Talk:Alexander Lukashenko: Archive 2

172, there were a number of significant factual points that needed to be corrected in your edits. I would be grateful if you could address the following issues:

You suggest that Lukashenko was elected as part of a "backlash against reform". This isn't so: there was no significant economic reform in Belarus before he was elected. The country's economic problems were chiefly due to the collapse of the Soviet command economy.

You say: "Lukashenko's election was an example of self-interested voters and citizens organizing into parties, trade unions, and non-government organizations to slow the process of establishing a market-economy." What's your source for this? According to mine, he ran as an independent without party backing.

There was some reform, especially price controls. We don't need to be assuming, however, that Belarussian voters in 1994 had a sophisticated grasp of the policies and implementation of "shock therapy" and "stabilization," and rejected reforms as a 'rational-choice.' The point is that the elections occurred in a context of rapid change and uncertainty. I have clearly been addressing this as a populist victory, not Communist. There is a relationship between Lukashenko's populist image and rhetoric and the welfare of many segments of the population that found difficulties adjusting to economic reform in the crucial early post-Soviet period. I have explained this relationship in structural terms, since we are dealing with collective actors, and not reasoned, informed opposition to reforms already enacted.

That's not quite what your edits have said. You've presented Lukashenko as being the leader of a popular movement against capitalist policies. That's not quite true - as I said, he had no party base. Moreover, according to the contemporary accounts of the election campaign that I've read, the main focus of his campaign was on corruption, and the electorate appears to have been motivated as much by dislike of Kebich as by positive support for Lukashenko.

Lukashenko was making promises contingent on postponing reform. To maintain his popular base of support (and personalistic regime), he could not afford to advance Russian-style reforms, to which his own emerging base of support would be most vulnerable. Believe me, once he is unable to parcel out Soviet-era state supports, he's out. It should be obvious that I was addressing a structural relationship, not criticizing the implementation of reforms in general.

He's only able to parcel out support in the first place because of Russian support for the economy and because of his arms sales to dubious countries. The only reason Putin's continuing to dole out money is because he doesn't want a pro-Western reformer to come to power.

You keep emphasizing the "depression induced by structural adjustment and stabilization of the regime [in Russia] has been far more severe than the Great Depression in the United States". True, but this has already been alluded to in the bit about the reasons for the electorate's support for Lukashenko in the 1994 election. It doesn't need to be repeated endlessly. This article is supposed to be about Belarus, not Russia. We're all agreed that Russia has experienced horrible social problems. The exam question is not what effect did economic reform have on Russia? but what effect did Russia's experience have on Belarus?.

Again, you cannot underestimate the degree to which poverty and instability in Russia has helped Lukashenko. Such background information also explains why he has neglected reform for nearly a decade, as this would probably force his most loyal bases of support to turn on him.

My problem with this is that your edits constantly stress how awful reform was for Russia - that's unarguable, but you repeatedly return to it and emphasize it again and again, in such a way that you appear to be arguing against reform, not simply presenting how the Belarusians saw it.

I said "most non-Belarusian analysts believe that Lukashenko's approach is ultimately unsustainable"; you replaced this with "the IMF, World Bank, and the United States argue that Lukashenko's approach is unsustainable in the long-run". Sorry, but that view is far more widespread than you suggest. Most economists and analysts internationally take that view. Lukashenko's policies defy economic orthodoxy (whether that's a good or bad thing is another matter altogether), so not surprisingly, orthodox economists don't like them.

Wasn't I arguing this very point on the talk page? Isn't this my view? But we are not here to argue that all non-market economies are doomed to failure as a matter of fact. Perhaps this sentence can be rewritten to meet NPOV standards. 172 01:30, 1 Feb 2004 (UTC)

I'm not arguing that "all non-market economies are doomed to failure as a matter of fact". My statement, purely as a matter of factual record, was that "most non-Belarusian analysts believe that Lukashenko's approach is ultimately unsustainable". They may be wrong about this but it's a view which needs to be recorded.

You've omitted entirely any mention of the 1998 financial crisis. I've re-inserted this, along with the wider context which you said was missing (but conspicuously failed to add yourself).

You've also omitted entirely the concrete reasons why Western countries became much more hostile to Belarus, notably the arms sales to states perceived as anti-Western and Lukashenko's public support for Slobodan Milosevic and Saddam Hussein. I've re-inserted this.

You've deleted a significant amount of the high-profile international criticism of Lukashenko's regime, notably the UNHCR's resolution of April 2003. I've re-inserted this; there's no justification for omitting it. You might not like it, but it has happened, it's historical fact and it should be recorded.

Once again, I did not make a blanket assertion stating that these subjects shouldn't be addressed. However, I did state that the coverage was skewed and that more attention should be given to the sources and ramifications of the tensions rather than the each flare up of diplomatic posturing and retaliatory measures. 172 01:30, 1 Feb 2004 (UTC)

No, you didn't make a blanket assertion - you made no assertions whatsoever. Not only that, you deleted any mention of the 1998 crisis. You didn't even bother to follow up your own suggestions that the background should be fleshed out more fully, which I did do subsequently. I'm forced to conclude that you simply don't want to say anything at all about 1998. There's no other reason I can think of for deleting this. It's established, indisputable historical fact.

Some of your additions/reversions are very clearly POV. For instance: "Lukashenko's charges [of Western conspiracies] are not baseless." This is quite clearly your POV which you try justify by dragging in Salvadore Allende - in my view, a dubious and sloppy parallel. You appear to be trying to make a case that the US always goes around "targeting and vilifying radical governments", which is very clearly a partisan POV and therefore incompatible with the Wikipedia NPOV requirement. Also, "Even his critics cannot disparage the good example that he is setting." This is pure editorialising on your part - it's your POV that he is setting "a good example". Some of us might support inactivity, alcohol and tobacco. :-)

For crying out loud, the paragraph also mentions Central Asia. Other factors are at play aside from the country's human rights record. 172 01:30, 1 Feb 2004 (UTC)

It's editorialising, as I said. If you really want to drag in Allende (which I think is a worthless comparison), you could express it in a more NPOV way as: "Some critics of the Western approach draw a comparison with the way that the US targeted the radical leftist government of Salvadore Allende in Chile in the 1970s". Actually, if you want to make a contemporary comparison (Allende was 31 years ago!) you might be better off using Hugo Chavez as an example.

