Talk:Definition
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Failed attempts to define definition
Though highly ambiguous, a definition is (in the most usual sense) a brief account of the meaning of...
- Removed "Though highly ambiguous". If someone can't explain how "definition" is ambiguous, especially how it is more so than your typical word, then this does not seem helpful.
A definition is the description of a pattern; if the pattern has been named definition may be of the assigned name or word customarily used as in a dictionary.
- Also removed. Here we have an attempt to define definition using rather non-standard uses of "description", "pattern", and perhaps "naming". I can't imagine this sentence helping anyone. --Ryguasu 16:35 Nov 4, 2002 (UTC)
An attempt to change the subject?
Obviously, we need a discussion definitions from a lexicographer's point of view here as well.
- No this is not obvious (see the real problem).Bensaccount 18:41, 5 Mar 2004 (UTC)
Abstract stuff
I'm curious about wording of this definition of "definition":
- the set of properties that characterizes all and only members of the extension of the word
This appears to be a broader definition than one in terms of "individually necessary and jointly sufficient" conditions. It seems to allow for disjunctive definitions, for example (e.g. "a frob is either an elephant, or something green, or both").
My question is: is this a strength or a weakness? It seems that laymen and philosophers most often have the more restricted sense in mind when they speak of "definitions". Are they somehow "right"? Is the above definition more "right"? Should we mention both in this article? Is this too pedantic for this article? (If so, where would it go?) --Ryguasu 01:03, 8 Sep 2003 (UTC)
The real problem
The real problem in defining definition is that the definition of definition depends upon the definition of definition. Bensaccount 18:33, 5 Mar 2004 (UTC)
The solution to this problem is not found in the various semantics of lexicography. It is a problem of the human mind. A definition is the human minds fundamental way of organizing information. It is simply an association. Bensaccount 18:35, 5 Mar 2004 (UTC)
Deletion of definitions
Is badBensaccount 20:48, 5 Mar 2004 (UTC)
Formulating intensional definitions: causality as an example
I deleted this from this page, because it's largely about causality rather than definition. An example this long and tangential is decidedly unencyclopedaic. — Adam Conover † 20:03, May 1, 2004 (UTC)
The above is a rough definition of 'intensional definition'. How might one go about formulating an intensional definition? Consider an example from philosophy--in particular our example is from the field of metaphysics.
Suppose we want to give a definition of causality, or causation. We want to know what it means to say that the cue ball causes the eight ball to roll into pocket, or that heat causes water to boil, or that the Moon's gravity causes the Earth's tides, or that a hard blow to the arm causes a bruise. What does all this talk of 'causes' mean? We all have some rough idea of the extension of the term 'causality': we are familiar with all sorts of particular cause-and-effect relations. The set of all those particular cause-and-effect relations is the extension of the term 'causality' (or of 'causal relation'). But what properties do all these particular cause-and-effect relations have in common? We say heat causes boiling, and punching causes bruising; so what do these two relations have in common, that we can both call them causal relations?
We can begin by taking a clue from the ancient Greeks, who treated concepts to be defined as species, or a specific category, of a genus, or a general category. Beginning with Socrates, and codified by Aristotle, the ancient Greeks sought so-called genus-species definitions. So we begin by asking: what is the genus of causality, the general category into which it falls? In other words, what sort of thing is causality?
Causality is a kind of relationship, or simply relation for short. We do, after all, speak of causal relations between things. The causality relation is the relation that holds between what we call a 'cause' and what we call an 'effect'. Another example of a relation is similarity. Suppose we say Jack and Jill are similar in appearance; then we say there is a certain relationship, the relation of similarity between them.
So we can say that, taking causality as a species, then the genus of that species is relation. Obviously we would have to know what kind of relation causality is.
Suppose we came up with some properties that allowed us to distinguish causality from all those other relations. They would be the distinguishing properties of causation. Those distinguishing properties would be called, by the ancient Greeks, the differentia of the species. The differentia of a species are the properties that the species has, and that other members of the genus do not have. So the differentia of a species are the distinguishing characteristics of the species. If we discover any, we can formulate a genus-differentia definition.
So if we are looking for a definition of a philosophical concept like causality, we might begin like this: "Causality is a relation that ... ." Here is an example:
- Causality is a relation that holds between events, where the first event (called the cause) precedes the second (called the effect), and where events like the first are consistently followed by events like the second.
(Something like this definition was offered by the Scottish philosopher David Hume.)
So when we say there is a causal relation between heat and water boiling, we say: the heating came before the boiling, and whenever water is heated sufficiently, then it boils. So sufficient heating is always, or consistently, followed by boiling. In this case, we can say that causality has a rather complex differentia: it holds between events; moreover, the first event precedes the second; and finally, events like the first are consistently followed by events like the second. According to this definition, those three rather complex properties together are the differentia of the species causality.
This is only a crude attempt at a definition of 'causality'. But it does provide an example of the sort of thing that we are looking for in a definition of a philosophical concept.
Types of definitions
Should the types of definitions be included within the article itself, with the individual pages (linked to, but mostly nonexistent) themselves being redirects? Most don't have an article, and all I could think to write on them isn't too much more than dicdefs + short examples of usage, and almost certainly no more than stubs. (Which *is* on my to-do list, but...) Operational definition seems to have a more substantial entry, but perhaps a shorter bit could be included and the article linked to. Mindspillage 16:07, 30 Jun 2004 (UTC)