -= delta; v0 -= (v1 << 4 ^ v1 >> 5) + v1 ^ sum + k[sum&3]; } v[0]=v0; v[1]=v1; }
References
- Youngdai Ko, Seokhie Hong, Wonil Lee, Sangjin Lee, and Jongin Lim. Related key differential attacks on 26 rounds of XTEA and full rounds of GOST. In Proceedings of FSE '04, Lecture Notes in Computer Science, 2004. Springer-Verlag.
- Seokhie Hong, Deukjo Hong, Youngdai Ko, Donghoon Chang, Wonil Lee, and Sangjin Lee. Differential cryptanalysis of TEA and XTEA. In Proceedings of ICISC 2003, 2003b.
- Dukjae Moon, Kyungdeok Hwang, Wonil Lee, Sangjin Lee, and Jongin Lim. Impossible differential cryptanalysis of reduced round XTEA and TEA. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, 2365: 49-60, 2002. ISSN 0302-9743.
- Roger M. Needham and David J. Wheeler. Tea extensions. Technical report, Computer Laboratory, University of Cambridge, October 1997.
- Markku-Juhani Saarinen. Cryptanalysis of block tea. Unpublished manuscript, October 1998. Can be found on the authors homepage or in sci.crypt.research newsgroup archive.
External links
- A web page advocating TEA and XTEA and providing a variety of implementations (http://www.simonshepherd.supanet.com/tea.htm)
- Test vectors for TEA and XTEA (http://www.cix.co.uk/~klockstone/teavect.htm)
- A survey of TEA and XTEA and their cryptanalysis (http://www-users.cs.york.ac.uk/~matthew/TEA/TEA.html)
- JavaScript implementation of TEA (http://www.movable-type.co.uk/scripts/TEAblock.html)
- PHP implementation of XTEA (http://php-einfach.de/sonstiges_generator_xtea.php)
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