Talk:Problem of evil

From Academic Kids

Earlier Discussion

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Why are there separate articles on the "The Problem of evil", "Theodicy", and "Free Will and the Problem of Evil"? Maybe these sections of the encyclopedia should be written with some kind of coherent article structure, instead of everybody's little, overlapping, essays on various topics.

Off you go, then. Be my guest. -- The Anome 12:40, 15 Aug 2003 (UTC)

Would anyone seriously object if this article were gutted completely? It's a rambling, badly-written Intro to Philosophy essay right now, not a Wikipedia article on the problem of evil. Graft 13:18, 15 Aug 2003 (UTC)

Ooh, someone did it! And beautifully... Graft

It is well written and accurate AFAIK, but nowhere near as comprehensive as the older version. I hope it gets expanded to an appropriate level of detail. --Robert Merkel 14:19, 15 Aug 2003 (UTC)

Would anyone mind if I simply folded this material into the fuller article, Free will and the problem of evil ? This page then could b turned into a redirect. The two articles are essentially the same topic. RK 19:44, 19 Aug 2003 (UTC)

The entire article is silly since "evil" is a religious term for a variety of things more appropriately described by other terms. "Moral evil" is worse, since the person engaged in it often (if not always) perceives the same action as "good." Then it degenerates into assuming free will exists in the absolute sense, not just the obfuscatory sense used by "compatibilists", which is equivalent to "freedom" and is not relevant to discussions of ultimate choice. The example of rape represents a violation of freedom, not of free will; if free will existed, it could not be violated. Fairandbalanced 23:41, 12 Sep 2003 (UTC)

If a merge was to be done at all, I think I'd prefer it to go in the opposite direction - include other stuff here rather than making this a redirect... free will isn't the only issue related to the PoE. Evercat 19:52, 19 Aug 2003 (UTC)

I concur. Graft

The article on free will and the problem of evil, while well-written and valuable deals with one particular strand of argument about the problem of evil, This is the more general article, and you should merge the contents of the other article with this one, and redirect it here. Since you are in a merging mood, don't forget the articles on theodicy, and the logical and evidential arguments from evil, which are also on the same topic as this article. Finally, after all the merges, you might consider bringing back some of the material from this article that I removed because it was so long-winded. By the way, I was intending to do all this myself, so if you don't get around to it in the next week or so, I will probably do it, unless somebody puts forward a good argument why not.

I agree. RK

I merged the theodicy article in. This reduced the coherence of the article, but at least we have started to consolidate this material. 66.82.112.10 16:53, 30 Aug 2003 (UTC)

Great! Maybe we should turn the Theodicy article into a link to this page. They are now covering the precise same set of topics. Also, I have finally merged all the text from Free will and the problem of evil into this article, and turned that entry into a Redirect to here. RK 17:50, 30 Aug 2003 (UTC)

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This argument is weak:

"But there is another, similar problem. Some instances of moral evil already involve violations of free will -- e.g., rape. For God to step in and deny the violator his freedom would also be to protect the victim's freedom. In such cases, it all comes down to whose free will is more valuable -- which instance of coercion would be worse? And it is morally implausible that the best thing to do is to respect a rapist's freedom to rape unhindered rather than protecting the victim's freedom. So, for a large category of moral evil -- all moral evil involving coercion -- it's automatically implausible that the value of free will can justify God's inaction. We must then narrow the domain of admissible evil yet again."

Why? The writer seems to missuse the term "will" to mean "destiny". Despite the freedom the victim has to not wanting to be raped, he can suffer from it against her will.

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An opposing viewpoint here would state that God has already intervened in the world: he has told us that rape and similar acts are wrong.

This rather misses the point. When we ask why on earth God allows all this evil, it's rather unsatisfactory to say "well, he's politely asked us all to be good - what more do you want him to do?" --Evercat 22:36, 4 Oct 2003 (UTC)

I am deleting that since it is irrelevant to this section. Also clarifying that free will is an unverified assertion. Attempted to tighten up some other parts without significantly changing the meaning. Fairandbalanced 03:54, 5 Oct 2003 (UTC)

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Moved to talk since I have absolutely no idea what this means:

But that argument fails because it assumes an identity between the beings in this world and God. For God to be indicted on this charge He would have had to have been capable of making a world with Himself identically reproduced in it. But He is one and indivisible, so per Plantiga's reasoning, He can't do that. His omnipotence is not impugned and the argument falls.

