Sweden and the Winter War

The Winter War broke out when the Soviet Union attacked Finland on November 30, 1939, three months after the start of World War II. The war lasted until March 1940 and during the conflict Finland received limited but crucial support from Sweden.

Message from the King

In the "Statsrådsdiktamen" on 19 February 1940, Sweden's king Gustav V publicly rejected pleas from Finland's government for military intervention in the Winter War for Finland's defense against the Soviet invader. The publication aimed at pressuring Finland to accept harsh Soviet peace conditions and to quiet a strong Swedish activist opinion advocating participation in the war. The statement had this effect, but came also to produce a substantial bitterness in Finland.

During the Winter War (30 November 1939 – 12 March 1940), Sweden's government rejected all-in-all three formal pleas from Finland's government to engage military in Finland's defense against the Soviet Union. Detailed plans for Swedish deployment along Finland's border had been made up ten years before, and regularly updated in secret contacts between the two countries' General Staffs; but no formal alliance had been concluded, and a proposed official recognition of cooperative defense of the de-militarized Åland Islands had in June 1939 been rebuffed by Sweden's parliament.

Background

According to the dominant view in Sweden's foreign ministry, Finland's foreign policy had, since her independence and civil war 1918 been "unsteady and adventurous". In addition, Finland's domestic politics was viewed with quite some suspicion by Swedish Social Democrats. After the Socialists' defeat in the civil war, anti-parliamentarism and Anti-Socialist policies dominated the Swedish impressions from Finland. Cooperation with Finland had in the 1920s and 1930s primarily been advocated by fringe right-wing politicians and military officers. Both to the right and to the left, a closer cooperation with Finland was seen as a means to counter the hegemonic position of the Social Democrats in Sweden.

After the Abyssinia crisis, both Finland and Sweden were forced to adjust their foreign policies, as the League of Nations seemed to offer only a hollow protection against foreign aggression. In the Baltic region both the reborn Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union were likely aggressors, eager to take back the losses from the last year of World War I, and of course to expand their influence further, if possible. Finland re-oriented her foreign policy towards Scandinavia and a neutralist policy of Swedish type. The detailed plans for military cooperation were supplemented by intensified contacts between diplomats and politicians. Parliamentarism was re-introduced in Finland, and their Social Democrats under Väinö Tanner were rehabilitated and included in cabinet. Finland's embassy in Stockholm was deemed the most important, and Paasikivi became embassador there.

If central politicians and officials had been converted and convinced of the necessity of a closer Swedish–Finnish cooperation, parliamentarians and publicists did not change their anti-Swedish or anti-Finnish attitudes as easily. Impressions made (in both countries) in connection with Finland's independence, civil war, Åland crisis, language strife and Lapua Movement stuck, and were compounded by a tendency in Sweden to emphasize the danger of Nazi expansionism and viewing the Soviet Union with a great deal of good will; contrary to Finland's emphasis on the danger of Soviet expansionism and viewing the Nazis' "New Germany" with a great deal of good will.

Litvinov's demission as Soviet Foreign Minister in March 1939 signalized an increasing tension and danger for Finland, the Baltic countries and indirectly for Sweden. Litvinov was known as "west-friendly" while Molotov had made a more aggressive impression. It turned out that Litvinov's half promises, to accept and support joint Finnish–Swedish provisions for the defense of Åland against the German threat, were not reproduced by his successor. As a consequence, Soviet-leaning ministers in Sweden, as Ernst Wigforss and Östen Undén, proposed Sweden's withdrawal from these plans. A parliament majority agreed, eager to continue Sweden's since 1812 successful policy of non-confrontationism vis-à-vis Russia.

Winter War

In the face of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact and the following Soviet aggressions against Poland and the Baltic countries, Finland's situation seemed increasingly dangerous. On October 4th Finland's government asked if Sweden was prepared to contribute to Åland's defence with military means. On October 5th Molotov invited a Finnish delegation to Moscow. Sweden's parliament was informed on October 6th. On October 12th, it turned out that the political support was deemed insufficient in Sweden for a military engagement on Åland: the Conservative party was in favor, the Social Democrats were split. A majority of the Agrarians and all Liberals opposed. The opposition was strengthened by the obvious military preparedness for extending the engagement to Mainland Finland, which few parliamentarians would support.

Publicly, Finland was suported, but Finland's Foreign Minister Elias Erkko was informed that Swedish troops were not to be expected — but it remains controversial whether he delivered this message to his colleagues and his president.

The message perceived by the public opinion in Finland, as well as in Sweden, thus differed greatly from the Swedish government's intentions. After the outbreak of the Winter War, in Sweden this difference resulted in many tensions between public opinion and the government's actual policy. For two months Finland literally fought for her national survival, but in the end of January 1940, the Soviet Union gave up her plans for a conquest of the whole of Finland. It was now deemed sufficient if Finland ceeded her industrial heart with her second largest city (Viipuri) — in any case a much greater territory than the Red Army had been able to grab by own means. Through the so called Statsrådsdiktamen, Sweden's king helped the public perception of Sweden's intentions converge with the government's intentions.

See also

• Sweden during World War II
• Continuation War (1941-1944)