Deflationary theory of truth
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The deflationary theory of truth is really a family of theories which all have in common the belief that assertions that seem to predicate truth of a statement do not really do anything of the kind.
One example of a deflationary theory is the redundancy theory of truth, which holds that the predicate "is true" really adds nothing informationally. It is a purely stylistic way of asserting something. Thus, "It is true that snow is white" and "'Snow is white' is true" both say nothing more than "Snow is white." In other words, to assert that a statement is true is just to assert the statement itself. The original version of this theory originates with F. P. Ramsey. A common objection to the redundancy theory is that it seems to provide no account of "blind" ascriptions of truth; i.e. when the statement which is being called true is not explicitly identified: for example, "the last thing Plato said is true."
Another example of a deflationary theory is the performative theory of truth, originated by Peter Strawson. This theory holds that to say that something is true is to signal one's agreement with it, much like nodding one's head in agreement. Thus, the assertion does not predicate truth; indeed, it isn't really an assertion. It is more like the kind of utterance a bride makes when she says "I do" at her wedding: she is, by the very act of uttering "I do" taking him to be her lawful wedded husband. She is not describing herself as taking him to be . . . etc. Thus ascribing truth is the performance of an action, not the assertion that a proposition has a quality called "truth."
References
Kirkham, Richard. Theories of Truth, MIT Press: 1992. Chapter 10 is a good survey of deflationary theories of truth.