Talk:Science
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(Several Different Points)
The divorce of science from philosophy is completely unjustified. --Daniel C. Boyer
- Because?...B
- Because it is a set of theories or a method of inquiry about how the world is, it is fundamentally an aspect of philosophy, and the divorce exists for no other reason than to enable science to get away without ever having to defend the a priori assumptions on which it bases its method. Why are these assumptions beyond challenge? --Daniel C. Boyer
- Daniel, I agree with the gist of your reply. My "Because?..." was questioning what I misunderstood to be a comment about the historically divergent paths of these disciplines. Generally, scientists are not adequately familiar with the philosophical presumptions upon which science rests, and they have become dogmatic and overly-confident in these presumptions. For example, how many scientists have studied formal logic, epistemology or acknowledge the problem of induction. Yet they bandy about such words as "logical", "true", "knowledge and "fact" as if they knew what these concepts mean! Not all of the rules of logic have been sorted out and there is still not a sufficiently developed theory of truth or theory of knowledge in philosophy, yet scientists act as if this has already been done. —B 21:14, Nov 4, 2003 (UTC)
- Was there ever a parting of philosophy and science? Even very recent philosophers have been influential (for better or for worse). A few names that spring to mind are Wittgenstein, Popper, Victor Kraft, Lacatos, Kuhn and Feyerabend. NielsBohr seems to have been a relativist [1] (http://www.xrefer.com/entry.jsp?xrefid=551466). Einstein, who wrote philosophical papers of his own, was inspired by ErnstMach. Einstein and Bohr, of course did challenge a priori assumptions about our ability to be objective. --ChrisSteinbach
- Chris, in a sense, yes, there was a parting, and this parting is the problem described in different ways by both Daniel and me above. Namely, that in order to do science well, scientists need to have a better background in certain philosophical subjects, but this has become more difficult since science became a discipline separate from philosophy with their own unique subjects of study. Some scientists have made contributions to the philosophy of science, but generally they go on with their research without adequately grasping the philosophical limitations of science. —B 21:14, Nov 4, 2003 (UTC)
The leading assertion of the second paragraph in the current article is false:
- "Certain fundamental assumptions are needed for science. The first assumption is that of realism."
Realism as defined in the article or scientific realism is not necessary to science. Science is no less compatible with instrumentalism than it is with realism. Science does not require that unobservable theoretical entities, such as electrons, are "real"; science only requires that unobservables help explain and predict sense-data. Besides the leading sentence, the rest of the paragraph has another sophmoric problem. In particular, equating "facts" and "physical objects and events" with the same ontological status: "facts are real"; "physical objects and events are facts". (Whatever that is supposed to mean...although that terminology may be popular or conventional, it's meaning is far from clear. Hmm, sounds like an analytic philosophy critique.) The third paragraph about consistency fails to even mention or explain science's (or rather scientific theories' or laws') dependence on the much more relevant principal of induction. (Nevermind the problem of induction.) B 17:03 Jan 8, 2003 (UTC)
I removed this: "Some scientists in the hard sciences consider all scientific-like fields of study outside of the hard sciences (including the soft sciences) not to be true science, or even relegate them to the realm of pseudoscience."
- The way this is phrased, that's just not true. In fact, this entire article was laced with unfounded anti-science remarks that were just egregiously POV. It started to look like a leftist Derrida-inspired deconstructionist tract to deligitimize science. RK 13:53 7 Jun 2003 (UTC)
- I looked at the "anti-realism" paragraphs you removed, maybe it should be put in its own article, like Scientific realism and rewritten as NPOV? (I don't understand much about the philosophy of science, so maybe I'm misled here) -- Rotem Dan 14:00 7 Jun 2003 (UTC)
Ought there not be some sort of criticism of Science
- ChrisG 17:39, 4 Nov 2003 (UTC)
I have some trouble with the first paragraph on the main Science page:
"According to the philosophy of science, science (from scientia, Latin for "knowledge") refers to the body of knowledge, which humans have accumulated; as well as to the method of studying this data. Scientific knowledge is said to encompass "the natural universe". Scientists, who study scientific knowledge, practice the scientific method (a process of observation and experimentation)."