Huh? Why does the argument assume God has to create a clone of himself? Evercat 21:32, 19 Nov 2003 (UTC)

Contents

1 what? 2 I object to this 3 What's all the fuss about Good and Evil. 4 One point 5 Epistemological Problem of Evil? 6 What's with the crappy presentation of the core peice? 7 bunch of articles 8 Passage on hell 9 Move 10 removed essay for consideration 11 Revert 12 Comment on previous revert

what?

"Karma's not a normal response from religions that are vulnerable to the PoE. Moving it to a less prominent position." (user:evercat, edit note) I'd like some explanation of what you mean by this. Are you saying that believers in karma are "invulnerable" to the problem of evil argument? If so, I think the deserves a particularly prominant place in this article :) Jack 19:41, 30 Jan 2004 (UTC)

My understanding is that the PoE is usually applied to Christianity, Judaism and Islam - the religions that believe in a single all-powerful fully-merciful God. These don't, to my knowledge, believe in karma. So karma is not a typical response to the PoE. Are there any religions that believe in an omnipotent omnibenevolent God and karma? Evercat 21:02, 30 Jan 2004 (UTC)

Sanathana Dharma / Brahman Hinduism? Also, Karma is perfectly compatable w all faiths, Christianity included. I know of may christians who interpret "as you sow, so shall you reap" as karma. I agree it is not a "typical response" but it is a valid one. It appears that you agree w me that karma is a solid answer to PoE? If so, this deserves alot more attention, not a cover up. Jack 02:32, 31 Jan 2004 (UTC)

I just moved it down. That's not a cover up. Is karma an answer? Well, if one only believes in a single life and not reincarnation (as the 3 religions that I named do, to the best of my knowledge) then it doesn't explain relatively sinless lives that are nevertheless awful. Karma only works to solve the PoE if one believes in reincarnation. So perhaps it can work for Hinduism, if indeed Hinduism really portrays an omnipotent omniscient omnibenevolent God (I don't have the knowledge of Hinduism). But you agreed with me above that it's not a typical response. That's why I moved it down. Evercat 13:49, 31 Jan 2004 (UTC)

I direct you to [1] (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Reincarnation#Reincarnation_in_Western_religions). I'm sorry if the word "cover up" came across harshly, but I feel this is an area which has been covered up (not necessarilly by you! :) and is consistantly glossed over. Reincarnation is probably necessary in order for karma to be an answer to the PoE, but reincarnation is generally seen as a byproduct of Karma. Its not easy to understand how Karma could work w/o it. Anyways, I plan to write more on this subject, and I do not agree that it must be relagated to a lower position due it's unconventional nature in western debate of this concept. You may want to look into Brahman if you have any confusion about the Hindu God. Jack 04:27, 1 Feb 2004 (UTC)

I object to this

"Some atheists believe that the problem of evil can be used to prove that God does not exist by the method of reductio ad absurdum. "

I was about to remove it, but I figured I should hear any evidence for, or explanation of this. It seems absurd to me ;) Sam Spade 05:50, 20 Feb 2004 (UTC)

I think it is just historical fact that thi8s has been used by some atheists as a profe that God does not exist. In my opinion not a very good proof, but see http://www.infidels.org/library/modern/james_still/evil.html and http://www.infidels.org/library/modern/nontheism/atheism/evil.html. The paragraph should therefore stay. -- Chris Q 07:37, 20 Feb 2004 (UTC)

Wow, that really wasn't ment to stand up to scrutiny, was it? Ok, I accept your evidence. I put in a disclaimer about lack of imagination. Sam Spade 08:12, 20 Feb 2004 (UTC)

Sam, I changed your sentence from "Others see the as a better example of argument from lack of imagination." to "Others see the atheists argument as an example of argument from lack of imagination.". This is what I think you were saying, but you left some words out!