As well as being POV, some of your additions/reversions are also unjustifiably speculative: "The US Congress introduced the 'Belarus Democracy Act' ... providing financial and perhaps covert CIA support". If it's covert, how do you know about it? The "perhaps" shows quite clearly that this is pure speculation on your part. You should confine yourself to hard facts, not speculation.

The statement was qualified. Do some research, anyone well versed in international relations would be shocked if this weren't the case. 172 01:30, 1 Feb 2004 (UTC)

As I suspected, you're speculating. What is your source for your claim? Do you have an inside knowledge of CIA operations? Clearly not. Like I said, please confine yourself to verifiable facts.

Having said all of that, I've tried to respect and merge into my version many of your changes (in some cases, putting them in different places with different wording but saying much the same thing in a NPOV sort of way). The nature of your changes and a look at your editing history suggests very strongly that you're writing from an anti-globalisation, anti-"imperialism" POV. I don't have a problem with you holding that POV, but I would ask you not to skew the Lukashenko article because of it or to delete factual content because you regard it as "excruciating". -- ChrisO 00:03, 1 Feb 2004 (UTC)

Don't twist my words around. What the hell does "anti-globalization" mean anyway? I support trade and markets. So do you. But I am not going to sugar coat unpleasantries and turn subjects into villainous abstractions, however unpopular and repugnant they are. 172 01:30, 1 Feb 2004 (UTC)

That's not the issue. The issue is that you are deleting large amounts of factual content without bothering to dispute or even discuss it in detail and replacing it with a large amount of POV commentary and speculation. This is supposed to be an encyclopedia entry, not an op-ed page. -- ChrisO 10:23, 1 Feb 2004 (UTC)

And now I suppose Adam's going to start accusing me of supporting this scumbag. You people seem to be obsessed with discussing Belarus' economic and political problems solely in terms of misrule under Lukashenko. Why is it so difficult to address the structural relationship between his image and rhetoric and the interests of social groups dependent on state support from the early post-Soviet period to this date? Why are you people so preoccupied with addressing symptoms, not sources? Rather than analyze how he emerged as a personalistic dictator, we have a laundry list of select examples of every little diplomatic skirmish between Belarus and the West. We may dislike him, but we should not base the content on our unfavorable views of this regime. 172 02:03, 1 Feb 2004 (UTC)

This is a biographical article about Lukashenko, a second-rate gangster and tin-pot dictator. Recourse to slabs of economic history is not necessary to explain or illustrate Lukashenko's biography, any more than it was to explain Milosevic or other post-Stalinist relics. If you want to discuss Problems of economic reform in the former Soviet Union, by all means do so, at an appropriate article. Adam 02:26, 1 Feb 2004 (UTC)

Another possibility is to take all the material that has been deleted from this article by ChrisO and me, and add them to the Belarus article under a heading ==Economic issues under Lukashenko== or something like that. I don't have any real problems with all your stuff about shock therapy etc etc, I just don't think it belongs here. Adam 02:58, 1 Feb 2004 (UTC)

The structural problems are discussed in the context of his election and consolidation of power. We are writing an article on a historical figure, not merely listing reasons why he's a tin-pot-dictator and a second-rate gangster. Frankly, if anyone's interested in seeing him go, he/she ought to be interested in the nature of his base of power and what conditions could undermine it. 172 04:48, 1 Feb 2004 (UTC)

I think the article as it now stands gives those matters adequate attention proportional to the article as a whole. It now reads much less as an elaborate apologia for his regime and more like a description of reality. It is now a much better balance of biography and commentary, and also more proportionate to Lukashenko's (not very great) importance in the world as a whole. The original article was of a length and complexity worthy of a major world-historical figure. I repeat my comment that much of the deleted material can and should find a new home in the Belarus or History of Belarus article. Adam 04:55, 1 Feb 2004 (UTC)

--- No. You seem to be disregarding NPOV policies. We must address the reasons for his emergence and consolidation of power. This is a biographical piece, so we must address what opportunities and challenges he faced while consolidating power.

You would be doing a great service if you started publishing exposes on his regime on your own. But NPOV means avoiding abstractions from his own propaganda and from his enemies. We have to present him as the personalistic leader that he his, ruling through his control of the state largesse and intimidation. 172 05:19, 1 Feb 2004 (UTC)

The article as it now stands is much less POV than it was before. Your version presented Lukashenko as a heroic defender of social equality against the evils of capitalism, and was full of tendentious arguments about how things were worse in Turkmenistan and the virtues of socialist equality. My version is more concise, more biographical and less tendentious. If you want to argue specific points with me, fine, but I won't let you revert to the previous version. Adam 06:15, 1 Feb 2004 (UTC)

--- What? For a while I thought that you were engaged in the ongoing discussion of the article. You don't seem to have written any new content, other than adding the external links, which I did keep in the article. So there really is no need to rehash arguments that I already laid out.

Frankly, your last posting was also far too outlandish to really elicit anything other than my bemusement. You seem to be resorting to the Stalinist tactics you claim to despise: browbeating, bullying, intimidation, and dictating. Seriously, but I can't do so if you continue to spot phantom Communist polemics, spew charges of Communist sympathies anytime someone questions your edits, and dictate orders. 172 07:12, 1 Feb 2004 (UTC)

OK well I see we are not talking the same language so there is no point in further argument. If you revert my edit again I will submit the whole thing to Wikipedia:Requests for mediation and let someone else decide. Adam 07:19, 1 Feb 2004 (UTC)

That's right. I never joined a Stalinist party. These tactics don't work on me. BTW, when you ask for "mediation" are you going to accuse me of a "pro-Lukashenko" bias once again? That's not a bad strategy. If you give a distorted account of my arguments and motives, it will woo more users over here with demagogic appeals and get them to gang up on me. I actually share your views on Belarus, but I can distinguish an advocacy piece from an encyclopedic entry. 172 07:36, 1 Feb 2004 (UTC)

As indicated, I am now submitting this dispute to Wikipedia:Requests for mediation Adam 07:47, 1 Feb 2004 (UTC)

I have submitted this:

User:172 and User:Adam Carr re Alexander Lukashenko

I would like someone to read both 172's version and my version of this article, and offer a comment on their respective merits, and on the solution I suggested at the Talk page but which 172 has not responded to. I believe mine is more biographical, more concise, more encyclopaedic and less tendentious than his. I think that the material I (and others) have deleted from the article belongs more properly at History of Belarus. No doubt 172 can tell you what he thinks. Adam 07:56, 1 Feb 2004 (UTC)

See? No abuse, no accusations. I suggest you add a comment. Adam 07:56, 1 Feb 2004 (UTC)

Do I gather that you are declining to participate in a mediation process? Adam 08:27, 1 Feb 2004 (UTC)

I'm glad that there was no abuse. But you should retract your statements grossly misrepresenting the article's contents. I was disappointed by insinuations that I am casting Lukashenko as a hero fighting the evils of capitalism. That was unbecoming of someone of your caliber.

