Freedom Evolves
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Freedom Evolves is a 2003 popular science and philosophy book by Daniel Dennett. Dennett describes the book as an installment of a life-long philosophical project, earlier parts of which were The Intentional Stance, Consciousness Explained and Elbow Room. It attempts to give an account of free will and moral responsibility which is complementary to Dennett's other views on consciousness and personhood.
Synopsis
As in Consciousness Explained, Dennett advertises the controversial nature of his views extensively in advance. He expects hostility from those who fear that a sceptical analysis of freedom will undermine people's belief in the reality of moral considerations; he likens himself to an interfering crow who insists on telling Dumbo he doesn't really need the feather. But it appears his view of free will is not particularly original or threatening: it comes down to compatibilism with an evolutionary twist, the view that although in the strict physical sense our actions are pre-determined, we can still be free in some other important senses. The important point for a compatibilist case is exactly what senses these might be, but Dennett is not very clear about this.
Dennett goes on to give altruism a similar treatment; he concludes that there is no such thing as altruism, strictly speaking, but rather certain kinds of selfish (or 'benselfish') behaviour which happen to involve helping others with only a superficial or short-term sacrifice; he explains 'benselfish' behavior as a result of evolutionary pressures producing kin selection.
The views are solidly presented, if not particularly new or groundbreaking: but Dennett also suggests that adherence to high ethical standards might pay off for the individual- because if others know your behaviour is restricted in these ways, the scope for certain beneficial mutual arrangements is enhanced; this is related to game theoretical considerations: in the famous Prisoner's Dilemna, 'moral' agents who cooperate will be more successful than 'non-moral' agents who do not cooperate. Cooperation wouldn't seem to naturally arise since agents are tempted to 'defect' and restore a Nash equilibrium, which is often not the best possible solution for all involved. Some find it odd to equate ethics with handcuffs in a book concerned with explaining moral freedom. One might have expected the opposite case: that free will pays off because it makes you scarily unpredictable, and hence a person to be treated with circumspection. Dennett concludes by contemplating the possibility that people might be able to opt in or out of moral responsibility: surely, he suggests, given the benefits, they would choose to opt in. This is a fairly different morality than most moral systems which involve duties as well as rights, making opting out of it not a possibility.
Criticism
Some liken Dennett to Roger Penrose, noting a tendency to extended digressions of apparently limited relevance to the main point of the book (An example being the exposition of Conway's game of Life by Dennet); but one of these is among the best parts of the book: a splendidly clear and convincing sceptical analysis of the famous experiments carried out by Benjamin Libet.
External links
- Short review by Steven Pinker (http://wired-vig.wired.com/wired/archive/11.09/play.html?pg=10)
- Favorable review (http://www.geocities.com/sande106/DanielDennett2.htm)
- Review by John Gray in The Independent (http://enjoyment.independent.co.uk/low_res/story.jsp?story=376373&host=5&dir=207)
- A review that appeared in The New Statesman (http://www.kenanmalik.com/reviews/dennett_freedom.html)
- Amazon link with even more reviews (http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/tg/detail/-/0142003840/qid=1115405743/sr=8-1/ref=pd_csp_1/002-7268795-9135219?v=glance&s=books&n=507846)