Talk:Jacques Derrida

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Contents

1 Interesting, but ... 2 "Language ordinary people can understand" 3 Cambridge University honorary doctorship controversy 4 Categories 5 Ad hominem attacks?

Interesting, but ...

There are some good bits here. Precious little about Derrida's position relative to the rest of French thought really (compared to the inevitable stuff about impact on the academy in the USA). Hardly enough on the relationship to Hegel (considering Glas). The discussion of translations ought to be secondary, really (unless we really want to privilege the non-francophone view of D). Charles Matthews 07:28, 13 Oct 2004 (UTC)

Although contributions on Hegel would be welcome, you could make the same argument about Benjamin, Kant, Freud, Levinas, Artaud, Lacan, or Genet, although the argument may only be most compelling with respect to psychoanalysis and Derrida's own practise of literary criticism. I don't say this because I don't know that at part of Derrida's work very well. I don't think that translation is secondary or that there is an absolute priority for discussing Derrida in a "French" context except to explicate ways in which Derrida's French breaks with the tradition and even the unity of that language (senses of "plus d'un langue"). As for Derrida being French, he has commented that this may only be admitted if one says that he is also and at the same time Algerian and Jewish. There were some remarks (subsequently edited out for NPOV) I made previously about Heidegger trying to write the French and Americans out of the will, arguing that they didn't have the linguistic resources. I'd like to rework these, as translation remains a critical conduit in Derrida's defiance of this.

I think some remarks about the way in which the 1987 era debates about Heidegger and possibly de Man emphasized certain differences within deconstruction needs to be discussed (as I believe that these arguments between friends are where Derrida also meets some of his most salient critics), but I don't think any of the participants in those exchanges would welcome its appropriation to a geophilosophical privilege given to France, even if that was the stage on which so much of it happened (Cerisy-la-Salle is, after all, home to "le Centre Culturel International"). I don't say this to demean France (or "Continental Philosophy"), but one foregoes too much caution in speaking of "the francophone view" or "the non-francophone view" of his work, for no such consensus exists at these levels. I think something needs to be said about Derrida's ideas of cosmopolitanism and globalization. All these matters do require greater explication. Your objections demand further answer.

A larger problem looms, however. The piece is now running at the length limit and needs to be divided. I'm not entirely happy with the current organization and would very much like to make way for further discussion of the issues raised above and a few more. I'd very much appreciate feedback on this matter. Buffyg 13:49, 13 Oct 2004 (UTC)

OK, if length is the issue I think Derrida on the Heidegger affair should really be with Heidegger; Derrida on de Man with de Man; and perhaps the Searle business deserves separate treatment also. None of these really speak to the importance of Derrida: if he were not so prominent a figure, they would hardly matter. The Cambridge honorary degree probably is a barometer of importance. As for my own slant: I've been going back to my older reading, and I see that what I was saying was very much what I'd picked up from Vincent Descombes in Modern French Philosophy, which IIRC is a translation of a work originally in French. Charles Matthews 18:25, 15 Oct 2004 (UTC)

I think I've got that cite from Descombes on a shelf somewhere and will add it to my list. I think one does need to discuss all of these "affairs" of Derrida and deconstruction but without accepting the sloppy terms in which they are most obviously offered. I'm not sure that everything about Heidegger that generated such controversy belongs on the Heidegger page -- the remark from Bennington I've cited (""Where does commentary on Heidegger stop and assertion by Derrida begin?"") does strike a chord. I'm interested in pursuing it in Lacoue-Labarthe from Heidegger, Art, and Politics to his remarks about pneuma and ruah in The Ister -- I suspect the linkage of these two words traverses through Derrida, particularly Of Spirit, and have to ask if there is a point where Lacoue-Labarthe's engagement with Heidegger can no longer be disengaged not just from his ties to Derrida but to a Heidegger that passes through Derrida. That's a lot of transit points. Later I'd like to go through an earlier essay like "Restitutions of the Truth in Painting" to start talking about Heidegger and Derrida in an earlier vintage, but there's a lot of homework to be done to pull that off before I'd have a result that I would then need to decide how to place. Similarly, I don't know if I could take the editorial decision that a discussion of Derrida writing on de Man, writing on Heidegger, Hölderlin, Rousseau, or the Jews in twentieth century European literature, simply belongs with either. I imagine a Derrridabase, hypertext carrying something like quantum records of so much terms and names: a Rousseau, but also a Rousseau after Derrida and a Derrida after Rousseau at this same juncture; so too for a certain vocabulary of psychoanalysis or Kantian or Hegelian metaphysics. As it is, I'm thinking of breaking out pieces on various works by Derrida into their own entries. I had a link to a review I wrote on Limited, Inc. that was pulled with a complaint about affiliate spamming (I'm not regretfully unaware of the mechanics) that I'd like to reconstitute to get that going. Buffyg 02:28, 21 Oct 2004 (UTC)