Since there wasn't much new content, I don't see the need to rehash arguments that I laid out on this page and Talk:Alexander Lukashenko: Archive 1. It's possible for you to join the discussion left over from ChrisO and myself.

For now, I don't see the necessity for mediation. It's best to just resume the debates that were still ongoing before you called for mediation. Right now, however, I have to go online. See you tomorrow. 172 08:37, 1 Feb 2004 (UTC)

We were not having a "debate" - you specifically declined to debate my edits, you simly reverted them. Since you decline mediation I will now take advice on my next course of action. Adam 08:40, 1 Feb 2004 (UTC)

This is going to go nowhere until you refer to my previous postings responding to the very concerns that you raised. We will be able to resolve our differences once you get a better sense of my rationale than was evident in those accusations of "apologia" that you posted earlier. 172 08:51, 1 Feb 2004 (UTC)

I had a quick look, and it seems to me you are in the http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wikipedia%3AConflict_resolution#Step_2:_Discuss_with_third_parties step. And when you look at it carefully, that is exactly what you tried to do here -> seeking other people advices. So, this is precisely what you should do. See Wikipedia:Requests for comment

Perhaps you could also quickly resume the core of the conflict. I noticed that in the reversion, there was also reversion of the spelling of the man. Aren't there rules about the way non english people name should be spellt ? Anthere

I believe that WP policy is that the most common English version of non-English names should be used. A Google search shows that this is undoubtedly Alexander Lukashenko. One of the consequences of 172's reversions is to reintroduce the Aleksandr spelling, which conflicts with the title of the article. Adam 09:08, 1 Feb 2004 (UTC)

I said the first time I read this article that it read as an apologia for Lukashenko, and that remained my view. ChrisO's edit improved it but it still (in my opinion) contained far too much material that was both tendentious (by which I mean that it presented rationalisations for Lukashenko's undemocratic behaviour) and irrelevant, in that it related to the history of the USSR, post-Soviet economics etc. I therefore did another edit, removing much of this material. As I said above, I believe the article now has an appropriate balance of biographical narrative and background commentary. It also gives due prominance to the most important single fact about Lukashenko, that he is a nasty authoritarian thug, and not to making excuses for him. I also did a copy edit that improved the general readability of the article. As I have said, I am happy to debate this edit in detail. So far, however, your sole response has been to revert my edit in toto. This is not acceptable. Rather than have a revert war, I then suggested mediation, which you declined. I will now take advice on what to do next. I suspect we will be off to Wikipedia:Conflicts between users. Incidentially, if you look at History of Belarus, you will see a sadly deficient article. My suggestion is that you take the version of this article as it was before ChrisO's edit, and use it as raw material for a much better History of Belarus article. Adam 09:04, 1 Feb 2004 (UTC)

I don't doubt that there's a lot of material in my edit that would be better off in History of Belarus. Frankly, I felt compelled to put it in or leave it in to answer or address the various points that 172 has been making. I've been taking a look at your version and I agree that it's more concise, but it does need to have a little more to explain his electoral success in 1994 and his quasi-"personality cult" in Belarus today. Your version of the 1998 crisis is also much too brief and is now somewhat inaccurate - you say "the Russian central bank suspended trading in the Belarusian ruble, which led to a collapse in the value of the currency", but in fact trading was suspended after the collapse; it did not cause it. There are a few other points which I think need to be emphasized as well (for instance, noting Russia's continued support for Lukashenko). However, overall it's pretty good and certainly better than the alternative. -- ChrisO 09:20, 1 Feb 2004 (UTC)

I am happy for you (or 172 for that matter) to make edits to my edit where I have created errors. My objection is not to being edited, it is to being arbitrarily reverted (and then accused of Stalinism!). Having said that, I don't think the Lukashenko election "victories" or his personality cult require elaborate explanations. Any dictator can rig an election and construct a personality cult, particularly in a country with a very weak sense of historical identity and a very weak civil society. Adam 09:36, 1 Feb 2004 (UTC)

I think you perhaps underestimate the genuine popular appeal of Lukashenko. The odd thing is that although his elections may have been crooked, he probably would have won them anyway. From what I've read and heard from people who've visited Belarus, it tends to be relatively well-off urban dwellers who dislike Lukashenko - the working class, farmers and pensioners (i.e. most of the electorate) do genuinely seem to support him. His authoritarianism doesn't seem to be a rational reaction to a strong political opposition or an effort to create a Central Asia-style kleptocracy, but probably has more to do with the man's own feelings of insecurity. We keep getting these comparisons between Lukashenko and other authoritarians, like Milosevic or Zhirinovsky or the Central Asian dictators, but really he's in a class of his own. I think this is worth noting.

I agree entirely with your point about arbitrary reversions. I've already challenged 172 to justify his deletions and POV additions - see the top of this page. -- ChrisO 09:46, 1 Feb 2004 (UTC)

Why should we take Adam's version seriously to begin with? It's now obvious that he has an ideological agenda, and that he's not interested in a balanced article. He fails to grasp that NPOV polices are relevant in every article, even those on unpopular and repugnant individuals. 172 17:33, 1 Feb 2004 (UTC)

Adam's version is based very much on mine, and I don't have an ideological agenda here. If anything, I think that accusation is better leveled at your edits. I said some time ago on the now-archived Talk page for this article that we should "get the historical detail right first, then move on to the analysis". I still want to do that. Unfortunately you keep deleting the factual content and replacing it with your own commentary and speculations. This will not be allowed to stand: it undermines the basic objective of this being an encyclopedia of facts, not just users' personal opinions. -- ChrisO 17:57, 1 Feb 2004 (UTC)

Page now protected

Anthere, thanks for putting a (temporary?) end to the edit war. What do you propose now? Given the entrenched positions that seem to have emerged here, I'm not too hopeful that a compromise can be worked out between the editors without someone else giving a "ruling", if that's the appropriate term to use. -- ChrisO 18:13, 1 Feb 2004 (UTC)

given that I had to go back more than 2 months in the past to find an apparently stable version, I suppose it is a temporary end, yes.