Also, I changed "Atheists" to "Some atheists", because I think many atheists see this as a rather limited and week argument. -- Chris Q 12:18, 20 Feb 2004 (UTC)

I should hope anyone would (esp. the author!), if they had bothered to give it much thought. Good eye catching my earlier edit blunder :S I have since made a couple of changes, but I don't think I've changed the meaning at all, just made the wikilink work, and improved the sentance I added (reduced it mainly). Sam Spade 12:33, 20 Feb 2004 (UTC)

What's all the fuss about Good and Evil.

What is the problem with evil? God is God. Is it so hard to accept that his existence is beyond good and evil, beyond our understanding of certain issues ie: if evil exist then God doesn't because God is supposed to be all good?

Good and evil are attributes of human nature/understanding of what they mean in relationship to one another (to good and evil) and to our existence. They are nothing more than experiences for our understanding of life. How we choose to apply, understand or experience it is up to us.

Certainly good or evil can not be used to validate or invalidate God's existence. It is not a mean for us to use individually or in conjunction with any other thing to prove or disprove God's existence. God's existence is unlimited and without bound in any and every direction. "Good and evil" have already limited God to within our scope of understanding or what we want God to be. God would not and could not be God if his existence requires our validation or understanding.

It is by choice not by logic that one will begin to understand God or know God exist. It is a given, that God exist, whether we choose to accept this or not.

Say Yang

You are right of course. Would you like to form a user account? Sam [Spade (http://en.wikipedia.org/w/wiki.phtml?title=User_talk:Sam_Spade&action=edit&section=new)] 06:14, 30 Jul 2004 (UTC)

Surely the discussion is about the existence of evil, not particularly the existence of God. The mention of using evil to invalidate the existence of God is a tangential reference. Moreover, the way you describe God, Say, is to describe anything which is "beyond," such that God could be something else equally beyond our understanding yet influences the world (Consciousness? Satan? 12th dimensional hyperspace?). Apparently, God made mortals so inept at understanding (even those who "choose" to understand him) that your approach so far has not succeeded in ridding the problem of evil from the world - thus we have this Wikipedia article.

Nice try, though. I honestly admire your effort.--Psients 13:39, 18 Aug 2004 (UTC)

People arn't enept, were busy suffering/learning. Progress is good. Sam [Spade (http://en.wikipedia.org/w/wiki.phtml?title=User_talk:Sam_Spade&action=edit&section=new)] 00:32, 19 Aug 2004 (UTC)

The only philosophical "problem of evil" would be if, 1.) there actually is moral "evil" -- not just subjective, personal dislikes, and 2.) the being ultimately in control of that "evil" intends it for an "evil" purpose and / or directly causes it. Without one (1), the events and thoughts designated as "evil" are simply more amoral facts of the universe, such as the fact of fingers or toes (some are disturbed by them, some have a fetish for them). Without (2), there is no "problem" insofar as the being in control of the "evil" does not have an "evil" motive and does not directly engage in the "evil" (which implies nothing about that being's ability to prevent the "evil").

One might note the problem of Adam and Eve eating from the fruit of the Tree of Knowledge of Good and Evil, and thus their loss of innocence leading to the fall. That might be one point of analysis for the user beginning this particular subject.

One point

"But Plantinga reminds us that there are always trivial limits on omnipotence -- God can't make 2+2=5 or create a married bachelor."

This means God is not omnipotent. If the evil demon of Descartes can deceive us about logic in such a way, making married bachelors possible, why can't God do it? It seems absurd that some demon is more powerful than God...

Plantinga is a Christian-Theist of the Reformed camp. Most Christians through-out history, including the Reformed Christians, have defined Omnipotence along of the lines of 'being able to do all that is not contrary to your nature, having no external power exerted on your being or will, your own self the source and original of all power'. Thus, when Plantinga speaks about God not being able to make '2+2=5' a true proposition, he is really making two statements: God's own thinking (part of His nature) is logical and coherent, and God is Omnipotent. Also, what Descartes' "Evil Genius" hypothesis referred to was the reliability of sense perception, i.e., the metaphysics of knowledge, viz., epistemology; what Plantinga was referring to was the actual state of affairs about the world, viz., ontological facts. I'm fairly certain that Plantinga would have no problem granting that God would have the raw capacity to deceive people about propositions like '2+2=5', so that they would hold to false beliefs, though I'm equally certain that he would argue that God's nature is such as to rule out that kind of behavior.

