Talk:Symbol
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Does anyone object to the idea of merging this content with the Sign page, and making Symbol a redirect to the merged page?
Gecko 20:27, 2 Apr 2004 (UTC)
I strongly object. Sign and symbol are NOT synonyms, although they have SOME senses in common. No one would say that cough is a "symbol" of influenza, or that the Chrismas tree is a "sign" of Christmas. Rather, this article must point out that one of the meanings of "symbol" is a "sign" (specifically, a "grapheme") usually stading for anything other than a sound. Jorge Stolfi 12:29, 11 Apr 2004 (UTC)
As I point out in Talk:Sign, coughing does symbolize influenza, and a cross on a church is a sign of Christiantity. What do you see as the difference between a symbol and a sign?
You seem to be arguing that only graphemes can be signs. It's true that grapheme is a kind of sign, but by no means is it the only kind of sign there is. For example, the call of a bird can signify its existence -- and is therefore a sign. No grapheme required.
Gecko 17:10, 11 Apr 2004 (UTC)
Gecko, methinks you are confusing philosophy with reality with language. (I myself have slipped down that slope before...)
Language first: in English these words cannot be used interchangeably, so they are not synonyms. For one thing, "symbol" is almost always used for things whose meaning is established and retrieved by convention, even when that convention is based on physical association; whereas a "sign" (in the sense of "evidence") is almost always used when the meaning is established and retrieved by logical or physical necessity. Thus cough may be a "symbol" of influenza in a syrup advertisement or a medical brochure, but it is a "sign" to a medical doctor. A wooden crucifix burned in a Satanic ritual is still a "symbol" of Cristianity but hardly a "sign" (evidence) of it.
Conversely one may use "signs" (hand gestures), but not a "symbols", to show the way to the restroom or speak to the deaf; but bowing, although it is a "sign of" respect, is not a "sign" in this sense. The "signs" that are placed along roads or afixed to walls may have "symbols" printed on them, but are not "symbols" themselves. The "sign" of the number 3.1415926... is positive, whereas its "symbol" is π. A yellow spectral line is a "sign" of sodium, but is "symbol" is "Na".
This may not seem logical, but that is how the language *is*. You may wish that the two words were synonymous, but they just aren't. In summary, "Symbol" almost always means "anything that, by convention, can represent something else in information communication or processing"; whereas "sign" has several very distinct senses, one of them being "evidence" (idependent of whether there are humans, computers, or conventions involved), another one is "hand gesture", another one is "which side of zero", yet another one is "non-phonetic glyph"; and only the last one is a (special case of) "symbol". (Except, however, that an unintelligible pen mark may still be a "sign" but not properly a "symbol"...)
Now, semioticists may have decided to redefine the word "sign" to encompass the common sense of "symbol" and perhaps some more. That is their right, just as topologists redefine "space", graph theorists redefine "edge", and chemists redefine "phase". However that redefinition should be confined to the semiotics and sign (semiotics) pages, and has no right to take over the general sign and symbol pages.
As for the philosophy: You seem to be saying that semioticians expand sign (semiotics) to include not only symbol (things that have conventional meanings to humans) but also sign (evidence), e.g. the syntoms of a disease or the spectral lines of an element, or perhaps even any kind of physical effect whatsoever. ((unwarranted sarcasm deleted Jorge Stolfi 16:15, 12 Apr 2004 (UTC)))
All the best, Jorge Stolfi 19:23, 11 Apr 2004 (UTC)
Your argument here is (frankly) so absurd that I don't even know where to begin. If you knew much at all about symbolic logic, you would be aware that significant portions of it (such as the existential and universal quantifiers, abduction, etc.) were developed by Charles Peirce as he articulated semiotics, which is the study of signs. Obviously signs and symbols are interchangeable if they are subject to the same logical operations. So the distinctions you try to suggest between "philosophy" and "reality" are just gibberish. Your cluelessness here is embarrassing. And trying to "taunt" me by valuing semiotics and Klingon identically is very immature.
Bottom line: You're a troll. Try getting a clue.
Gecko 15:01, 12 Apr 2004 (UTC)
I am sorry, really sorry, for falling into that really bad argumentation mode. Please accept my apopolgies. Jorge Stolfi 15:07, 12 Apr 2004 (UTC)
I have deleted my unwarranted sarcarstic comments about semiotics (or, rather, what I misunderstood semiotics to be). I hope we can start again in a less emotional mode.