I already listed it at Wikipedia:Requests for comment. Well, either some more people are interested in jumping in, and suggest perhaps a compromise that would suit all of you (it seems neither disputants had the right idea till now), or I suppose we should talk about mediation again. This said, if 172 refuses any types of discussion on the matter, as it has been reported, I suppose the decision will be taken by other people, in order to settle the case once and for all. That would be very unfortunate that the solution is decided without the protagonists though. Anthere

User:172 and User:Adam Carr re Alexander Lukashenko

By exposing the issue to a larger audience you may find that your position is the favored one. If 172 sees that he may very well back down or at least be more willing to compromise. If RfC doesn't work, then you can have a poll to make things clear. Only when that fails to convice the other party do you seek mediation. --mav 08:16, 1 Feb 2004 (UTC)

I think Adam has effectively already exposed the issue to a certain extent. This edit war had been going for some time before I stepped in to rewrite the article to a (in my view) more NPOV and factually-detailed version. The current conflict is between a slimmed-down version of my article (Adam's preference) or an article mostly by 172 but incorporating many of my contributions (172's preference). See http://en.wikipedia.org/w/wiki.phtml?title=Alexander_Lukashenko&diff=2277442&oldid=2277343 for a comparison.

My personal preference is for Adam's version, though it does still need some modifications. I have some major issues with the changes that 172 proposes, which wipe out a great deal of factual content for no particular reason and adds a good deal of POV material (apparently written from an anti-imperialism perspective). I suggest that we raise the issue on Wikipedia:Requests for comment and move on quickly to a poll, as there's every sign that Adam and 172 will simply continue to revert each other's changes every few minutes. -- ChrisO 09:34, 1 Feb 2004 (UTC)

I support Anthere's decision to protect the page, although it is a pity she chose a version so far back to protect it at. In response to 172, of course I have an ideological agenda: so does everyone who edits articles of this kind. Mine is that I like democracy and dislike dictators and demagogues. So sue me. The point is not what my agenda is, but what I write in the article. I dispute that my edits are ideologically driven, except inasmuch as I dislike ideology. They are driven by a desire to produce a more readable, more biographical and more encyclopaedic article. When 172 signs on to that objective, we can work together. So long as he insists on loading the article up with slabs of irrelevant and tendentious commentary, further progress will be difficult. Adam 23:30, 1 Feb 2004 (UTC)

I apologize for having chosen such an old version. It was an attempt to reach a stable version. Adam, if you and 172 agree on a more current version (as a temporary one of course), I will gladly put it for you. Even if one of you is unsatisfied with the temporary one, you might both agree that another one is a better choice than this old one. For example, you, Adam, might agree on the current version of 172 as a temporary version. Or 172 might agree on your version as a temporary version. Or you might both agree on another one. At least, this will be one thing you will agree on :-)

fr0069 23:59, 1 Feb 2004 (UTC) (anthere is a she)

No worries - hopefully we can get this sorted out fairly quickly. Protection is supposed to be a temporary measure, I believe? If you could continue to stay involved, I'm sure we'd all be grateful for that. -- ChrisO 00:32, 2 Feb 2004 (UTC)

My apologies to Anthere: I have corrected my pronoun. Adam 00:43, 2 Feb 2004 (UTC)

I must admit that I initially read her surname as a contraction of "Ant[hony] here". Oh well - too literal, obviously. :-) -- ChrisO 01:23, 2 Feb 2004 (UTC)

See m:Anthere for what my name is about. Ant is a shorter name, which refers to me a very small, but industrious collaborative insect.

Tell me if you see how I can help you here. The positive side is that I am very unbiased on the topic. The negative side is that I don't put up well with long and complicated comments :-) Seriously, I mentionned your problem in several places; I hope that some people will come to give their opinion on the matter, and perhaps bring some suggestions, but I am not sure of that. If not, it will have to follow the hard way :-) fr0069

More discussion

I moving my last set of comments to the bottom of the talk page. No one has responded to them. Instead, ChrisO continues to charge me with "writing from an anti-imperialist perspective." Earlier, it was "anti-globalization." I'm impressed that he can use the "straw man" technique well to his advantage. It's just as impressive as his attempts to position himself as the reasonable one when I removed his blatantly misleading, unicausal account of the '98 financial crisis.

These charges of his are nonsense. The dispute over the article cannot end in such an atmosphere of brow-beating. I too hope to see vibrant market democracies in the former Soviet Union with strong, constructive ties to the West. I am glad to see countries like Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic resuming healthy economic growth and integrated in the EU and NATO.

But I am not interested in glossing over harsh realities to the east. It seems that Adam and ChrisO are simply uncomfortable when forced to acknowledge the relationship between the Lukashenko regime and the problems of democratic and market transition in the former Soviet Union. You are both especially uncomfortable when it comes to acknowledging his relationship with lower class groups dependent on state support.

This time, I hope to receive a mature response on the merits of the arguments and the approach that I am suggesting for weighing the significance of the welter of factual data that could possibly be added to his article.

I admit also admit that my version was a hasty, and perhaps sloppy, attempt to integrate a lot of new material into a single article. In the end, I'd be happy with any concise, readable article that discusses Lukashenko's regime in the context of structural change and continuity in Belarus. 172 00:01, 2 Feb 2004 (UTC)

Anyway (and once again), here is the overview of my position on the article:

Looking at things from the standpoints of your ideological assumptions, and not the wealth of social science literature on postcommunism and structural adjustment in the developing world, you both continue to misunderstand almost everything that I post.

When I call 1994 a "populist victory," I mean that especially in light of the fact that he had no party base. "Movement" and "party" are two different concepts in the social sciences as well; do not conflate the two. I continue to stress that he was an outsider who made a personal connection to large segments of the population who felt left out of the country's established political institutions and party. It was a rejection of the nomenklatura, who were positioned - in the eyes of many workers, pensioners, and collective farmers - to reap the lion's share of the benefits from reform, as in Russia. I continue to refer to him as a personalistic leader, and not a party-builder or an institution-builder, as these would be constraints on his personalistic leadership style.