Epistemological Problem of Evil?

Shouldn't the article list both forms of the "problem of evil" -- ontological and epistemological? Right now there is only the ontological problem listed under the definition: God is all good / powerful, evil exists, therefore God is either not all good / powerful, or evil doesn't exist. But there is also an epistemological form of the problem: the existence of evil would make it impossible to know that God is all good (on the basis of experience alone), evil exists, therefore one cannot know that God is all good. The epistemological form of the problem is not very strong against 'revealed' religions, which claim to have knowledge of God's Omnibenevolence by direct revelation rather than by an inductive survey of human experience, but it is still a distinct form of the problem and probably merits some mention.

What's with the crappy presentation of the core peice?

I've seen some crappy presentations but that takes the cake. It's like 1 line. There's a whole nice logical presentation that only takes a few lines.

1. God is all-good.
2. God is all-powerful.
3. God is all-knowing.
4. All-good beings would seek to destroy evil.
5. All-powerful beings could destroy evil.
6. All-knowing beings would know evil would be created.
7. If an all-good, all-powerful all-knowing being existed, evil would not.
8. Evil exists.
9. An all-good, all-powerful all-knowing does not exist.

Responses.

1. Middle-knowledge. No free will/fideism.
2. Limited Omniscience. God didn't know Satan would go bad and create evil.
3. Fatalism. God created evil? And... he's still God!
4. Contradiction. Sure, it is contradictory but its all still true.
5. Additional response from LukeH 18:11, 30 May 2005 (UTC): There is a flaw in the logic is at point "4.": All-good beings would seek to destroy evil. That is not necessarily true, particularly in the light of the justice of God (which is one of the things that makes Him perfect), and man's agency. The fact that He could destroy evil (point "5.") does not necessarily mean that He would destroy evil; and the fact that God is all-good does not necessarily mean that He would destroy evil either, if there is a higher purpose in the existence of evil. (For example, perhaps opposition is crucial to our development, so evil may exist for the "higher good".)
6. It is also arguable that good would not exist without the existence of evil as a comparative. LukeH 18:11, 30 May 2005 (UTC).

Seen some better presentations, for the formal logic argument. This one here is off the top of my head and I'm sleepy. So it's kinda weak. Tatarize 13:10, 23 Nov 2004 (UTC)

You are assuming that things can be created and destroyed. This violates the laws of thermodynamics. Also, you assume that God isn't good and evil combined (God = All), and that evil isn't necessary. I would say that without evil, good would have alot less meaning, that evil is the lack of, or distance from, God. [[User:Sam Spade|Sam Spade Arb Com election]] 18:50, 23 Nov 2004 (UTC)

• First off, you don't understand the laws of Thermodynamics. That's the only explanation for your first comment. They have nothing to do with creation or destruction. Conservation of matter and conservation of energy perhaps, thermodynamics does involve conservation of entropy. But you still lack a leg to stand on there. Thermodynamics is heat exchange, not a magical law that says God exists.
• Yes, the problem of evil includes the assumption that God is omnibenevolent. If you reject that assumption the argument holds no weight. However all-good is often a qualifier of God.
• Your final point is one of the critics of the of the argument: Dualism. And should be added to the list.
• Your responce seems a little too directed at me. The argument is the argument is the argument. That's the formal presentation of it. I'll either sharpen it up personally or look for a public domain source for the formal but probably just the former for the write up. Tatarize 03:05, 24 Nov 2004 (UTC)

I dare say it is you who fails to comprehend the ramifications of the laws of thermodynamics, and I never suggested that they are magical or prove God exists, but thats off topic. Lets just simplify to state that your argument presupposes that things can be created or destroyed, which is by no means a given.

