Talk:Qualia
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This article has problems. First of all, these lists are terrible. Entries like "8. Junction points between being and experiencing" and "9. Starting points of becoming" are so vague as to be meaningless, and the entries under "Qualia in Practice" are completely unexplained. (I think that the reference to Sony might be nothing more than a poor pun.) Would anyone object if I deleted these? --Conover 05:27, Apr 6, 2004 (UTC)
Do it... Evercat 11:27, 6 Apr 2004 (UTC)
- Done and done. --Conover 20:12, Apr 6, 2004 (UTC)
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Giant Rewrite
I just did a giant rewrite of this article. I tried to keep everything I could, but unfortunately a large part of the previous version struck me as unsalvagable. Of course, I admit that I could be wrong about a lot of it, so I encourage everyone to check the last version of the page (http://en.wikipedia.org/w/wiki.phtml?title=Qualia&oldid=3078881) and integrate anything you think worth keeping.
Also, I am concerned that the explanation of Jackson and Dennett's arguments may have gone on a little long to be truly encyclopedaic. If necessary, they could be moved to the pages of the philosophers themselves, or to specific pages about their arguments.
What does everyone think?
--Conover 23:32, Apr 6, 2004 (UTC)
Bizarre definition
The article begins: Qualia (singular: "quale") are most simply defined as the properties of sensory experiences by virtue of which there is something it is like to have them. ...What on earth does that mean? --Jorend 21:55, 20 Apr 2004 (UTC)
- it (above) is a fairly classic philosophical definition. Qualia are what distinguish the various types of sensations that we experience. Your personal experience of the "redness" of red differs from your experience of the "blueness" of blue.....red and blue objects act by way of your visual system to produce different qualia. Some people deny that the "redness" of red can be accounted for in terms of physical brain activity. Biologists like Gerald Edelman propose theories of mind in which qualia do result from brain activity. JWSchmidt 18:54, 21 Apr 2004 (UTC)
- This current definition is supposed to be less "vague" (quoting Conover) than its previous definitions!? -- 198.166.58.45 04:27, 2 Jun 2004 (UTC)
- It's true that this definition is vague, but unfortunately that problem comes with the territory. I have thoroughly researched the definition of qualia, and this much is widely agreed-upon. — Adam Conover † 20:53, Jun 15, 2004 (UTC)
- The problem is that if you aren't familiar with the phrase "something it is like to ..." (ie, if you haven't read much philosophy of mind), then the sentence is impossible to parse.
Qualia vs. Experiences
Aren't qualia the same thing as experiences? If not, what's the difference? — Monedula 09:16, 15 Jun 2004 (UTC)
- In a nutshell, qualia are properties of experiences, just like colors are properties of objects. Specifically, qualia are the properties of experiences which describe what it is like to have that particular experience. — Adam Conover † 20:53, Jun 15, 2004 (UTC)
- Then, what aspect of experiences is not covered by qualia? If we know what it is like to have a particular experience, then we know everything about that experience, isn't it? — Monedula 21:25, 15 Jun 2004 (UTC)
- Well, first I should tell you to go read the primary source material, just as Frank Jackson's "Epiphenomenal Qualia" and Dennett's "Quining Qualia" -- both should be available in any good phil mind compilation. But in a nutshell, no -- even if we knew the qualia of an experience, we would not thereby know anything about its other properties, such as its intentional properties, its causal properties, and its capacity to cause certain behavioral responses. — Adam Conover † 23:39, Jun 15, 2004 (UTC)
- I would rather say that qualia are not properties of experiences, but the material they are made of, a sort of "mental substance". And the intentional and casual properties have more to do with the "outside world" than with experiences themselves. — Monedula 11:31, 18 Jun 2004 (UTC)
Larger scale phenomena - refactoring
I'm not certain what happened, but I signed up for an account, logged in, and the bottom section of the article is no longer visible. It was fascinating, talking about how qualia could be experienced differently at higher metabolic rates. I was going to ask if anyone could provide references to this idea. Now it's gone. I think it also talked about the idea of 'refactoring'. Can anyone help?
Scroll up the page to the link to the old page before the large rewrite.Second section. ---Steenies 16:59, 16 Jul 2004 (UTC)