You probably are not familiar with the social science concept of "populism," which has been increasingly used since the early 1990s to refer to not only Lukashenko and Chavez on the left, but also in reference to neoliberals, such as Yeltsin in Russia, Menem in Argentina, Fujimori in Peru, Collor in Brazil, Perez in Venezuela, Mahuad in Ecuador, and so on. Read this article, which discusses recent uses of this concept in the social sciences. No one can understand the politics of economic adjustment in Latin America and Eastern Europe in the 1990s without reading the authors cited by Roberts in the article below.

http://216.109.117.135/search/cache?p=neoliberal+populism&ei=UTF-8&cop=mss&url=ZGG4CFaEa6gJ:www.iir.ubc.ca/pwiasconferences/threatstodemocracy/abstractspapers/roberts.pdf In

This article makes use of Latin American cases, but it's the best article that one can read free of charge, as it focused foremost on presenting the social science concept. I have free access to others focusing solely on the former USSR, but it's illegal to send them.

I object to your version because it fails to present what you just stated on the talk page: that the working class, farmers and pensioners (i.e. most of the electorate) do genuinely seem to support him. You addressed this matter even more directly than I did (Alex576 did as well several days ago). I will continue to work toward a version that makes it clear that there is a relationship between Lukashenko's populist image and rhetoric and the welfare of many segments of the population that found difficulties adjusting to economic reform in the crucial early post-Soviet period.

Yes, I understand that the rhetoric of the '94 race focused on corruption, which often gets brought to the forefront of discussion when a populist mobilizes excluded groups, sectors, and classes. But there is a far deeper structural relationship. Lukashenko mobilized groups excluded from the emerging reform processes, and built up a clientelistic, personalistic dictatorship on this bloc of support.

Adam may say that this is a rationalization of Lukashenko's autocratic tactics. But in reality, this is an attempt to avoid naive optimism. There are far greater challenges to building a stable, inclusive democratic order in the former Soviet Union that just discarding some tin-pot-dictator. Anyone with a slight familiarity with Russia's setbacks in democratization and marketization over the past decade would want to avoid Adam's black-and-white bluster, and consider the complexities of all the other variables involved, however unpleasant they are to consider. 172 19:54, 1 Feb 2004 (UTC)

Time for 172 to discuss specifics

172, for me the most disconcerting thing about your approach is that you're presenting one set of arguments on the Talk page and another in the article itself. You criticise my "blatantly misleading, unicausal account of the '98 financial crisis" and said earlier that I should put it into the context of the wider Asian/Russian financial crisis. I did so. You deleted it anyway. Moreover, despite your own words, you replaced it with nothing. You also evade questions about the clearly POV and factually tendentious commentary that you insist on inserting, such as your claim that the CIA is "probably" trying to bring down Lukashenko. A while back in this discussion, I said that we need to get the facts straight before trying to analyse them in detail. I still think we should do this.

Anthere has given us an opportunity to resolve the details of this argument without having to worry about edit wars. So let's go over your last sequence of edits; I would like some straight answers to your specific areas of disagreement. (I'm going to emphasize specific constantly here, because you have consistently evaded the specifics in your answers so far). I've even provided a place in which to explain your disagreements with individual points and give any amended versions of paragraphs with which you disagree. So far you haven't given any details of specific disagreements. A continued failure to do so will enable people to draw the obvious conclusions, so I suggest that you start explaining what specific points you disagree with.

Comments on my & Adam's content deleted by 172

"Early career (to 1994)" - I think this is relatively uncontentious, right? At least it hasn't suffered major changes from either you or Adam relative to my original version.

"Populist victory" - you deleted all of the information about the economic crisis that helped Lukashenko to win the 1994 election. Do you deny that there was an economic crisis? If you don't, what specific points do you disagree with in the following paragraph:

Lukashenko's platform was strongly at odds with the pro-reform policies backed by the leaders of Belarus' neighbours, which had undertaken radical reforms following the fall of Communism. Very little reform, however, had taken place in Belarus. Only 2% of the economy had been privatized by the time of Lukashenko's election. The end of the Soviet command economy, on which Belarus was very heavily dependent, led to a 50% drop in production between 1991 and 1994 and a corresponding fall in living standards. At the time of the 1994 election Belarus faced an economic crisis: the question was what to do about it.

If you think the above is factually wrong here's a space to provide a version which you believe is closer to the mark:

......................................................

You deleted almost all of the preceding paragraph. Do you deny that what it states happened? If you don't, what specific points do you disagree with in the following paragraph:

Although he won substantial popular support due to his proclaimed opposition to privatization and market reformers, much of his electoral platform was focused on the corruption of the Belarusian government. He claimed during the campaign that he was facing a constant threat of assassination and that he had even been shot at. He attacked his opponents in lurid terms, promising to expel them "to the Himalayas"; if he was elected. Many domestic and foreign observers drew a comparison between his approach and that of the Russian ultranationalist Vladimir Zhirinovsky, although the two men's politics were very different.

If you think the above is factually wrong here's a space to provide a version which you believe is closer to the mark:

......................................................

"Stabilizing the economy and strengthening presidential power" - you've deleted entirely the section about the 1998 crisis and Lukashenko's reaction to it. Do you deny that it happened? If not, then why do you keep deleting any mention of it? What specific aspects of the following paragraph (tweaked for factual accuracy) do you dispute:

At the start of 1998, Russian speculators bet against the Belarusian ruble, leading to a rapid collapse in the value of the currency. The Russian central bank suspended trading in the Belarusian ruble and publicly blamed the currency's weakness on the Belarusian government's policies of funding state expenditure by printing money. Lukashenko responded by taking control of the Belarusian central bank, ordering the exchange rate to be set back to earlier levels, freezing bank accounts and curtailing the activities of commercial banks. Not surprisingly, this led to a run on Belarusian banks and a spate of panic buying. Lukashenko also blamed the country's problems on "economic saboteurs" at home and abroad. Thirty government officials were arrested - some paraded on state television - and hundreds of others were punished.

You've been very evasive about your reasons for repeatedly deleting this (all of which is a matter of historical record, by the way). What specific points do you disagree with? If you think the above is "blatantly misleading [and] unicausal", here's a space to provide a version which you believe is closer to the mark:

......................................................

Likewise, you keep deleting the following paragraphs:

He blamed foreign governments for conspiring against him, and in April 1998 he expelled ambassadors from the United States, Britain, France, Germany, Greece, Italy and Japan from their residential complex near Minsk. This caused an international outcry, as diplomatic residences are supposed to be strictly off limits under the terms of the Vienna Convention. The affronted countries all withdrew their ambassadors, as did, temporarily, Russia.