As to me speaking directly to you, it is your particular presentation of the argument which I am speaking to. As far as Dualism, I wasn't refering to dualism at all, quite to the contrary I was invoking Summum bonum, but a mention of dualism would of course be helpful in the article as well. [[User:Sam Spade|Sam Spade Arb Com election]] 12:15, 24 Nov 2004 (UTC)

I don't know where you guys are going off on this...I think you can also assume that God -could- have created the world with no evil. And suddenly thermodynamics can represent an abstract and intangible object like "evil"? I doubt it applies...but off the topic.

You've entirely forgotten to directly mention the convention of "Free will". God chose to give us free will (according to believers, of which I am one), so therefore he cannot interfere with that.

bunch of articles

apart from this article, we have

• Logical and evidential arguments from evil
• Epicurean paradox
• Theodicy
• Maltheism, Theophilia
• Eutheism and dystheism

I know this was already discussed above. But it seems to have gotten worse instead of better. These articles are all about the same topic, and there shouldn't be so many of them...

Also, into which of them would I include the observation that mention of the problem is probably first attested (and not resolved) in Psalm 14,1

The fool hath said in his heart, There is no God. They are corrupt, they have done abominable works, there is none that doeth good.

dab (ᛏ) 17:34, 20 Dec 2004 (UTC)

Yes, now that I have an id, I'll point out that I'm the anon who made this point at the beginning of the Talk page, way back in summer 2003. I also tried in August 2003 to rewrite this page and merge Theodicy, although some time after I wandered off, this seems to have been undone. It seems to have only gotten worse since then, and someone has then merged stuff the other way into Theodicy. Or maybe it was already worse only I didn't realize it. Why don't we plan how to merge all these articles? Does anyone think there is a good reason for them to be separate? --BM 20:39, 21 Dec 2004 (UTC)

This afternoon, I made a start on merging. Logical and evidential arguments from evil was redirected to theodicy, and its content appended to the theodicy article. This is not ideal, but I didn't want to lose the content. I shortened this article (that is, The problem of evil) somewhat to make it an overview, and appended the content of Epicurean paradox here, after redirecting that article. Also, I renamed Eutheism and dystheism to Eutheism, dystheism, and maltheism, and merged the Maltheism in as a (too long) final section. For the moment, it is a separate article, but my feeling is that it should also eventually be discussed in the one article on this general topic, and that the eutheism, dystheism, and maltheism material should be much reduced.

So, we are down to a three articles at present. Now, does anyone have any thoughts on which article should be the final target of merges, theodicy or The problem of evil. I lean somewhat towards theodicy, with the the problem of evil becoming a redirect. --BM 23:17, 21 Dec 2004 (UTC)

Passage on hell

Franc28: the passage, originally placed in the article by an anon, that you've replaced is original research, with no citations or reference, and is both poorly written and poorly argued. Why do you think that it should remain? Mel Etitis (Μελ Ετητης) 21:11, 6 May 2005 (UTC)

After further consideration, I agree that the paragraph in question is disjointed. But an extended reference to the Problem of Hell should still be maintained on the page. Franc28 23:18, May 6, 2005 (UTC)

Perhaps that could be a separate article? As a topic, it's rarely found in philosophy of religion, though theologians talk about it. That's because it involves a problem internal to certain religious beliefs (a discrepancy between claims about the existence and nature of god and the existence and nature of hell); the problem of evil, on the other hand, involves a problem external to religious belief (the existence and nature of god and facts about the world independent of religious belief). Do you have any citations? A look through my books, including monographs and collections specifically on the problem of evil, failed to produce any (except for mediæval philosopher/theologians like Julian of Norwich). Mel Etitis (Μελ Ετητης) 10:04, 7 May 2005 (UTC)

Whoa, wait up a second here, I thought that God created *everything*. How can any problem be external to religious concerns ? Franc28 17:41, May 7, 2005 (UTC)

But that's not the point — there's a difference between a contradiction internal to religious belief and a contradiction between religious belief and the independent, objective facts. Philosophy is interested in the latter, but not so much in the former, which is the province of theology. Mel Etitis (Μελ Ετητης) 17:51, 7 May 2005 (UTC)