As for the difference between "sign" and "symbol" in the English language, my comments above still stand, and in my view are reason enough to keep the two pages separate.
As for reality vs. philosophy, please note that semiotics (like physics, ecology, logic, etc.) is not reality, but a model (or view, or whatever you call it) of reality -- a model that "exists" only inside our minds. It is unfortunately very easy to get into a mode of thinking where one confuses such models with reality. I don't know how to clearly express this warning in words, but I know the problem because, as I said, I have fallen into that pit myself. That happens when one starts believing that categories such as "sign" or relations such as "cause of" are real things and not just artifacts of our own minds.
Finally, as for the scope of semiotics: I still don't know wether it is just the study of "symbols" (things with conventional meanings to humans) or is supposed to include also any effects like spectral lines and medical symptoms. If the latter, then there is good reason to dismiss semiotics as an empty discipline, because a discipline that aims to encompass "everything" -- all phenomena, physical and mental, at all scales of complexity -- will necessarily have nothing useful to say about them.
Jorge Stolfi 16:40, 12 Apr 2004 (UTC)
I'm pretty sure this is a waste of my time, but I'll try...
"As for the difference between 'sign' and 'symbol' in the English language, my comments above still stand, and in my view are reason enough to keep the two pages separate."
And in my view, these are simply arbitrary delinations. For example, you say "cough may be a 'symbol' of influenza in a syrup advertisement or a medical brochure, but it is a 'sign' to a medical doctor." And I have to agree completely! The same cough is both a symbol and a sign. That's because symbols *are* signs.
"A yellow spectral line is a 'sign' of sodium, but [its] 'symbol' is 'Na'."
You don't seem interested in trying to back up this assertion. I could just as easily say that they are both symbols and both signs. And I do.
"This may not seem logical, but that is how the language *is*."
Are you saying that the illogic of language is proof that symbols aren't signs? This makes no sense to me.
"As for reality vs. philosophy, please note that semiotics (like physics, ecology, logic, etc.) is not reality, but a model (or view, or whatever you call it) of reality -- a model that 'exists' only inside our minds."
I never said otherwise, and in any event, this has no bearing on whether signs are symbols or not. For what it's worth, I mostly agree with you.
"You seem to be saying that semioticians expand sign (semiotics) to include not only symbol (things that have conventional meanings to humans) but also sign (evidence), e.g. the syntoms of a disease or the spectral lines of an element, or perhaps even any kind of physical effect whatsoever."
It is not semioticians 'expanding' sign to mean this. Semiotics is, and always was, the study of *all* signs -- anything that can mean something. This has been true since the discipline was pioneered by logicians in the 19th century. The processes of signification and symbolism were only chopped up into various separate disciplines later on by folks who really didn't understand it. This is why, for example, Peirce's work on the logic of sign relations is considered to be formal logic (by some people) and not semiotics. Yet when he actually *did* this work, there was no such false distinction in his mind.
"[H]ere is good reason to dismiss semiotics as an empty discipline, because a discipline that aims to encompass 'everything' -- all phenomena, physical and mental, at all scales of complexity -- will necessarily have nothing useful to say about them."
You dismiss it so casually because you don't really get it. I never claimed that semiotics "aims to encompass everything" -- whatever that means. Those are your words, not mine. Semiotics, as I've said before, is simply the study of signs and symbol systems.
In all seriousness, I encourage you to consider learning something about semiotics and formal logic before you make such categorical claims about the nature of symbols. You might be surprised by what you find.
Gecko 20:50, 12 Apr 2004 (UTC)
Gecko, the meaning of words in English is not "just a matter of definition". Again, semioticians certainly have the right to redefine "sign" *in semiotics* anyway they want, including "any kind of symbol"; but that does not change the common meaning of that word in English. In topology the word "space" is redefined so that it includes a plane, a line, or even a single point; but that does not authorize topologists to claim that "space" and "point" synonymous in English.