Well, I'd say it is unfortunate that all works are cited as if their titles are in English in the original. And not a word about Tel Quel. Time to look at the French version, I think. Charles Matthews 14:04, 13 Oct 2004 (UTC)

Please chill out. I'm not writing you off, but I do have some serious reservations about some of the things you're saying and want to discuss them. While I've taken the time to contribute heavily to a rewrite, I will admit that I don't often take the time to consult the French version of every bit of Derrida I cite -- for that matter I don't often have the French, and I don't see any point in faking this by referring to an edition I've not read and for which I don't know pagination. I'm not affiliated with any university, so what I've got is what I've got without benefit of a research library. I'd like to be able to cite the French in the future, but that future isn't realistically near, even if it is a great deal easier to come by French texts since I moved to the UK. The title of a book translated into English is English, which is also the language of the vast majority of people reading this wiki, but it would certainly be reasonable to provide titles in both languages in the works cited section. Better yet would be to split off a multilingual bibliography in the wikipedia. Would you be willing and able to help with such an effort?

The word deconstruction, whether in English or French is in any case already a translation -- that's neither incidental nor because Derrida wanted to deconstruction to be entirely French. As for the French wiki, which is much shorter, doesn't mention Tel Quel, GREPH and the Haby Reform, Lyotard, Levinas, Deleuze, Cixous, etc. And considerable space is devoted to his reception in the United States. On the other hand, one finds references to the États Généraux de la philosophie, le prix Jean-Cavaillès, and l'association Jan-Hus. All of this suggests much more that needs to be done -- that's never been a dispute.

Derrida's position on philosophy, language, and nation is explicit, and I do believe that what you're arguing risks contradicting them for lack of caution. At the end of the first chapter of De quoi demain..., "Choisor son Héritage", which (not incidentally) recounts a great deal of Derrida's past in France, one finds the following:

"In le s'agit pas en effet de rien de moins : la signification de la philosophie. Son <<idée>>, son institution s'inscrit d'abord dans une langue et dans une culture, dans la langue et la culture grecques. Aussi n'existe-t-il nulle part ailleurs qu'en Grèce une chose qui peut se nommer rigoureusement <<philosophie>>. Ailleurs, s'il y a des pensées certes très puissantes, et autres que philosophiques, la philosophie comme projet spécifique d'une pensée de l'être est née en Grèce."

"Mais elle est née - et en cela on peut suivre Husserl et Heidegger - comme le projet universel d'une volonté de déracinement. Si la philosophie a une racine (la Grèce), son projet consiste en même temps à soulever les racines et à faire que ce qui se pense en grec -- et plus tard en allemand, selon Heidegger -- soit délivré en <<plus d'une langue>>. La philosophie se délivre donc, elle tend au moins à se libérer d'emblée de sa limitation linguistique, territoriale, ethnique et culturelle." (p. 38)

And further:

"De la même façon, si la philosophie greque est européenne au départ, mais si sa vocation est bien universelle, cela veut dire qu'elle doit sans cesse se libérer du relativisme. Le travail philosophique consiste en un affranchissement constant : tout faire pour reconnaître mais aussi passer, sans forcément la trahir, sa propre limite ethnocentrique ou géographique." (p. 40)

Buffyg 00:01, 14 Oct 2004 (UTC)

Plenty to discuss here, then. I'll just note a few points - there are a couple of long obits from newspapers I'm going to read. On book title, I see Jean-Luc Nancy does give all titles in French. On Hegel, I thought that the article in citing aporia would note the connection, but I see the page for that has not much either. On the French context, the 1968 references seem a bit tangled (a short reference to the students, a longer one to international politics that manages to have parentheses within parentheses, and really should be sorted out). The French deconstruction article is brief but interesting.

Charles Matthews 06:10, 14 Oct 2004 (UTC)

Many of these points are taken, if not already conceded. As for Nancy, I don't think that's decisive -- wouldn't it be reasonable for him to cite the French title of a book he read in French, even if he were writing in English? ;-> Do you have any good cites on 1968? I'd looked at Dosse, but I'm not comfortable citing him as a source without confirmation from another -- among other things, Dosse falls well short of the challenge of a history of structuralism laid out at the beginning of "Force and Signification". Buffyg 19:54, 15 Oct 2004 (UTC)

"Language ordinary people can understand"

In the Discussion of the Derrida article, an article I find very good and neither hagiography nor demonology (graphy versus logy, get it? nyuk nyuk nyuk: we write of saints but let demons speak Pandaemonium), we read the plaint that the article should be in language, ordinary people, can understand.

