U.S. White House briefing on terror threats of August 6, 2001

The U.S. White House briefing on terror threats of August 6, 2001 is the briefing given to U.S. president George W. Bush and members of his administration by security agencies on that date, concerning terror threats from Osama bin Laden and others.

What follows is a redacted text of the presidential daily briefing from August 6, 2001, as picked up from FOXNews.com and CNN.com. As this is an official U.S. government document, and this is only the text of that document, without commentary, it is in the public domain. It is marked, "Declassified and Approved for Release, 10 April 2004":

Text of the briefing

Bin Ladin Determined to Strike in U.S.

Clandestine, foreign government, and media reports indicate Bin Ladin since 1997 has wanted to conduct terrorist attacks in the US. Bin Ladin implied in US television interviews in 1997 and 1998 that his followers would follow the example of World Trade Center bomber Ramzi Yousef and "bring the fighting to America."

After US missile strikes on his base in Afghanistan in 1998, Bin Ladin told followers he wanted to retaliate in Washington, according to a [deleted text] service.

An Egyptian Islamic Jihad (EIJ) operative told an [deleted text] service at the same time that Bin Ladin was planning to exploit the operative's access to the US. to mount a terrorist strike.

The millennium plotting in Canada in 1999 may have been part of Bin Ladin's first serious attempt to implement a terrorist strike in the US. Convicted plotter Ahmed Ressam has told the FBI that he conceived the idea to attack Los Angeles International Airport himself, but that Bin Ladin lieutenant Abu Zubaydah encouraged him and helped facilitate the operation. Ressam also said that in 1998 Abu Zubaydah was planning his own US attack.

Ressam says Bin Ladin was aware of the Los Angeles operation.

Although Bin Ladin has not succeeded, his attacks against the US Embassies in Kenya and Tanzania in 1998 demonstrate that he prepares operations years in advance and is not deterred by setbacks. Bin Ladin associates surveilled our Embassies in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam as early as 1993, and some members of the Nairobi cell planning the bombings were arrested and deported in 1997.

Al-Qa'ida members—including some who are US citizens—have resided in or traveled to the US for years, and the group apparently maintains a support structure that could aid attacks. Two Al Qa'ida members found guilty in the conspiracy to bomb our Embassies in East Africa were US citizens, and a senior EIJ member lived in California in the mid-1990s.

A clandestine source said in 1998 that a Bin Ladin cell in New York was recruiting Muslim-American youth for attacks.

We have not been able to corroborate some of the more sensational threat reporting, such as that from a [deleted text] service in 1998 saying that Bin Ladin wanted to hijack a US aircraft to gain the release of "Blind Shaykh" 'Umar 'Abd al-Rahman [sic] and other US-held extremists.

—Nevertheless, FBI information since that time indicates patterns of suspicious activity in this country consistent with preparations for hijackings or other types of attacks, including recent surveillance of federal buildings in New York.

The FBI is conducting approximately 70 full field investigations throughout the US that it considers Bin Ladin-related. CIA and the FBI are investigating a call to our embassy in the UAE in May saying that a group of Bin Ladin supporters was in the US planning attacks with explosives.

Discussion

Some arguments have focused on clear warnings in this letter, specifically that:

• a large attack was planned
• the attack would be on United States soil
• target cities of attacks included New York and Washington DC
• the World Trade Center was explicitly mentioned
• hijacked plane missions were anticipated
• people living in, or traveling to, the United States were involved
• recent surveillance of federal buildings in New York was witnessed.

However, those arguing that warnings were not clear will note that:

• specific buildings were unknown
• specific dates were unknown
• specific airlines, flights, or planes were unknown
• the World Trade Center was mentioned in the context of following a 1993 example, not as a definite future target
• plane hijacking was mentioned in the context of freeing Shaykh Rahman, implying a hostage situation, not using the planes themselves as missiles.
• the Bin Laden supporters in the U.S. were thought to be planning attacks with explosives, as in all previous bombings by Al-Qaida
• the use of planes as missiles, while discussed before, had not been attempted by Al-Qaida

Possibly new revelations include the belief that Bin Laden operatives were trying to recruit young U.S. nationals for their operations, the statement by the White House that attempts at future attacks were expected (based on past attacks), and that Washington, D.C., and New York were specifically mentioned.

While specific hijacking times, and dates, and targets were unknown, critics charge that the administration did not take possible actions such as increased airport screening, and reinforcing cockpit doors, that may have minimized the lethality of the September 11 attacks, or even prevented them. The administration and its defenders respond that the memo did not give any new information about the threat that would warrant taking additional measures, since the fact that Bin Laden and other terrorists had wanted to strike inside the United States had been well-known for over 20 years.

External links

• Transcript of actual briefing, from FOXNews.com (http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,116766,00.html).
• Facsimile of actual briefing, from CNN.com (http://www.cnn.com/2004/images/04/10/whitehouse.pdf), PDF file.
• Weblog article said to be U.S. White House backgrounder on briefing release (http://blog.zmag.org/rocinante/archives/000157.html) - said to be transcript of tele-conference call, on David Peterson's weblog.

eo:Usona Prezidenta ĝisdatiga dokumento de la 6-a de aŭgusto, 2001