Do you deny that this happened? If not, what specific points do you disagree with? If you think the above is factually incorrect, here's a space to provide a version which you believe is closer to the mark:

......................................................

Although the ambassadors eventually returned after the controversy died down, Lukashenko stepped up his rhetorical attacks against the West and took to portraying his domestic opponents as stooges of hostile foreign powers. He claimed that Western governments were trying to undermine Belarus at all levels, including the economy (ejecting an International Monetary Fund delegation and labelling them "swindlers") and even sporting (claiming that Western countries were conspiring to defraud Belarus of medals 1998 Winter Olympics at Nagano, Japan).

......................................................

Lukashenko moved beyond rhetoric to take a more active stance of supporting countries in conflict with the West. During the late 1990s, Belarus exported about $400 million worth of armaments annually to an assortment of countries including Iran, Sudan, Iraq - which received anti-aircraft weapons and training - and Yugoslavia. The outbreak of the Kosovo War in 1999 led to Lukashenko proposing a "Slavic Union" of Russia, Belarus and Yugoslavia, an idea which received only lukewarm support and was quietly dropped. Following the Iraq war of 2003, the United States announced that several high-ranking Iraqi officials had been issued Belarusian passports.

......................................................

Comments on 172's content deleted by Adam and myself

I'll add my own comments on specific things that you've added that I find problematic.

Virtually the whole of your "Populist victory" section is commentary, at least some of which is clearly your POV - most obviously:

Lukahsenko's election is perhaps the most notable political victory in the former Soviet Union for those vulnerable to the wrenching effects of the transition from a system of administrative command to capitalism, which always comes with immense social costs to the most vulnerable segments of society dependent on state support.

It's your personal POV that's being stated here. Others would argue that Lukashenko won by exploiting the fears of an destitute population. That's a POV too. Stating baldly, as you do, that a transition to capitalism always has "immense social costs" is also a POV. The important point is that other POVs should be represented, rather than presenting yours as "the only version of the truth". For example, a NPOV version of the above would read something like:

Lukashenko's supporters cited his electoral success as a victory for those vulnerable to the social costs often associated with a transition to capitalism. His opponents, however, attacked him as a demagogue and accused him of exploiting public fears of the personal consequences of economic reform."

The very title of the "Western hostility" section is unbalanced: it implies that the hostility has all been one way. In your version, Lukashenko is a blameless if authoritarian ruler who proved the opposition of the West and "rich countries" (which countries?) by rejecting radical reform. This is clearly a POV. What's more, you've systematically deleted anything that would undermine your POV: you've deleting virtually all of the criticism of the West by Lukashenko but retained and emphasized all of the criticism of Lukashenko by the West. The result is totally unbalanced - it makes it look like all the hostility was in one direction only.

The following paragraphs are totally POV:

Lukashenko's resistance to IMF, World Bank, and US-backed reform has met great resistance among the rich countries. The United States has embarked on a strategy of trying to topple President Lukashenko through the ballot box. Its appointment of Michael Kozak, a veteran of Washington's campaigns to install sympathetic leaders in Nicaragua, Panama and Haiti and undermine the Fidel Castro government in Cuba as head of the US mission in Havana for four years, to lead the US Embassy in Minsk was considered to be a sign of Western hostility.

The description of the resistance ignores the human rights dimension and the criticism of many NGOs and supranational organisations, notably the UN; the description of the US ambassador is innuendo (in what way is he a "veteran"?); and you say that his appointment "was considered to be a sign of Western hostility" - considered by whom?

Lukashenko's charges [that the US is trying to bring him down] are not baseless. For instance, the United States maintains relatively friendly ties to the far more autocratic regimes in Central Asia. The United States also has a history of targeting and vilifying radical governments elected through the ballot box, such as Chile's elected socialist president Salvador Allende, who was ousted by a CIA-engineered coup in 1973.

As I've said before, this is pure editorializing. It's your POV that "Lukashenko's charges are not baseless." You also totally ignore the fact - which I included in an earlier draft but was unfortunately deleted by both you and Adam - that Belarus is rather closer to the borders of both the EU and NATO than Central Asia, and as such is that much more of a concern. Your invocation of Salvador Allende is also very unsatisfactory - totally irrelevant in this context and way out of date (31 years ago!). You seem to be making the case, as I've already said, that the US always goes around "targeting and vilifying radical governments". That is very clearly a partisan (anti-imperialist?) POV.

You unnecessarily repeat the Central Asia point later on, again without any mention of the strategic context:

The US, meanwhile, proceeds trying to destabilize Lukashenko's government, despite its strong alliances with other former Soviet regimes with arguably far worse human rights records, especially in Central Asia.

And the following, as I've already said, is totally speculative:

The US Congress introduced the - Belarus Democracy Act ... providing financial and perhaps covert CIA support, if history is any indicator, to the pro-Western opposition.

You certainly aren't privy to what the CIA does and I doubt if any Wikipedia editors are. I think you recognize that you're on shaky ground in making this assertion, as you've not attempted to give any sources - your riposte earlier was "Do some research, anyone well versed in international relations would be shocked if this weren't the case." What are your sources?

And on a related issue, I've noticed that on Wikipedia:Conflicts between users you've said: "I am the only one familiar with the social science literature on postcommunism and structural adjustment, so this will hardly matter around here." I hate to pull rank on you, but in this case I think it's justified: during the late 1990s I worked as a government policy advisor and analyst on central and eastern European affairs, including Belarus, and I was involved (albeit at a distance) in some of the events that I mentioned in the article. I can honestly claim to have a pretty good idea of what actually happened on the ground and I can say for a fact that I've seen a lot more hard data on Belarus than anyone at the University of South Florida is likely to have been privy to. So when I disagree with your assertions, I'm not just blowing smoke in doing so. I would suggest that you consider the possibility that (amazing though it may seem) some people might actually have a grasp of the story that's at least as good as, and quite probably better than, yours. -- ChrisO 02:01, 2 Feb 2004 (UTC)

ChrisO has put a lot of work into analysing the problems this article faces and I hope 172 engages constructively with the questions Chris has posed. If he does not do so within a few days I think Anthere should be asked to return the article to the state it was in after my last edit, and then - perhaps after Chris has had another go at it - to protect that version.