Language. Ordinary people. Understanding.

The problem is that what is meant by "ordinary" is anti-philosophical. Ordinary people don't turn to philosophy for vernacular concerns, instead they turn to it, in many cases, when they have extraordinary concerns and are indeed rather repelled by the suggestion that they are ordinary.

If I merely report that Derrida believed that systems of thought were undercut by reliance on that which they thought to erase, many Americans (who have a cultural, if buried, memory of psychoanalysis which was very popular in America up until 1980) are , like, details at eleven, and tell me something I don't know. So if I use "ordinary" language, I am reporting dead ideas which don't come to life in the mind of the reader and cause him to say, hey wait a minute, that is nihilism. The report is journalism and not the writing of an encyclopedia unless the writing of an encyclopedia is journalism, that is, the narrative of the Other which by narration keeps it at arm's length.

Things only get interesting when the encyclopedia writer departs from the ordinary and asks if Derrida's views self-apply, and the counterintuitive discovery illuminated in the text is that they do.

I think you can maintain NPOV but not be boring in a philosophical article by winding up the mechanism (or the charm, as in "peace! the charm's wound up" in Macbeth) and setting it to roll across the reader's mind...while adopting a light and almost tongue-in-cheek mode (which literally interpreted undercuts speech as did Demosthenes, who spoke to the sea with pebbles in his mouth according to legend).

Almost anything is preferable to the forced and false neutrality which confuses blind inheritance of "ordinary" language (and its categories) with a NPOV.

It seems to me that Wikipedia is here navigating uncharted waters, similar today to waters to the north of Canada opened up by global warming. Its writers cannot be legislators of an old fashioned POV like Diderot, or the Encyclopedia Britannica, but neither can they claim to speak for the ordinary slob, because such a generalized category is useless today.

In fine, language is a virus from outer space, there are no ordinary people, and understanding is an active verb.

All well and good; but I prefer to think of WP as standard prose and not playing self-referential or interrogative games. Wikis are dynamic - this is about as interesting as it needs to get. One man's point of view Charles Matthews 08:44, 2 Nov 2004 (UTC)

Edward G. Nilges: OK, standard prose, and I do NOT mean to imply that my discussion style should be recommended for Wiki articles: please refer to my contribution to the Theory section on Adorno in which I exercise iron self-control.

But if we do NOT play what you call "games", then we transmit a POV, the standard journalistic account, not of Derrida's thought, but as it registered on a preponderance of minds. The problem is that it is becoming increasingly obvious (in light of the numerous protests sent to the New York Times after his death against a superficial account of his thought) that Derrida in fact misregistered in a way that should be familiar to a student of the history of philosophy.

Spinoza misregistered as a licentious man, Socrates misregistered as a bad influence on youth, Peter Singer is misregistering as a mass murderer. I think Wikipedia can do better as a collective phenomenon.

An encyclopedia is not a dictionary, where a dictionary reports standard usage as a statistical matter. An encyclopedia can transmit knowledge about a philosopher only by running a simulation of the philosopher's thought in the reader's mind.

As to "self-referential games". This is a phrase frequently hurled at Derrida. It hides the grand fallacy, which is to avoid self-reference like the plague. The grand fallacy produced the verificationist criterion of meaning and truth. The grand fallacy stands outside political and social phenomena OF WHICH IT IS NECESSARILY A PART and the grand fallacy is productive of lack of humility.

The way to get to NPOV from POV is indeed self-referential and involves a humorous consciousness of the fact that one writes from a position, me from the Chungking Mansions in Hong Kong in a room half-height, like the office in which John Cusack works in Being John Malcovich.

If we think that an unanalyzed inheritance of standard, received categories is a NPOV then Derrida died in vain.

