Studies and Observations Group

The Studies and Observations Group (SOG) was an extremely secret American special force which conducted unconventional warfare operations prior to and during the Vietnam War. The teams consisted of 1-3 Americans and another 3-5 "Indigs" or Nungs and Yards, tribesmen of Vietnam, Laos, Thailand and Cambodia.

The members in a SOG RT or Recon Team were ranked like so: The One-Zero was the leader, and was always the most experienced of the team regardless of rank. The One-One is the 2nd in command of the team. The One-Two is the team's radioman. These three are almost always Americans. The rest of the team consist of Indigs. Sometimes, for the most audacious missons, entire teams consisted of Americans.

A large variety of weapons and equipment were available to SOG recon men, most likely obtained through the CIA. Car-15s, AK-47s, M3 Grease guns, RPD machine guns, M1 Carbines, M1/A1 Thompsons, MP40 SMGs, and Sten SMGs were among the many guns recon men carried.

The American team members were drafted from forces like the Navy SEALs and the Green Berets. SOG has been said to have the highest kill ratio of any American unit, 100 enemy soldiers to one Recon man. SOG operated in Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos.

There were three main SOG units: CCN (Command and Control North) based out of Danang, CCC (Command and Control Central) based out of Kontum, and CCS (Command and Control South) based out of Ban Me Thout. CCN mostly ran missions in and north of the DMZ, or in Laos west of the northern part of South Vietnam. CCC worked the "tri-border area" where South Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia met. And CCS ran operations mostly in Cambodia.

One must remember, of course, that the US could not legally conduct combat operations in Laos or Cambodia, thus the extreme secrecy and "plausible deniability."

CCN's teams were mostly named after snakes (RT KRAIT, RT COBRA, etc.). CCC's teams were named after states (RT CALIFORNIA, RT MAINE, RT NEVADA). CCS's teams were named after tools (RT LEVEL).

The C&C camps didn't just have RT's; they also had their Hatchet Force (exploitation company) units. These company-sized units were composed of American SF officers and NCOs in leadership positions (down through Squad Leader) and mercenary troops (Montagnard or Nung). If an RT (or other source) located a likely target, a Hatchet Force might go in to tear it up, do a thorough job of seizure and search (especially if looking for possible US POWs or intelligence), or block a particularly sensitive road (just to aggravate the NVA). It was a Hatchet Force operation that was involved in the recent "Tailwind" scandal with CNN. Hatchet Force operations usually lasted no more than a week, with the company then being withdrawn by helicopter (usually to the local NVA commander's great relief).

RTs seldom operated in South Vietnam; there were plenty of conventional units for that. Their mission was "across the fence", where conventional units could not go. Tens of thousands of NVA soldiers were tied down trying to keep out the RT's.

SOG RTs and Hatchet Force (exploitation) companies did not wear insigias, they did not wear dog tags, and sometimes did not even wear US uniforms or carry US weapons. This put the soldiers outside the protection of the Law of Land Warfare, the Geneva Convention, etc. .. but that was no matter, since the NVA never returned a single SOG member they might have captured.

Almost all of the US personnel in the RTs and Hatchet Forces were US Army Special Forces. I can't confirm that claim about highest kill ratio: the RT's mission was NOT to kill, it was to recon. If you got in a fight, you just failed in your mission.

RT missions were usually seven days. After that the teams ran out of radio batteries (the only contact with the outside world other than emergency radios and reflective mirrors). They were already out of food, of course (we seldom carried more than one meal a day, and that for only 4 or 5 days). And most people's health started to deteriorate after 5 or 6 days. The stress of almost no sleep (you never got a full night's sleep; you catnapped all night long) could provoke hallucinations and poor judgment. So anything over seven days was extreme; the C&C HQs tried very hard to get the teams out after six or seven days. Of course, if there were other emergencies demanding the air assets, if other teams were in trouble, if there were scheduled team insertions (and an insertion always took priority over a routine extraction), you just had to sit there and wait.

Casualty rates among RTs and Hatchet Force personnel were high, at times up to one half of the force. CCC in 1968 had a bad time of it, and CCN was always known as an extremely dangerous place for recon men. (By casualty, I mean KIA or wounded so severely you had to be medevac'ed out of country. Minor wounds didn't count.)

The name of the game was usually "Break contact, continue the mission." It was difficult and dangerous to get an RT inserted; once you were in, they wanted you to stay in as long as possible. All awards (and three Congressional Medals of Honor came out of my CCC camp alone during the year I was there) had a location of "Deep within enemy held territory". All missions and after action reports were classified TOP SECRET. It was a very very different sort of war. And if you got in trouble out there .. you usually died alone. There was always a BRIGHT LIGHT team (another Recon Team) standing by at a launch site, to try and help out an RT in trouble. But usually there was little they could do. A recon team bloodied the NVA's nose and ran and got away, or they stood and died fighting.

And of course it was supported by some of the bravest helicopter crews and fixed wing ("Covey") FAC pilots in the world. One can never say enough for the Huey and Kingbee (VNAF CH-34) crews who put us in, and then came back to take us out, sometimes through a hail of enemy fire.sl:Studies and Observations Group