'Stripped down', it says:
"Science refers to the body of knowledge which humans have accumulated, as well as to the method of studying this data. Science is said to encompass "the natural universe".
The phrasing leaves room for improvement, but rather than change it directly myself , I thought it more 'in the spirit of Wiki' to merely point out the issues.
Issue (1):
Science, as a term denoting 'a body of knowledge', is not 'the body of knowledge which humans have accumulated", there being knowledge other than science in this all encompassing body.
Issue (2):
Whilst the claim that 'science is said to encompass the natural universe' is perfectly reasonable, it does not address the difficulties raised by issue (1) unless is is modified so that it says:
"science is exclusively concerned with the natural universe"
We can perhaps address both issues by a new phrasing of the definition:
"The term science, when used to denote a body of knowledge, refers to a body of knowledge exclusively concerned with and derived from the study of the natural universe".
This adjustment does not make any attempt to address where the boundaries between natural and metaphysical knowledge might occur and is not intended to do so, it is merely to address some inherent ambiguities in the existing phrasing of the definition.
in addition
I also find the introduction to be a source of tribulation. for instance, it speaks of such things as Identifying what "things" are in a very strange and even outrightly irritating way. possibly more notable are assertions of "causal powers" among others. these terms should possibly be defined, repleced, or even removed. I certainly don't get it. the structure of this introduction is less then helpful I would say. I can't immediately think of a better way to do it, ill likely come back when It is not so late and I am not under the influence of intoxicants. even then, I may not be the guy, well just have to see after my head clears. in any case, the whole artical seems to be in need of revision and clarification. such an important artical as "science" main article should be of considerably greater quality. I have to say, even based on wiki standards, this seems somewhat poor. (ME)
Ericross
Is it not the case that early 17th century scientists such as Galileo, Descartes and others, in their theory of primary and secondary qualities, demolished naive realism. Naive realism is the belief that, for example, the colour red is an inherent (or primary) property of a body, rather than a secondary quality; i.e. only a sensation produced in the mind of an observer, albeit in some way caused by the object. Leighxucl 04:00, Jan 12, 2004 (UTC)
theories, laws, and hypothesises
As to Lord Kenny's statement that "theories do not turn into laws". That is false ... the article is inaccurate due to his edits. A theory is different from a physical law in that the former is a model of reality whereas the latter is a statement of what has been observed, BUT there is a exceedingly remote chance that the accepted "laws" are wrong (and evidence is needed to regeneralize the the "so-called" laws). This was has occured (eg. Newton vs Einstein).
A hypothesis is a proposed explanation for a phenomenon ... this in turn develops into a "theory" to model the phenomenon ... and, ultimately, evolves into a "Law" (when scientific generalization occur based on empirical observations) ... they are refered to as "laws", but they are, in reality, just theories (that haven't been disproven) ... many scientific theories (such as ones concerning gravity) do turn into laws. Sincerely, JDR
- I have to agree with the statement that "theories do not turn into laws." Laws and theories are two separate things, each of which might have been previously verified, and each of which might be disproven. A hypothesis might develop into either a law or a theory. The difference is that laws are simpler correlations of observable data, while theories typically try to build a theoretical framework which may help to explain physical laws or other theories. Newton's law of gravity, for instance, explains nothing. It only gives the observed correlation between the measured values of a gravatational force between two objects, the mass of the two objects, and the distance between thier gravitational centers. Einstein's theories attempted to give a deeper understanding of how gravity worked, from some sort of theoretical basis. millerc 06:27, 17 May 2004 (UTC)
This has been removed from the philosophy section:
- Implicit in classical science's devotion to acquiring knowledge about the universe is an assumption that atoms, animals, gravity, stars, wind, microbes, etc. all exist independently of our observations of them. This essentially metaphysical view is termed realism. The opposed view of modern science parallels a metaphysical position, that of idealism which in varying forms denies the existence of matter independent of mind. The two views are metaphysical because although both are consistent with our experience there appears to be no way to get outside of that experience in order to see which (if either) is true.