I think that a thorough, reliable account of who Derrida was, what he did and wrote, would be a very good thing in the first place. AFAIK the article isn't there yet (does it mention Bachelard and Derrida's formal connection as a student of his - I haven't looked recently?). I can sympathise with anyone who says 'not enough'; but given the debate, a slur-free piece of reporting is a good start. A thorough bibliography would be another part of the picture. I don't think the article has any business tackling the question of whether he lived, or even died, in vain: too soon to tell is the obvious verdict. Attacking NPOV is also not a good ploy. Attempts to write from a NPOV - even if flawed - are a hell of a lot better than not so trying, as looking round WP will surely convince one. Charles Matthews 13:44, 2 Nov 2004 (UTC)

Edward Nilges: I'm not attacking NPOV. Instead, writing journalistically and attempting "just the facts" in philosophy violates NPOV, because it replaces it by a POV in which the thought of an original philosopher will appear to be false.

Many philosophy survey classes create Fundamentalists, Creationists, and Islamo-Fascists by a dialectical process as the professor reports without passion or interrogation the skeptical views of the western tradition starting with Descartes, and the student, grinding through the financial demands of the American educational system or the classist demands of the French, decides on the basis of the evidence presented to believe ANYTHING but what seems to be claptrap by the time the class reaches Hume, and deep claptrap by the time of Kant.

I think there is a NPOV, but it's confuse with dictionary POV which can be attained in principle by polling people on their usages of words.

Of course, you can't poll cab drivers on Derrida (although they often have good insights: a NYT journalist described Francis Fukuyama's theses to a DC cab driver and the guy said, give me a break).

But this means that to preserve the dictionary approach you have to poll people "in the know" such as journalists and college professors.

But their very engagement with Derrida means that they will have a POV.

You can't get anywhere near a Fair and Balanced view from mere reportage of the views of three sets of people:

(1) People who understand Derrida and "believe" him: note that their belief itself will be interrogative and critical

(2) People who have adopted the pomo mantle and "believe" a misunderstanding of Derrida

(3) People who think he's full of horse puckey.

The only worthwhile sets are (1) and (3) but to describe the critical, interrogative view, you'd have to quote a representative of the view (may as well write this section yourself if you consider yourself type 1).

But this view can't be expressed neutrally and from the outside. It has to be set in motion as did Derrida set it into motion, SELF-REFLEXIVELY. The convergence of intellectual honesty as an ethos with the love of truth and humility doesn't permit "self-reflexive games", it commands them as does Wisdom in the Torah/Bible, "playing in the world".

And the reportage of the more amusing fellows in set (3) is a good way to avoid that "seriousness" which fails to self-apply and is the reverse of Wisdom.

Well, fortunately as it seems on your account, I have not studied philosophy in any formal setting; and retain therefore some naive hope that the English language can be used to discuss a philosopher without any of these preconditions. I'd have thought that we could present an argument that philosophy or JD is sui generis, and even an argument of JD why we couldn't, and so on, if that's what we needed. In practice it is about editing a page to produce a better approximation (wikijargon wabisabi), not pretending it's all finished. Which is quite a good counter to some of the infinite regress arguments, amongst other virtues. Charles Matthews 05:48, 4 Nov 2004 (UTC)

Ed Nilges: no, it is simply unacceptable that people "who have not studied philosophy in any formal setting" should NOT ONLY participate in the discussion (which is perfectly acceptable) BUT ALSO legislate the overall terms of discourse.

The journalistic misrepresentation throughout history of philosophers, which has in many cases in the West and in Islam gotten philosophers killed, results from this view, which is intolerance masquerading as tolerance.

The final product can and should be READ, of course, by people without formal training in philosophy. But it seems that here we are saying that it can and should be WRITTEN by pure of heart idiot savants who haven't read Plato and fail to realize how and in what way Plato, like Derrida, wasn't completely "serious" about what were thought-experiments, and who hasn't accessed modern scholarship which translates Symposium into "boy's night out" with an illuminating levity.

Phrases like 'unacceptable' and 'legislate the overall terms of discourse' are not, well, acceptable on a wiki. They certainly are completely out of focus with the social reality. No one 'legislates' here; the whole online world is entitled to edit as they see fit; and reference to Plato in this fashion seems to me to be fairly simple, old-fashioned intellectual snobbery. Charles Matthews 07:50, 5 Nov 2004 (UTC)

Ed Nilges: if an ordinary participant in a discussion cannot use the word "unacceptable", then you've just destroyed the very idea of NPOV and discussion.

You cannot scan an ordinary participant's discourse for keywords and purge "strong" words. This completely misses the whole point of open discussion: the discussion has to be open to strong views.

A similar logical error was pointed out by Derrida on "forgiveness". The only way to resolve strong views during a truth and reconciliation process is to take the rather strong meta-view that true forgiveness forgives the unforgiveable.

Furthermore and as you realize ("well"), you cannot avoid yourself the use of the word "acceptable" in a context of equal logical strength.