I know what the difference is supposed to be, I'm just saying it makes no sense.If religious belief is correct, then there is no such thing as an independent, objective fact (see the TANG). Franc28 20:20, May 7, 2005 (UTC)

But that's hardly a standard or widespread view among non-believers or believers (the TANG reference doesn't really back it up, either). The fact remains that, whether one is a religious believer or not, one is faced with moral and natural, physical and metaphysical evil; one isn't faced with the reality of hell even if one is a believer — at most one believes that it exists. That is, belief in hell – and thus the problem of hell – is internal to and depends upon religious belief, while belief in evil – and thus the the problem of evil – isn't. Mel Etitis (Μελ Ετητης) 22:25, 7 May 2005 (UTC)

Oh dear, Mel, the proposition that the "belief in evil" does not "depend upon religious belief" is just as arguable as your other premises. Many Christians would argue that evil is only coherent from the Christian perspective, and TANG proponents like me would argue the exact opposite. Franc28 23:18, May 7, 2005 (UTC)

Well, first, the interpretation of evil and being faced with are two very different things. Secondly, you're still ignoring the central distinction. Mel Etitis (Μελ Ετητης) 11:31, 22 May 2005 (UTC)

Move

Shouldn't this page be moved?? This has been suggested already for a related page The problem of Hell, and so it would follow that it should be done for this page too if it applies to the other page.

So:

Template:Move

Add *Support or *Oppose followed by an optional one sentence explanation and sign your vote with ~~~~

• Support move - "The" should only be used if it is an unmovable part of the title (so The Beatles, The Guardian; but Netherlands, National Football League etc... ). Mathmo 07:56, 8 May 2005 (UTC)
• Oppose According to the template it's not a question of the definite article, but of the capitalisation of "evil" (for which there's no ground). I went to check at Wikipedia:Requested moves, but couldn't find any mention of this article. Was it ever actually placed there? Mel Etitis (Μελ Ετητης) 13:53, 22 May 2005 (UTC)

removed essay for consideration

I've just removed this extended personal essay from this article and Theodicy, but copied it to the Talk pages because some of it could be incorporated into the articles:

What do other editors think? Mel Etitis (Μελ Ετητης) 11:21, 22 May 2005 (UTC)

Revert

I've just reverted a very large-scale edit by LukeH. Some of it might go back, but much is, I think, not really salvageable. For example, he seems to miss the reductio nature of the argument in many of its forms, and so thinks that it fails because it starts with the premise that god is omnipotent, omniscient, etc., and then concludes that there is no such being.

It wasn't just a matter of adding a chunk of text — if it had been, I'd have brought it here instead of revrting it, but editors can find it in the history easily enough. Any comments? Mel Etitis (Μελ Ετητης) 22:15, 29 May 2005 (UTC)

Comment on previous revert

LukeH 05:21, 30 May 2005 (UTC):

Either I misrepresented the point I was trying to make, or what I wrote was somehow misread by Mel Etitis. My comments did not "conclude that there is no such being". All my changes were intended to put the rebuttals under one heading (separating the argument from the rebuttal, which is why I moved one of the original paragraphs up), and I then added several further points. It is possible there were inconsistencies between what I added and the original points of the arguments -- but this is the point of a rebuttal. I did not conclude anything about the existence of God, I merely showed that the current arguments in this article are incomplete to prove the inexistence of God. This is an important point, and I feel the article is not complete without it.

The main points I added were that:

1. There are inconsistencies in the arguments in several of the statements made at earlier points in the article (this is merely an illustration of logical inconsistency or incompleteness of the previous arguments, without actually making an attempt to remove the arguments (because they are commonly used), and without even approaching the question as to whether "the problem of evil" actually is a problem or not);
2. The logical incompleteness of extant arguments into the problem of evil leave this as an open problem (this point is made without drawing the conclusion that "the problem of evil" does not exist, simply that current arguments are logically incomplete); and
3. It may be that evil must exist for good to exist, and vice versa, otherwise good itself may not be definable relative to something else (I think this point really needs to be made).