I don't know why. It explains the difference between realism and idealism, and then points out that both are metaphysical and that science isn't really affected by the "truth" of either one. I don't understand why this should be removed, or why it supposedly conflicts with other paragraphs. I think the first sentence just needs to be rephrased and everyone can be happy with it. - Omegatron 20:14, May 18, 2004 (UTC)
- These terms are not subject-specific. They are barely related to science but as a subnote. (realism is not necessary to science).
- I am adamant about the process of explaining jargon.
Bensaccount 20:24, 18 May 2004 (UTC)
- They are important terms relating to the question "What is science?" and the relationship between science, philosophy, metaphysics, empiricism, perception, etc. Philosophy is hardly a footnote to science. They both descended from the same thing, and are still intertwined, even if the applied sciences and technologies no longer refer to any philosophical concepts directly. Neither idealism or realism are necessary for science, but they ARE necessary to include while discussing the nature of science...
- Then why are you removing the explanation?
- - Omegatron 20:40, May 18, 2004 (UTC)
- They do not answer what is science. Science is merely a process, and the results of that process.
- By the process of explaining jargon I meant by using hyperlinks.
Bensaccount 20:43, 18 May 2004 (UTC)
- A process of what? Making observations? Observations of what? This is not an article on the scientific method, but an article on the nature of science itself.
- I don't understand what you mean. Did I remove some wikilinks by accident?
- - Omegatron 20:49, May 18, 2004 (UTC)
- Science is both a process of gaining knowledge, and the knowledge gained by this process. (Science).
- I mean just hyperlink realism instead of explaining it on this page.
Bensaccount 20:52, 18 May 2004 (UTC)
PS. I think that the philosophy here may fit better on the nature article, which is harder to define. (What is nature?)
- Nature is the natural world, especially in its essential form, untainted by human influence. This definition makes the assumption that atoms, animals, gravity, stars, wind, microbes, etc. all exist independently of our observations of them. This essentially metaphysical view is termed realism. The opposed view of realism is the metaphysical position, idealism which in varying forms denies the existence of matter independent of mind. The two views are metaphysical because although both are consistent with our experience there appears to be no way to get outside of that experience in order to see which (if either) is true.
Bensaccount 23:12, 18 May 2004 (UTC)
Philosophy of science
Why have two sections addressing philosophical issues? Philosophical foundations of the scientific method, rather curiously, did not discuss the philosophical foundations of the scientific method. Philosophy was a rather idiosyncratic chat about Kant – not exactly a renowned philosopher of science. Rather than attempt a halting account in this article, why not link to the main philosophy of science articles? Banno 11:30, Jun 8, 2004 (UTC)
Theories of various quality
I rather object to this sentence: "Thus, when scientists refer to the theories of biological evolution, electromagnetism, and relativity, they are referring to ideas that have survived considerable experimental testing." While there no doubt is a great deal of circumstantial evidence supporting the theory of evolution, it does not exactly lend itself to experimental testing. So you might observe that certain bacteria adapt to their environment, or might even create new types of vegetable by cross-breeding, but has anyone ever observed the development of a completely new species, let alone created a new species using the mechanisms that allegedly drive evolution? I think not.
Note that I am not criticizing the theory of evolution itself. I would merely argue that, as a theory, it is far weaker than the theory of relativity, for example. In my opinion, it should rather be compared to something like continental drift.