It is a mistake to believe that neutral language, purged by a merely syntactical process of strong words, is somehow more democratic than "strong" language. "We believe", after all, "these truths to be self-evident".

Finally, you managed to rip "legislate the overall terms of discourse" out of context. I think WE do so, but I think there are better and worse ways of doing so. The better ways generally involve what some people call "deep listening" and what I regard as far more than a superficial evaluation of syntax.

I see this venture self-destructing once it is claimed, syntactically, that a mere reference to Plato indicates "intellectual snobbery". The REAL snobbery today is one in which the ordinary person can't read or mention Plato without worrying, as in some sort of intellectual Gulag, about being denounced as a snob, or bourgeois running dog.

I'm not purging anything. I had a look at the contribution posted yesterday, to Talk:Visual Basic, from the IP number used for this page also. I suddenly find myself with plenty of other things to do on the site, which seem to have priority over replying to this kind of editorialising. Just a friendly suggestion: why not log in and introduce yourself? Charles Matthews 09:11, 6 Nov 2004 (UTC)

Done. My logon id is now spinoza1111 and I have posted a self-introduction at the Miscellaneous section of the Village Pump.

You can sign and timestamp by adding four tildes. Charles Matthews 09:18, 8 Nov 2004 (UTC)

Carsten Husek: I personally think that the figure of "ordinary man" (or Joe Six-Pack, as one might say) has its abiguities, too. For example, who says the "ordinary" man has any supirior "right" to "legislate" what is legible? The ideas of "ordinary" men are typically based on uncritical acceptance of received wisdom. Thus the ordinary or common does not constitute a privileged POV to judge anything. IMO, that means some difficulties sre to be exspected. And not only that: if Joe Six-Pack can say "ah, that's it" you can be sure that you have fallen prey to oversimplification. --134.100.1.177 13:48, 4 Feb 2005 (UTC)

There is a WP style guide. Since we often aim at a concentric development, with the opening para saying it once, and fuller versions following, the point seems to me not to have great impact. The use of hyperlinks means that the explanation of literary theory, say, can be taken off the page. There is no particular reason why careful expository arrangement and choice of language should dumb down the discussion. Charles Matthews 17:16, 4 Feb 2005 (UTC)

Cambridge University honorary doctorship controversy

I would expand this later.

Carsten Husek: sorry, but IMO all these things about affairs/controversy are not very helpful. In discussing Derrida, one should stick to his work. Maybe, as a compromise, you could do an extra article on this, see the handling of "the sokal affair" in the article on "deconcrruction".(4.2.05)

The reference to Hugh Mellor seems to me digressive. Looking at Mellor's comments in the Cogito interview, said to provide specific responses to Derrida, these specifically address "Signature, Event, Context" and Limited, Inc. and are not a strong reading of that material: Mellor trivializes Derrida argument by presenting only trivial but more or less indispensable elements as the sum total of what Derrida offers. There does not appear any particular reason to privilege Mellor as a critic of Derrida (there's no doubt that there was opposition to the award amongst the philosophy faculty, but was there any greater merit to their arguments over those of others? Mellor's comments do not indicate that he is any more competent in criticizing Derrida than the signatories of the published letter or Searle.) or use him as an example given that there's not sufficient space to treat arguments by both in this article. One ought to give some account of these issues in the reception of Derrida's work, but this example is not offered as instructive. Buffyg 17:38, 29 Mar 2005 (UTC)

The reason I added the reference to Mellor was not that he may or may not have the strongest philosophical arguments against Derrida, but that he was the head of the Cambridge philosophy faculty and was the central opponent in the university. He had the (voting) power to oppose the award, whereas non-Cambridge academics could say what they liked but could do nothing about it. Hugh Mellor was also the main person in the widespread UK media controversy which surrounded this; i.e. it was he who was interviewed by the media. All told, AFAIK Hugh Mellor was the central person in the controversy other than Derrida.