In your cough example, just because a brick can be a paperweight and also a weapon, it does not follow that weapons and paperweights are the same thing. The "symbol" for influenza could be changed by convention, but the (medical) "signs" of influenza cannot. This is just another example of the difference in meaning between the words "sign" and "symbol" in the English language — which has nothing to do with logic or semiotics.
I am not entirely ignorant of formal logic, and in fact my final remark — that a "theory of everything" necessarly will have nothing to say — could be viewed as a trivial theorem in logic. I do know, in particular, that formal logic doesn't make any claims whatsoever about the "nature of symbols" — that is why it is called "formal". On the other hand, you are right that I do not know much about semiotics, but I was hoping that the article could help me learn more: at the very least whether spectral lines are or are not considered "signs" in semiotics. I am still confused, alas.
All the best,
Jorge Stolfi 01:41, 13 Apr 2004 (UTC)
For the past few days I've been toying with the notion of "symbols as a kind of sign" vs. "symbols as signs." There is some work in semiotics to back up this distinction; for example, one rendition of the ontological categories breaks signs into three groups: icons, indices and symbols. However in other places the two really are treated synonymously. And it does seem bogus to me to treat symbols as some kind of special case of sign. I'm not aware of any symbol that isn't also a sign, or vice versa, short of accepting artificial (and often irrelevant) delineations between the two. Logic treats them identically. There is no separate predicate calculus for symbols and signs; there is just one predicate calculus for both.
So... I think (given the ambiguity of the notion of a symbol) that I'm willing to put the issue aside for now. I think this ambiguity is what's preventing us from reaching a common understanding. The relationship between sign and symbol in Wikipedia is very broken, replete with many false distinctions and conflicting viewpoints, but I think any attempt to seriously correct it will be stymied by the lack of a widely-accepted practical understanding of symbol processing. Perhaps this is the best we can do for now.
Gecko 02:04, 18 Apr 2004 (UTC)
Agreed. I have written a few more comments to clarify my position, but I feel it is best to keep them off-line. See User:Jorge Stolfi/Sign and Symbol (section III) if you are interested. All the best,
Jorge Stolfi 14:59, 18 Apr 2004 (UTC)
possible copyvio
This section was added by an unregistered user, can't find it elsewhere but it seems copyvio. Don't know what to do with it so this should be a good holding place for now. --SonicAD 17:26, 11 Dec 2004 (UTC)
A word symbol is used in several different ways, it is "one of the most misused words." In general cultural usage, such as "religious symbol," it is an important object or event, pregnant with meaning that is relatively unknown. Symbols affect people, have power over people, symbol could provoke wars or make piece.
But the same word 'symbol' is often used for traffic signs. It is important to differentiate symbols and signs. Sign is a conventional notation, mark, or object, which stands for something else. The meaning of a sign is known and defined by conventions. In semiotics, words sign and symbol are used inconsistently; usually symbol is understood as a type of sign. In mathematics also conventional notations are often called symbols.
Carl Jung gave first scientific, psychological analysis of the nature of symbol as 'an important event.' Symbol is pregnant with meaning. Symbol, according to Jung, is a psychological process connecting unconscious contents of psyche to consciousness. Symbols make conscious certain aspects of archetypes, the unconscious neural structures of psyche. Symbol is a process, which creates meaning. It is a creative process.
Neurophysiologist Karl Pribram in a book "Languages of the Mind" described signs as neural signals with definite, fixed meanings. He considered symbols as neural signs with adaptive meanings, changable according to circumstances. Leonid Perlovsky in a book "Neural Networks and Intellect" gave a mathematical description of symbol processes. A symbol process starts with a vague, fuzzy content, which evolves into a definite, crisp content. It involves concepts and emotions. Initial fuzzy state is unconscious. Final crisp state is accessible to consciousness.
Every act of perception and cognition is a symbol process. Perception of everyday objects (a glass, a chair) takes about 0.2 second. Cognition involving complex new meanings such as ineffable God, or crucified God, or idea of predestination, or red (communistic) banner (or any national symbol), might take years or centuries. When content of a symbol process completely reaches consciousness, it becomes definite, well understood sign. It does not steer emotions at national levels, does not inspire wars or piece. It becomes a part of everyday culture, and creative powers can turn to new meanings.
A text below illustrates classical semiotic usage of words sign and symbol, which has not recognized complex psychological processes involved in creation new meanings.