- I believe there are several examples of completely new species. I'm no expert. Try looking here: Observed Instances of Speciation (http://www.talkorigins.org/faqs/faq-speciation.html) - Omegatron 13:31, Jun 17, 2004 (UTC)
Locations of science
The "locations of science" section seems to imply that academia is the standard by which all science is "truly" done, and that researchers in private institutions only occasionally brush with scientific exactitude. But since the mid 20th century the line between academic and industrial science has become so blurred (UC Berkeley's entire Int. Bio. dept is paid for by Monsanto, if I recall), and the rise of private financing of basic research (Genentech comes to mind) makes its current formulation overly idealistic and quite a bit naive, I think. Am I the only one who thinks this? --Fastfission 01:13, 10 Jul 2004 (UTC)
- Or you can do science in your bedroom by yourself. Or to determine which route is the fastest way to get to work. I don't know why it has this concept of science in a place... - Omegatron 05:07, Jul 10, 2004 (UTC)
- I agree. I tried to address the acedemia POV in that section by pointing out other locations where science is practiced. Although some of them come close to the ill-defined border between science and technology, so I expect further improvements by other contributors. --Rick Sidwell 23:43, 10 Apr 2005 (UTC)
The classification list
I have rearranged this list, and removed the following section, as by its own admission it does not belong in the list.
- Computer and information sciences
- Officially subset of mathematics, computer science is listed here to aid the reader.
– Smyth 22:27, 2 Nov 2004 (UTC)
- I am sorry Smyth, but you are removing this list upon the false premise that computer science is a subset of mathematics, moreover I am surprised to see this false premise accepted by an undergraduate CS student. What is a subset of mathematics is called theoretical computer science and it only comprises a small area of study of computer science - go read the article if they haven't taught you that in your introductory CS course. I am therefore putting computer and information sciences back, except for Information Technology and Cognitive Systems, which I am not inclined to regard as sciences - but if someone disagrees, feel free to discuss it here.
- Regards, 212.200.132.21 - 6 Mar 2005
- I do indeed think that most of "computer science" is either mathematics or engineering, a belief that is supported by Computer_science#Major_fields_of_importance_for_computer_science. Most computer science work consists of constructing mathematical models of computing and studying their application to the real world, not attempting to descibe any aspect of the real world by means of theories. Obviously there are certain areas of computing where the scientific method is used, particularly in studying the way in which humans and technology interact. So I'm fairly happy with the selection of fields you kept. – Smyth\talk 10:38, 7 Mar 2005 (UTC)
- I don't see that your view is supported by the list you cited, e.g. how do you fit operating systems, compilers, artificial intelligence, databases, networking, computer graphics, human-computer interaction into mathematics or engineering? The view that all sciences, and only sciences, need to try to explain the real world is not valid IMO - e.g. there are Economics, Political science, Health science listed here - they all pursue some practical knowledge rather than explaining the real world. On the other hand, metaphysics clearly tries to explain the real world (though not using the scientific method), yet it is not a science. Economics or political science could be regarded as applied sciences, but they do not have fundamental counterparts. Health science and computer science do have fundamental counterparts, but they have outgrown as disciplines in their own right and developed their own methods. So the line isn't that sharp as it may seem at first sight. I tend to regard mathematics as a science as well (considering mathematical proofs as equivalent to experiments), though this view is not widely accepted. As for use of the scientific method in computer science, it has already been discussed - computer science does use the scientific method. A computer scientist: 1) Develops a hypothesis about a particular way of organizing systems, or solving a given computational problem; 2) Devises an experiment (typically involving the construction of a computational artifact) that tests this hypothesis; and 3) Evaluates the results by comparing its behavior with that of other, previously known computational artifacts (controls). The fact that the phenomena that the computer scientist studies are usually human constructions, or that much of the analysis can be done using mathematical instruments rather than physical ones, does not make this less scientific.
- Regards, 212.200.133.64, formerly known as 212.200.132.21 - 7 Mar 2005 (GMT)
In the list of scientific disciplines, Psychology is a difficult one. Although much of it belongs under 'social science', where it resides at the moment, is there not a large degree of the subject which also resides under 'natural sciences' (e.g. neuroscience)? Are there any other examples of sciences which may fit more than one classification?
psychology is actually a 'behaviorial science' like 'economics' and 'communication science'
Removed
I removed the following text:
- Science is also the scientific knowledge that has been systematically acquired by this scientific process.