Incidentally, a key point is that the honorary degree was proposed by non-philosophers at Cambridge, who knew little or nothing about the subject. By opposing it Mellor was making the important point that Derrida was regarded as a charlatan by many genuine philosophers (certainly those of the analytical tradition). (I was by the way a philosophy student at Cambridge at the time.) Ben Finn 23:14, 26 Apr 2005 (UTC)

It is arguable that the most publicly prominent remarks about Derrida's nomination were those published in the Sunday Times, as these point to opinions shared by a number of people, who, although not members of the Cambridge faculty, are all philosophers insofar as they have been admitted to teach on philosophy faculties at reputable institutions. I take your last remarks about "genuine philosophers" with a rock of salt, the more so given that the cautious quotation marks previously surrounding the "non" are quickly abandoned to the characterization that those so designated "knew little or nothing about the subject." One might accept the claim that some of these people, possibly a majority, were not so familiar with philosophy as Professor Mellor and company taught it in the Philosophy Faculty, but this does not justify the correlative argument that Mellor and company were either themselves particularly aware of Derrida's work or justified in their ignorance of it. Mellor's comments and those advancing claims of charlatanism showed themselves thereby to be of questionable qualification in remarking on Derrida's suitability for the honorary degree.

As you've stated Mellor's position, the emphasis on nominalism makes for a less than compelling philosophical argument and sounds rather like petty snobbery. Perhaps he was central from such a perspective, but that isn't attributing philosophical centrality to his position. As it is, we have addressed some of the sociological and institutional interests, but drawing these out further and contrasting them with philosophical issues would only seem to make Mellor look foolish — is that really what you're inclined to do for lack of options? Although Mellor's understanding of Derrida is incomparably better than the signatories of the letter to the editor (in that he shows some evidence of having read Derrida's work in part, as opposed to fabricating examples of it), he still fits well enough a pattern discussed already in the article (his characterizations are still substantially inaccurate for the pieces referenced in the manner I have previously described), so I don't see any reason to overrate his authority or significance in the matter at hand, which is not to say that I would wish otherwise to dismiss out of hand his professional accomplishments or other contributions to Cambridge University. Buffyg 00:23, 3 May 2005 (UTC)

'Perhaps he was central from such a perspective' - this was my main point and the reason I added the (small) mention of him to the article. Whatever the philosophical issues, Mellor was the central opponent to Derrida's honorary degree, as he was in a position to oppose it. It was Mellor who stood up in the Senate House and declared 'non placet' rather than the customary 'placet' when the degree was proposed. And Mellor was the Cambridge professor of philosophy at the time, the head of the subject (whether or not anyone may think he was qualified to judge in this case).

It is an extremely unusual situation for anyone to get an honorary degree not thanks to the recommendation of the relevant faculty, but in the face of their vociferous opposition! (Actually I can't think of any other cases when this has occurred.) Surely this merits a mention? Ben Finn 19:52, 3 May 2005 (UTC)

It is so much more unusual than having a colleague write a letter on departmental letterhead and invoking title in numerous associations, which she could not imagine she was representing under their bylaws and charter, to a minister of state, asking that the minister intervene in a manner completely without institutional provision to set aside your unanimous election by your colleagues to an honorary position? And thereafter cohabitating with that same person in a department at another university after strenuously and publicly protesting the previous incident? I think Marcus so exceptional as to establish that there is some level of extraordinary consistency in the measures undertaken by various of Derrida's ill-decided opponents to object to formal acknowledgment of his professional standing. No, the details are not quite the same and the differences ought to be accounted for, the more so where one can highlight more profound unities, but I think that further examination of these incidents ought to be a separate article — the larger array of incidents is undoubtedly of interest, but there's enough to be said in saying it reasonably well that, by way of volume in an article that approaches the recommended length limit, it does threatens to eclipse what I hold to be a still too cursory survey of Derrida's work (and I say that as one who has contributed as much to the volume of what's there as to imbalances in its composition). I would go so far as to say that an analysis of these incidents would be insufficient without paying greater attention to the work that they neglect, lest one without nearly enough self-conscious irony repeat gestures one finds objectionable. Buffyg 20:24, 3 May 2005 (UTC)

I don't think these incidents merit a separate article, but nor do I think the addition of my 14 words ("which had also been strongly opposed by the university's own philosophy professor Hugh Mellor") suddenly makes the article too long, or eclipses anything. Currently the section reads as if Cambridge University was in general support of Derrida, which misrepresents the situation, and hence arguably violates NPOV. (But having just taken a look at your 4000 word (!) unpublished open letter to the New York Times criticizing their obituary of Derrida, I doubt I shall convince you!)

