Operation Linebacker II

The Christmas Day Bombings in late December, 1972, codenamed Operation Linebacker II, were the heaviest bomber strikes of the Vietnam War, ordered by US President Nixon against North Vietnamese Army forces in North Vietnam and Laos.

Some 200 American B-52s armed with 750-pound unguided bombs launched airstrikes against Hanoi and Haiphong with devastating results. The North Vietnamese fired most, if not all, of their SAM missiles and 15 Air Force B-52s were shot down in the operation. Privately, the administration knew that the Christmas Bombings could not continue indefinitely.

The war was a legacy Nixon had inherited from his three immediate predecessors, Eisenhower, Kennedy, and Johnson. Nixon had previously tried to "end US involvement in Vietnam," but saw the government of South Vietnam as uninterested in peace and taking the US defense forces for granted. The escalated bombing attacks were to serve as a demonstration of the destructiveness of the war, in the hopes of forcing the South Vietnamese government back to peace talks with North Vietnam.

The bombings also were protested around the world, as people began to pressure their respective governments to officially condemn them. The United Kingdom and Italy did so, but other European countries maintained their silence. Some elements in the Western media were alleged to have misreported the extent of damage done in Hanoi and Haiphong; thus, contributing to the anti-war unrest.

Nixon claimed that the bombings were successful in the short term, and the Paris Peace Accords were signed on January 27, 1973, ending US involvement in Vietnam and completing the so-called "Vietnamization" of the war. Hanoi maintained that the bombings did not influence their peace decision. There are two different opinions about the real effect of the bombings on the government of North Vietnam:

• Some believe that the North Vietnamese were afraid of an even larger air campaign against North Vietnam's dikes or even the use of nuclear weapons.
• Others believe that China would have tolerated neither nuclear attacks nor American ground forces in North Vietnam without entering the war against the United States. Avoiding conflict with China was an important goal of the American government. Indeed, Nixon's nuclear threats were just posturing. He called it the madman theory, saying "I want the North Vietnamese to believe I've reached the point where I might do anything to stop the war."

The campaign was marked by top-down planning from Strategic Air Command (SAC) headquarters, Omaha, Nebraska. SAC's initial plans had all B-52s approaching Hanoi in three discrete waves per night, using identical approach paths at the same altitude. Once planes had dropped their bombs, they were to execute what SAC called "post-target turns" to the west. These turns had two unfortunate effects for the B-52s:

• The B-52s would be turning into a strong headwind, slowing their ground speed by 100 knots and prolonging their stay in the target area;

• The turn would point the emitter antennas for the B-52s' electronic warfare (EW) systems away from the radars they were attempting to jam, as well as showing the largest radar cross-section to the (now unjammed) radars.

Additionally, the aircraft employed had significantly different EW capabilities; the B-52G carried fewer jammers and put out significantly less power than the B-52Ds.

The combination of stereotyped tactics, degraded EW systems, and limited jamming capacity led to the loss of five aircraft on night three (20 December 1972). The commander of the B-52 wing at U-Tapao, Thailand sent a message to SAC headquarters that sharply criticized SAC's tactics and control of the operation. SAC turned planning over to 8th Air Force headquarters on Guam, then ensured that the U-Tapao commander was not mentioned in the official history of the operation.

On December 26, 1972, the new tactics came into play: instead of multiple waves, all bombers would be in and out of the Hanoi area within 20 minutes, and would approach Hanoi from multiple directions. The steep post-target turns were eliminated. The North Vietnamese air defense system, though still capable, was overwhelmed by the number of aircraft to track in a short period of time and a dense blanket of chaff that was laid down by 7th Air Force fighter-bombers.

The peace talks between North and South Vietnam would dissolve. The NVA secured South Vietnam in 1975, unifying Vietnam under communist rule.

Note: The term "Christmas Day Bombings" is misleading. Operation Linebacker II began on December 18 and ended on December 29, but sorties were only flown on 11 of these days; bombing was halted on Christmas.