From the end of the first paragraph because I felt that it was repitition of the first sentence of the paragraph - feel free to disagree and revert. - Estel (talk) 21:01, Feb 16, 2005 (UTC)
Theory
I revised the definition of theory. The idea of a theory is that it is a framework, a set of ideas. To be a scientific theory, it is hopefully capable of making predictions. This is in contrast to, facts or observations, such as "the rock is black", which cannot be used to make predictions. A theory might be: "rocks of volcanic origin are black." Plenty of theories have been falsified, while plenty of others have received overwhelming support. To a scientist a theory doesn't stop being a theory simply because it is in conflict with observations, it simply becomes a wrong theory.
Also, (like one of the authors above) I don't agree with calling it an "experimental verification" of evolution. Evolution has been verified mainly by countless observations, and the mechanism (DNA) has studied, experimentally, in the lab. But evolutionary history is not an experiment. Likewise, astrophysicists make observations, not experiments. --Joke137 01:07, 12 Mar 2005 (UTC)
- I have rewritten this section somewhat; it was starting to become repetitive. – Smyth\talk 15:26, 12 Mar 2005 (UTC)
Applied Sciences
This very diverse field is either torn apart in the more natural disciplines or jumbled together in "engineering", which seems to be a subdiscipline of physics. Huh? Likewise, agricultural sciences is not biology, it is applied biology. Also, I always tended to make the sciences distinction like this:
- humane sciences (history and language)
- social sciences (psychology, social and politic sciences, and economics)
- exact sciences (science in a strict sense)
- natural sciences
- applied sciences (including computer science)
Phlebas 10:34, 15 Mar 2005 (UTC)
Environmental sciences
I have added this as a seperate heading since it is a crossover between natural sciences and social sciences. Alan Liefting 22:13, 18 Mar 2005 (UTC)
Humanities and Mathematics?
The humanities (as opposed to the social sciences) are not sciences, even loosely defined, as they do not use the scientific method. They are identical to the arts (as opposed to the fine arts), as best I know. Neither is mathematics a science, because it has its origin in axioms rather than experiment or observation of the world. It happens to one of the best tools we have for doing science, but that's a different issue. --Joke137 17:31, 20 Mar 2005 (UTC)
Wikiportal
Template:Portal There are two Wikiportals, Mathematics and Physics which, by their existence show up the lack of one for Science. Ancheta Wis 00:01, 8 May 2005 (UTC)
Role of the Observer
Removed from "Goals of Science" (paragraph 2):
- The developments of quantum mechanics in the early 20th century showed that observations are not independent of interactions, and the implications of wave-particle duality have challenged the traditional notion of "objectivity" in science.
- ...
- How nature really "is" does not depend on our ability to observe it, with or without our observations affecting it.
Bohr's principle of complementarity suggests that there may be some relationship between "observer" (whatever that is!) and observed, but the idea's been contested ever since and, recently, dealt a blow by the Afshar experiment. I'm not against mentioning this controversy somewhere in the article, but simply stating that observation's been "shown" to affect results is misleading, and the idea's importance is overstated here. --Echeneida
Formal science
Formal science is not a very widely used term, but it is gathering momentum due to the effort made by Benedict Loewe (http://www.math.uni-bonn.de/people/loewe/index.html) in pushing it; roughly speaking it is those sciences that study sorts of formal entities. Mathematics and logic are its most characteristic inhabitants, computer science and linguistics are counted members by the Foudantions of the Formal Sciences (http://www.math.uni-bonn.de/people/fotfs/) conference series.
I think the term is relevant to the Science article, but I am hesitant where to go about introducing it, because it rather cuts across the way the scientific method is invoked in the article. Any thoughts? --- Charles Stewart 18:58, 8 Jun 2005 (UTC)
- You might add a paragraph under its own heading. That way it won't interfere with the rest of the article.--MarSch 10:29, 9 Jun 2005 (UTC)