How about as a compromise adding "which had also been strongly opposed by the university's own philosophy faculty", which is undoubtedly true and relevant, and does not suggest (if you think it otherwise would) that Hugh Mellor had the strongest arguments against Derrida? Ben Finn 20:57, 3 May 2005 (UTC)

Well, to judge from the result of the vote, Cambridge University in fact generally supported awarding the degree, which is from several perspectives not therefore a matter of point of view. I'm not sure what to make of an allusion to my letter to the New York Times that emphasizes word count but says nothing about what was said on either side; its use as evidence of my susceptibility to rational persuasion is a considerable disappointment given possible implications of ad hominem argument. I don't care at all for the tone of propriety of cast by "the University's own Philosophy Faculty," as I have indicated that the interests of that propriety ought to be subject to scrutiny in a self-reflexive manner to justify that claim given its form, which is precisely where it can be seen to fail. If you feel it necessary to register objections, is the claim that "support for the honorary degree came down to a vote before the University faculty, which passed over the strenuous objections of some in the Philosophy Faculty" not a more defensible characterization? For the very same reason that one might find cause for concern in your presenting this as a matter of propriety, ought one not temper this observation by drawing out some of the irony that eludes it? Buffyg 23:40, 3 May 2005 (UTC)

I disagree. My original wording and my revised one are both unarguably factually correct; and they are also I think relevant and neutral. It is highly relevant that the philosophy faculty opposed the degree; and it was not merely 'some' in the philosophy faculty. Apologies, but I don't have time to contribute to further discussion on this. Ben Finn 17:34, 4 May 2005 (UTC)

I've now rewritten my latest wording a bit & incorporated it; I believe it's entirely neutral & true. FYI I've also modified the earlier sentence 'many analytic philosophers and scientists state their disagreement with his positions' - this understates what these people think; they don't just disagree with Derrida's views (after all, they routinely disagree with many different philosophical views) - they make a much stronger claim, namely that his work does not even count as philsophy. I have no doubt you disagree with them, but I've worded it neutrally. Ben Finn 23:55, 4 May 2005 (UTC)

I'd have to insist that the characterization that "many" of the above "state their disagreement with his positions" is extremely POV, however subtle the expression of bias. It is precisely a question of exactly what means when one speaks of a "disagreement" with his "positions" in the plural; perhaps in the singular ("position," alluding rather more to his credibility and prominence than his works) the statement might be somewhat less contentious. I am not saying anything new when I highlight that the form of argument is itself what makes these claims already questionable: exactly how philosophical are the arguments presented about what is admissable as philosophy? It is entirely arguable, in philosophical fashion, whether these arguments should themselves not be credited as philosophy, particularly not by way of tautology. The latter submission cannot be assumed, whether under institutional aegis or not, particularly when the question is of what an institution ought to credit as philosophy, which is one stake of the case at hand, the more so given the claims of philosophy to exceed such contexts. I do not accept that the claim about pseudophilosophy is "stronger"; it is more strenuous an assertion, but it should not be so readily credited as rigourous. Buffyg 00:38, 5 May 2005 (UTC)

Not used a talk page before so here goes... I removed "with some amusement" from the Cambridge bit, just because, while we can't really know if someone was genuinely amused or not, describing one party as coming out laughing seems to imply that they won the argumnent, thereby taking us further away from that elusive neutral POV.

I was reminded of Francis Wheen's anti-deconstructionist rhetoric in "How Mumbo-Jumbo Conquered the World" where Derrida is described as "huffily dismissing the prankster-professor [Alan Sokal] as 'pas serieux'." I'm sure we agree that "huffily" wouldn't be appropriate here, and "with some amusement" has a similar effect.Util 01:31, 18 May 2005 (UTC)

That seems to me a torturous account of one speaking of irony with irony, resulting in haphazard conclusions ("seems to imply" and "a similar effect"). Ought one not acknowledge the tone set by publishing the interview under the title "'Honoris causa': This is also extremely funny"? Derrida was clear in several places in expressing that he was, among other things, able to find some of this state of affairs humourous. I'm happy to go back through and review the evidence, but need we establish whether he was at all amused or whether he was "genuinely" amused where there is a clear acknowledgement of a measure of amusement? I may be amused that I am having this exchange, but I am also quite serious about my willingness to go back, review the texts, and demonstrate textual support. Derrida's sense of humour and its philosophical validity are a stake here, and the evidence is that Derrida continued to insist on his claim that he takes humour seriously. Shall we invoke irony explicitly to clarify the characterization? Buffyg 08:01, 18 May 2005 (UTC)

My assessment was primarily of how it reads, I'm not disputing its relevance or the evidence. It seems to me that emotional states shouldn't be reported uncritically, especially when they are, as you say, important. Say, if someone has a stance on war or death (or anything likely to inspire fear) that involves not being afraid, it would hardly be apporopriate to say that they replied "fearlessly" to their critics, even if that was the tone they set for their response. If you can think of a better way to refer to Derrida's tone here, then great, although since it's mentioned in the next paragraph I'm not sure it's necessary. Util 13:23, 18 May 2005 (UTC)

