Revolution in military affairs

The military concept of Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) occurs when a combination of technological, organisational, social, doctrinal and political-economic changes take place in conjunction, and affect the way militaries plan, equip, train, and ultimately wage war.

Contents

1 Interested nations 2 More or less destructive? 3 Hubris 4 Areas of focus 5 External links

Interested nations

Interest in RMA is high both in the military forces of the United States and within the Chinese People's Liberation Army, with the future of RMA seen as a central component of current Chinese strategic thought and internal debate focusing on whether and how to mesh RMA with Maoist conceptions of people's war. Many additional militaries have researched and considered RMA adoption—particularly Canada, United Kingdom, the Netherlands, Sweden, Australia, New Zealand, South Africa, Singapore, Taiwan, India, and Russia — however any meaningful degree of implementation is typically relegated to those who can afford it, which is a particularly large obstacle for third-world and post-communist militaries.

More or less destructive?

Soviet military theorists were the first to address what they perceived to be revolutionary changes about to take place in late 20th century conventional warfare, specifically regarding advances in microelectronics, sensors, precision-guidance, and control systems. Soviet officers, particularly Marshal Nikolai Ogarkov, asserted that technology would, "make it possible to conduct military operations with the use of conventional means of a qualitatively new and incomparably more destructive form than ever before." By contrast, American and Chinese theorists tend to see technology as making warfare more effective but less destructive.

Hubris

Renewed interest was placed on RMA theory and practice after what many saw as a stunning, one-sided victory by the United States during the 1991 Gulf War against Iraq. In the immediate years that followed, haughty visions and characterisations were bestowed upon the US military. Overly confident authors and researchers pointed to the very real possibility of "lossless" operations, campaigns conducted using only riskless yet effective air-power, and the like. These views were somewhat dampened by regrettable US experiences in Somalia, fruitless attacks on Iraq post-1991, and a somewhat muddled "victory" by NATO forces in Kosovo.

However, given the recent impressive combat results in Afghanistan and Iraq (2002-2003) by the US Military, discussion has once again turned to the revolution which has occurred over the last two decades.

Areas of focus

One of the central problems in understanding the current debate over RMA is due to many theorists' use of the term as referring to the revolutionary technology itself, which is the driving force of change. Concurrently, other theorists tend to use the term as referring to revolutionary adaptations by military organisations that may be necessary to deal with the changes in technology.

When reviewing the gamut of perspectives, three fundamental variations of a Revolution in Military Affairs come to the forefront. The first perspective focuses primarily upon changes in the nation state and the role of an organised military in using force. This approach highlights the political, social, and economic factors worldwide, which might require a completely different type of military and organisational structure to apply force in the future. Author's such as RAND's Carl H. Builder and Lt. Col. Ralph Peters (Ret.) emphasize:

• the decline of the nation state

• the nature of the emerging international order

• the different types of forces needed in the near-future.

The second perspective—most commonly assigned the term RMA—highlights the evolution of weapons, weapons technology, information technology, and military organisation and military doctrine among advanced powers. This "System of Systems" perspective on RMA has been ardently supported by Admiral William Owens, Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, who identifies three overlapping areas for force assets. These are:

• intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance

• command, control, communications and intelligence processing

• precision force.

Finally, the third concept is that a "true" revolution in military affairs has not yet occurred or is unlikely to; however there has been a continuing evolution in equipment, organisations, and tactics to adjust to changes in technology and the international order. Authors such as Michael O’Hanlon and Frederick Kagan, point to the fact much of the technology and weapons systems ascribed to the contemporary RMA were in development long before 1991. Several critics point out that a "revolution" within the military ranks might carry detrimental consequences, produce severe economic strain, and ultimately prove counterproductive. Such authors tend to profess a much more gradual "evolution" in military affairs, as opposed a rapid revolution.

External links

• http://www.comw.org/rma/fulltext/overview.html
• http://www.ub.edu.ar/facultades/feg/revolution_warfare.htm
• http://www.vovklict.nl/Intercom/Intercom_uitgaven/2000/mil_affairs/mil_affairs.htm
• http://www-cgsc.army.mil/milrev/english/mayjun97/kipp.htm
• http://www.defencejournal.com/2000/sept/military.htm
• http://www.vuw.ac.nz/css/docs/working_papers/WP14.html
• http://www.vcds.forces.gc.ca/dgsp/pubs/rep-pub/dda/rma/intro_e.asp
• http://www.ntu.edu.sg/idss/Perspective/research_050108.htm
• http://www.brook.edu/dybdocroot/fp/projects/rma.htm