One comment: I did delete the stuff relating about the US attitude to Belarus in comparison to other countries that Chris refers to. I did this because I think that what regimes the US does and does not have good relations with and why is quite irrelevant to a biographical article on Lukashenko. It might belong under Belarus foreign relations or something like that. I doubt the US cares much one way or the other about Belarus, except to generally disapprove of Lukashenko. Lukashenko's real foreign policy problems are with Russia and the EU (which will soon include Belarus's neighbours Poland, Latvia and Lithuania). Adam 03:16, 2 Feb 2004 (UTC)

I have reiterated repeatedly that I am well acquainted with almost all the facts that you put forward in your version. But the issue is not the facts, but how to sort them out. You certainly are stronger on the former (it's patently obvious that I have no special connection to Belarus), but my suggestions on the latter, given my training in other fields, may be helpful.

I will agree to let Adam's version stand temporarily if we are able to discuss the approach, which is at the root of our differences. Below, I will proceed to address my concerns with your version in terms of the approach, rather than by going through every difference between the two versions point by point.

As I've said repeatedly, my version was hastily drawn up to reconcile the competing versions. I made it clear that I was open to the reintroduction of the material that I omitted. Your version, Adam's version, an my version are each unsatisfactory for now.

Your article read like a laundry list of diplomatic spats, bizarre Lukashenko pronouncements intended for domestic political posturing, and Western governments and NGOs grievances with his regime. Given its emphases, it might as well have been John Bolton's "Beyond the Axis of Evil", rather than an encyclopedic entry.

Given your background as a policy analyst for a Western government, your frame of reference is understandable. But for balance, a greater level of detachment is healthy. A new version of the article should briefly give an overview of the origins and sources of the tensions.

These tensions also need to be linked to his steadfast avoidance of market reforms. Whereas your article went into great deal on the "symptoms," my version was an attempt to address the "sources," so to speak.

While concerns over human rights or the erratic actions by the Belarussian government are - more often than not - the immediate causes of each diplomatic spat, Lukashenko's avoidance of market reforms ultimately determined that his regime would not enjoy the basis for a constructive set of relations with the West. As a Soviet-style command system, the ties of markets and cultural linkage, and international leverage over Belarus, are extremely weak. Unlike his counterparts in Russia, Lukashenko has a relatively weak set of incentives to maintain healthy ties with Western governments, multinational corporations, financial firms, multilateral lenders, and NGOs. In other words, his autarkic regime – secure in the Russian orbit - could withstand the mounting tensions with the West. In such an environment, he can even exploit tensions to his advantage for demagogic bluster domestically. Instead, the country's small middle class would form stronger ties to Western governments and NGOs.

Thus, I was not speaking of "imperialist" conspiracies to plunder socialist countries, but the lack of a structural correspondence between non-market, autarkic economies and the Western world necessary to form strong, cooperative ties. The strategic context may vary, but, by and large, the West rarely maintains good relations with authoritarian regimes with autarkic economies, unless there's some overriding strategic concern (as in Central Asia).

If you can do a better job linking the structure of the economy to the tensions with the West, you are welcome to do so and replace the references to Allende and Central Asia. That text was far from optimal. Initially, my goal was to sum up the sources of the tensions as quickly as possible in a relatable, readable manner. But this topic relationship should be addressed - in one way or another - from the onset when beginning the section on Lukashenko's international isolation.

Finally, my principal concern with your version was your preoccupation with the regime's international difficulties, and the relative neglect of the factors behind the emergence and consolidation of his personalistic regime.

BTW, I did not say that the transition to capitalism always produces more winners than losers in the short-run. I was referring to IMF-backed SAPs, which are always wrenching for certain segments of society. The austerity regime component involves a tight money and fiscal policy, which always slows growth or deepens recession in the short-run. This is a matter of fact statement. These are not stimulus packages, but attempts to stabilize the economy to lay the foundations for healthy growth. You came to the conclusion that I was interested in an anti-capitalist commentary too hastily.

Most importantly, we need to address the relationship between Lukashenko's populism and the interests of segments of the population unable to adjust easily to structural reforms in the crucial early post-Soviet period, as I've reiterated over and over again. The article needs to make it clear that his base of support rests with the working class, farmers and pensioners, as you put it. The article will not be acceptable until it can discuss the nature of Lukahsenko's regime in the context of the problems of democratic and market transition in the former USSR. 172 06:15, 2 Feb 2004 (UTC)

172, I am glad that we seem to be creeping towards an agreement on how to resolve this impasse. We would creep a bit quicker if you would address yourself directly to Chris's questions above, rather than reiterating your overall position. Adam 06:38, 2 Feb 2004 (UTC)

I think the set of questions Chris proposed is really helping clarifying the issue, and a good move. Take your time 172, but please, try to comment each point listed. Any issue not answered should be considered agreed upon and included in the article.

At the same time, why don't you just do exactly the same with the various points on which you do not agree with ? Instead of a too generous paragraph, try to divide each point, propose your own content proposition, and ask Chris and Adam for feedback.

It would be nice of all three of you could agree on which facts are true or not true first. Begin to stick to facts. If you disagree on facts, try to find sources or citations. Then, when you agree on fact, you may move on to see where you could meet in explaining them. Last, you may considerer together whether it is best to include them, or not to include them at all, or to include them in another article. fr0069 09:12, 2 Feb 2004 (UTC)

172's response

Since our disagreements rest on approaches and emphases, there is no need for us to defend each of our changes point by point. However, in this posting I will address some of ChrisO's concerns with respect to the content that he removed. In the mean time, I agreed to let Adam's version be posted as a temporary measure. Once again, I confirmed his facts from the beginning. My objections were at a broader level.

The article needs to discuss Lukashenko's regime in the context of problems of democratic and market reform. We need to describe where his base of support rested from 1994 to this day and sources of these links. In this sense, the comparisons with Russia that other users have been deleting are relevant. After all, Lukashenko's base of support (the classes and sectors most adversely affected by market reforms in the short-run) illuminates why Belarus has moved so solely with reforms since his election. This is not a "pro-Lukashenko" statement, but a reference to the economic and political conditions in which he is struggling to maintain power.

We all agree that these reforms are necessary (yes, ChrisO, so do I, despite your accusations), even if they come at a huge cost to the poorest and most marginalized segments of Belarussian society, but we should keep our pro-market and anti-Lukashenko biases in check when presenting the data.

On that note, let me comment on the following sentence to which ChrisO raised objections:

"Lukahsenko's election is perhaps the most notable political victory in the former Soviet Union for those vulnerable to the wrenching effects of the transition from a system of administrative command to capitalism, which always comes with immense social costs to the most vulnerable segments of society dependent on state support."