You keep speaking of "emotional states," and I maintain as before that is not a justifiable characterization. I cannot subscribe to anything that follows this premise, particularly an extremely untenable analogy (as in: "because it is unlikely... it would hardly be appropriate"). We are not strictly concerned with Derrida's emotional state. Ironic amusement ("with some amusement") here is as well a textual effect; this does not simply embed uncritical assumptions about the affect of the statement's author, although in this case there is a question of ironic consciousness, of underlining and counter-signing an irony that was in some sense previously unwitting but was always legible. Derrida replies by elaborating an amusement that was already there. Amusement is thus a register of his reply, thus there is little ground to dispute that he observed with amusement. I'll think about better ways of saying this (I'm increasingly fond of the idiom), but it is without a doubt privatory to argue that the previously offered characterization is untenable or even lacks neutrality, particularly when one objects with so little caution. Buffyg 19:54, 19 May 2005 (UTC)

Categories

I'm removing him from Category:Fascist/Nazi era scholars and writers since the "Fascist/Nazi era" ended when he was not yet 15 years old. --Angr/ 08:39, 2 Jun 2005 (UTC)

Apparently you misunderstand the meaning of the category. The category is for people writing about the Fascist and Nazi era rather than people writing during it. If you're not clear on this, read through the entries in that category. Buffyg 09:32, 2 Jun 2005 (UTC)

Apparently you misunderstand the meaning of Derrida's work if you think he belongs in such a category. Of course the Nazi era was relevant to his work (as it must be for any philosopher or theorist since then), but to call Derrida a scholar writing about the WWII era seems to me absurd. --csloat 10:14, 2 Jun 2005 (UTC)

For my own part, I'm not sure how you get from the characterisation of Derrida as someone who has written extensively about issues of the 1930s and 1940s (with particular reference to Heidegger, de Man, and Schmitt) to saying that Derrida's writing about this era is in some sense incidental, perfunctory, or otherwise like that of any other and from there to telling me that I don't understand Derrida's work on account of a small gesture noting it. Buffyg 12:00, 2 Jun 2005 (UTC)

Ad hominem attacks?

An ad hominem attack is when one attacks the (wo)man, not her/his argument. There is a difference between an argumentum ad hominem and an insult. An insult doesn't imply argumentation, and it isn't bound the rules of logic. The following is a passage from this article:

Outside this circle Derrida's work has often been at least as controversial as within; many analytic philosophers and scientists, some going so far as to regard it as pseudophilosophy, even engaging in ad hominem attacks against him, calling him a "charlatan".

This isn't an example of an ad hominem attack, it's an example of an insult.Maprovonsha172 02:03, 23 Jun 2005 (UTC)

No, calling someone a charlatan is making claims about their person by way of their work. Where one does nothing more than offer this characterisation without justification, that's attacking the person rather than the work. This insults people's intelligence as much as anything else. Buffyg 10:53, 23 Jun 2005 (UTC)

First of all, critics of the postmodernists have hardly offered characterizations "without justification." Secondly, insulting a person's intelligence is still just an insult. Ad hominem implies that the only thing his critics could do was to revert to personal attacks. Not all personal attacks are argumentum ad hominems.Maprovonsha172 12:12, 23 Jun 2005 (UTC)

Look, chap, if you've nothing to offer other than hopelessly broad generalisations like "critics of the postmodernists have hardly offered characterizations 'without justification,'" perhaps you might reconsider whether you are in fact arguing the point at hand or trying to justify such generalisations without considering the evidence at hand. I did not say that calling Derrida a charlatan was insulting Derrida's intelligence — I said that the characterisation as offered is insulting to the intelligence of anyone who is trying to find specific reasons for strong rejection of Derrida's work. Again you miss the point that calling someone a charlatan without elaborating reasons is imputing something to his work by way of his character and to his character by way of his work. Absent reasoned justification, the characterisation is ad hominum by default. Buffyg 13:07, 23 Jun 2005 (UTC)

In any case, have you read the Searle-Derrida debate, the letter to the Times opposing his award from Cambridge, the interviews he has given on these, or any other materials referenced in the section? Buffyg 13:12, 23 Jun 2005 (UTC)

I've reverted the edit. Since you're proposing a change and we have a nascent edit war on our hands, let's both please wait until others have a chance to comment on the matter before engaging in further editing of the article. Feel free to continue making your case here. Buffyg 13:22, 23 Jun 2005 (UTC)