I feel that both sides of the argument need to be fully represented. Suggestions describing reasonable changes to these arguments are welcome. Rebuttals existed in the article before, but were not explained in great depth. Any rational argument ought to stand up to scrutiny, and I simply added an analysis of the logical structure of the arguments that were previously presented, and attempted to illustrate internal inconsistencies in the arguments. The argument and rebuttal were clearly separated so that the two viewpoints would not be confused within the article.

I would like to respectfully un-revert the changes. Please add comments here as to suggested content changes. Thanks!

Further comments from LukeH 05:34, 30 May 2005 (UTC):

In order to be reasonable about the un-revert, I wanted to be sure I understood where you were coming from. I believe you read the phrase "If evil did not exist, would there be such a thing as good?" as "If evil did not exist, would there be such a thing as God?". That is not what I wrote and is not the intent. Undoing the revert.

No, I'm afraid that you've misunderstood both my own comments (I didn't, for example, say that you'd concluded that there's no god) and my reason for reverting. There is indeed room for more material in the article, and for more on responses to the problem (and responses to those responses, etc.) — it's just that what you added wasn't really up to scratch. Aside from the fact that you've not grasped the logical structure of the problem (as I explained in my first comment above), it reads like original research, and it fails to represent the main responses to the problems very clearly. I'd be happy to work with you on improvements to the article; I've held off partly because I've published on the topic, and am perhaps a bit too close to the material, but perhaps that's being too punctilious.

Perhaps I should add that much of what you feel is missing is covered in Theodicy. Mel Etitis (Μελ Ετητης) 10:44, 30 May 2005 (UTC)

You're right, I misread your comments. Sorry for the confusion, and thanks for taking the time to clarify further.

I'd be happy with the article if it made one thing clear, which is the primary thing I take issue with, as it appears logically incomplete to me.

There is a gap in the line of reasoning that is presented in the argument that starts with God's perfection and concludes that there is no god. It shouldn't be "filled in" if the gap exists in the standing argument; it just needs to be addressed in the "Responses to the problem" section. It is simply that the unjustified assumption is made that if a perfect God exists and evil exists, and God could destroy evil, then "obviously" He would destroy evil, so therefore there can be no God. You cannot imply that God would destroy evil if He could -- there may be a higher purpose in the existence of evil, which is beyond our mortal capability to comprehend. Agency and justice factor into this. This is a point I tried to make in my commits.

Hardly original research, since it is commonly acknowledged (and almost certainly does not need sourcing) that mankind recognizes his non-omniscience, and that most beliefs of God attribute God with omniscience. If God is omniscient, how can we really know why He does anything that doesn't seem logical to us? (There are an awful lot of things attributed to God, even by prophets that claim to worship that God and communicate with Him, that simply don't make sense to the mortal mind.) The fact we do not fully comprehend God does not necessarily mean He does not exist; simply that we don't understand how or why He (or anything else that He created or apparently allowed to come into existence) exists.

One other comment -- at least according to various Christian (and some non-Christian) beliefs, God has said that He will destroy evil, just not yet :-) --LukeH 17:37, 30 May 2005 (UTC).

First, the relationship between goodness and being prepared to destroy evil is largely irrelevant to most versions of the argument, which asks why god would create an evil world, not why he wouldn't do anything about evil that he found. In so far as it is relevant, though, it's by no means clearly a gap, and the literature on it is reasonably extensive. It's not enough to claim that it's a problem as though that's simply a metter of fact.

Secondly, it's not original research to say that we're not omniscient and that many notions of god hold that he is — the problem comes when you infer that this creates a problem for the argument. One doesn't have to be omniscient to know that someone who does or permits evil isn't perfectly good. Of course, we can get it wrong with regard to other human beings, because other human beings are limited by causality, and sometimes have to choose between two evils (a surgeon cutting up a patient to save her life, etc.) — but as god is also supposed to be omnipotent, he isn't limited by causality, so the same doesn't apply. (see also Dostoevsky's The Brothers Karamazov for a famous response to that sort of claim). Mel Etitis (Μελ Ετητης) 19:19, 30 May 2005 (UTC)