This is not a "personal POV." Nor is it necessarily a "pro-Lukashenko" statement. It merely identifies what kinds of constituencies he managed to mobilize along with a note on their coalescing short-run interests in structural terms. We do not need to be told how supporters or opponents interpret this. In other words, we can address this outright without making normative judgments. Even in Latin America - where neoliberal SAPs have come with a similar set of social costs - we've seen Lula da Silva, Lucio Gutierrez, Nestor Kirchner, and Hugo Chavez win the presidency by mobilizing similar alliances.

Perhaps the sentence can be reworded just to ensure that it isn't misinterpreted. Here's a suggestion:

"Lukahsenko's election is perhaps the most notable example in the former Soviet Union of the mobilization of those vulnerable to the wrenching effects of the transition from a system of administrative command to capitalism, which always comes with immense social costs to the most vulnerable segments of society dependent on state support."

I also stand by the latter part of the sentence. As I said earlier, it does not refer to all "transitions to capitalism" in general, as ChrisO charged earlier, but the transition in the context of the Soviet-style ACS system. If ChrisO fails to understand this, I will recommend some texts on the consequences of economic restructuring in terms of state-society relations.

Given ChrisO's background, he is probably prone to assume that economic and political liberalization are mutually reinforcing and complementary in a virtually automatic process. He accuses anyone of not sharing this faith of advancing "a partisan POV." But his assumptions are a "partisan" point of view in their own right. These views are shared by those who advocate these reforms, whether in policy think-tanks, multilateral lending agencies, and Western government agencies.

On the opposite extreme, we have the "anti-globalization" activists. Harking back to the Latin American dependistas of the '60s, they argue that the governments of poor countries have lost substantial authority to regulate their economies, design their social policies, and organize their institutions in ways that differ from those of their dominant trading partners. They contend that "globalization" blocks the development of dependent economies.

The reality, however, is somewhere in between these two extremes. How close reality is to one extreme or the other depends on the context and the scope of the time horizon. If this is recognized, we can avoid partisan disputes.

Let me give an overview. In the short-run aftermath of structural adjustment reforms, slashing spending, raising taxes, and tightening the money supply are always destabilizing; the degree varies depending on the context. A recession and contraction of output always results in the short-run. In no way does this imply that they are inherently bad policies. That certainly isn't my view.

BTW, one should consult the literature on simultaneous market and political transitions in postcommunist systems before I'm accused of advancing an "anti-imperialist" bias once again. My stance is not motivated by anything else other than it being necessary to discuss Lukashenko's consolidation of power and leadership style in the context of the challenges of market and political reform in the former USSR. In no way does this imply that reforms are a bad thing, but that the legacy of Soviet Communism left monumental challenges for reformers.

Now, to address the section on tensions with the West. Since Belarus is in the Russian orbit, and Russia is a much more powerful actor in Belarus politics and economics, Minsk-Moscow relations deserve greater attention relative to the amount of detail on tensions with the West. The amount of attention that this topic received relative to everything else gave ChrisO's version a Western bias, just as Adam's version stresses the concerns of human rights advocacy groups, it seems. To get rid of these biased filters, we need to view this regime in a broader post-Soviet historical context written from the vantage point of what kinds of conditions a populist leader exploited to set up personalistic regime resting on links to groups dependent on Soviet-era state support in stark contrast to Yeltsin.

In short, I am advocating a version that places Lukashenko at the center of attention. I favor adding a good amount of backgrounding, but only to give a general overview of what kinds of conditions have been obstructive of, and conducive to, his consolidation of a personalistic regime domestically. It might have more details on economics that some readers find dull, but this is the most biographical approach. If a reader just looks at him in a vacuum, he or she will understand little. If the article is written from the vantage point of a Western human rights group or Western diplomatic policy-makers, then the article is more about them and what kinds of things they are choosing to emphasize, rather than Belarus' president. 172 23:24, 2 Feb 2004 (UTC)

172 once again sets out his overall view of recent Belarusian history rather than engaging with the specific points Chris has raised. This is disappointing, since he is in effect dealing himself out of the editing process. I think we should now ask Anthere to restore the article to my last edit, and then those who wish to discuss specific edits to that article (which at the moment seems to be Chris and me) can do so. 172 can participate or not as he chooses. Adam 23:46, 2 Feb 2004 (UTC)

I'm disappointed too, this seems to be something of a non-answer. I wonder if what we're experiencing here is something of a clash of editing philosophies? 172 seems to want to write an analytical article interspersed with supporting facts, while I've progressed much more from a fact-based perspective, recording what happened rather than trying to offer my interpretation of it. To be honest, the 172 versions read like the author had a particular conclusion in mind at the start and stripped out anything that didn't support that conclusion. In my view (and I would guess yours too, Adam), Wikipedia articles should first and foremost be factual narratives describing what actually happened. "Comment is free, but facts are sacred" - CP Scott.

CP Scott said that my article "read like" I had some sort of "analysis" in mind all along. To him, the "facts" can't go wrong, and someone talking about "approach" or, God forbid, speaking on an 'analytic' level, is suspect. But writing an article is inherently a process of analysis. It is a process of sorting out the significant from the insignificant, which is based on a certain set of assumptions. CP Scott needs to be less naïve. One must not only check "the facts," but focus on the perspective as well. My field is comparative history, so perhaps my suggestions can be worthwhile.

I note that 172 has added some more comments under his entry on Wikipedia:Conflicts between users. I was struck by one thing that he said:

As I have reiterated repeatedly on the talk page, the issue was not the accuracy of the facts that he presented, but what kinds of facts that he chose to include and what kinds of facts that he chose to omit.

So 172 isn't disputing the accuracy of the facts that I included, but so far he hasn't taken the opportunity to explain what kind of facts should be included and what should be excluded. (And I do mean facts here, "an actual occurrence" as Webster's puts it, not a personal analysis.) I hope 172 reconsiders and tries to engage with the factual questions that I posted above. I think he should be given a few more days to do so. -- ChrisO 00:34, 3 Feb 2004 (UTC)

Yes, I did. If you would read my many detailed postings, you'd understand what my suggestions are. Right now, it seems that you just stop reading once you find a quotation you can pick out of context in order to misrepresent what I'm saying. 172 04:45, 3 Feb 2004 (UTC)

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